Jérôme Segura

16 Followers
94 Following
199 Posts
Threat intel and web threats
@mithrandir @rmceoin really enjoy reading your posts. Nice writing style to keep it informative and fun to go through.

Completed Part 3 of my personal #SocGholish series.

The article digs into the follow-up payloads delivered once the Update.js is executed on a victim machine.

Interestingly, I saw #NetSupport RAT and an unknown (to me) PowerShell C2 beacon be delivered together.

If anyone can shed more light on what the PowerShell beacon may be, it would be much appreciated! Seems to be inspired by #AsyncRAT, though.

Big thanks to @rmceoin for help along the way.

https://rerednawyerg.github.io/posts/malwareanalysis/socgholish_part3

SocGholish Series - Part 3 :: Reverse Engineering and Analysis — Reverse Engineering and Analysis

This is a continuation of my personal series on SocGholish (or FakeUpdates). At the conclusion of “SocGholish Series - Part 2”, I had obtained the primary, first stage JavaScript payload, titled Updates.js. In this writeup, I will execute the payload and observe the response(s) from the C2 server.

Malvertisers targeting "AI image generation" keywords 🤖​🎨​

1️⃣​ Search for "AI image generator"
2️⃣​ Ad for fake Meta messenger page
aisystemit[.]online
3️⃣ ​Download click & redirect involving iplogger[.]com
➡️​ .exe download from DropBox

Can anyone identify the family of malware being dropped here?

🔗 https://www.virustotal.com/gui/file/28eb7478cdf53820a76b8aac0d5f1755f5d4ee105b1a457f76f21312ae8d2389/content (file)
🔗​ https://www.virustotal.com/gui/url/9faac0ecbfcaa0ed9747043ec00147a7b22520a849b1932ee16c397fdfa117c2/details (URL)

#Malware, #CTI, #Malverting, #iocs

@rmceoin it looks like there is a wave of fraudulent ads recently and .shop domains.

So, this is interesting. On Tuesday I saw Facebook send a user to a fake Sam's Club site. Today the same user had Facebook send them to a fake Wayfair site.

If you shop and pick out something it runs you through a realistic billing page that leads to a Stripe page that'll send the money to some "DATUSSON SUPPLY LLC" who has a really handy phone number of 201-555-0123.

chairs-room[.]shop
howed[.]shop

Malvertisers rickrolling security researchers...

softwareinteractivo[.]com
winsccp[.]com
protemaq[.]com/wp-content/update/iso/6[.]1/tusto/WinSCP-6[.]1-Setup[.]iso

https://www.virustotal.com/gui/file/2eb2ef7a562145a0faf3c82f439221908adfcc784022a64e5bb17a432f4a8a91

VirusTotal

VirusTotal

VirusTotal

VirusTotal

Some next level cloaking from this malvertising group.

Payload is RedLine Stealer:
cdn[.]discordapp[.]com/attachments/1067816024541507666/1116463363891933204/AnyDesk.zip

#Malvertising targeting Cisco AnyConnect dropping Python Meterpreter payload.

mypondsoftware[.]com/cisco/anyconnect/file.php
trafcon[.]co/wp-content/plug/des/sus/cisco/anyconnect/cisco-anyconnect-4.iso

C2: 141.98.6[.]95

https://www.virustotal.com/gui/file/9c57a2a27b6fcea5bcf1eda791ccdaa0eb3fdbf93781b37283d956332f4d2ceb?nocache=1

VirusTotal

VirusTotal

The #SocGholish TDS first stage has a different set of checks since the last time I reversed it.

It no longer checks if the window is closed or if userAgent contains Windows. But there are two new interesting checks.

It now checks for automation, like Selenium, and browser debug mode. In both cases it lets the TDS know that it matched those conditions, so they know somebody is poking at them.

Also, when I first analyzed this stage on May 21st it was only minified. This time it was obfuscated.