Jérôme Segura

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94 Following
199 Posts
Threat intel and web threats

Completed Part 3 of my personal #SocGholish series.

The article digs into the follow-up payloads delivered once the Update.js is executed on a victim machine.

Interestingly, I saw #NetSupport RAT and an unknown (to me) PowerShell C2 beacon be delivered together.

If anyone can shed more light on what the PowerShell beacon may be, it would be much appreciated! Seems to be inspired by #AsyncRAT, though.

Big thanks to @rmceoin for help along the way.

https://rerednawyerg.github.io/posts/malwareanalysis/socgholish_part3

SocGholish Series - Part 3 :: Reverse Engineering and Analysis — Reverse Engineering and Analysis

This is a continuation of my personal series on SocGholish (or FakeUpdates). At the conclusion of “SocGholish Series - Part 2”, I had obtained the primary, first stage JavaScript payload, titled Updates.js. In this writeup, I will execute the payload and observe the response(s) from the C2 server.

Malvertisers targeting "AI image generation" keywords 🤖​🎨​

1️⃣​ Search for "AI image generator"
2️⃣​ Ad for fake Meta messenger page
aisystemit[.]online
3️⃣ ​Download click & redirect involving iplogger[.]com
➡️​ .exe download from DropBox

Can anyone identify the family of malware being dropped here?

🔗 https://www.virustotal.com/gui/file/28eb7478cdf53820a76b8aac0d5f1755f5d4ee105b1a457f76f21312ae8d2389/content (file)
🔗​ https://www.virustotal.com/gui/url/9faac0ecbfcaa0ed9747043ec00147a7b22520a849b1932ee16c397fdfa117c2/details (URL)

#Malware, #CTI, #Malverting, #iocs

So, this is interesting. On Tuesday I saw Facebook send a user to a fake Sam's Club site. Today the same user had Facebook send them to a fake Wayfair site.

If you shop and pick out something it runs you through a realistic billing page that leads to a Stripe page that'll send the money to some "DATUSSON SUPPLY LLC" who has a really handy phone number of 201-555-0123.

chairs-room[.]shop
howed[.]shop

Malvertisers rickrolling security researchers...

softwareinteractivo[.]com
winsccp[.]com
protemaq[.]com/wp-content/update/iso/6[.]1/tusto/WinSCP-6[.]1-Setup[.]iso

https://www.virustotal.com/gui/file/2eb2ef7a562145a0faf3c82f439221908adfcc784022a64e5bb17a432f4a8a91

VirusTotal

VirusTotal

VirusTotal

VirusTotal

Some next level cloaking from this malvertising group.

Payload is RedLine Stealer:
cdn[.]discordapp[.]com/attachments/1067816024541507666/1116463363891933204/AnyDesk.zip

#Malvertising targeting Cisco AnyConnect dropping Python Meterpreter payload.

mypondsoftware[.]com/cisco/anyconnect/file.php
trafcon[.]co/wp-content/plug/des/sus/cisco/anyconnect/cisco-anyconnect-4.iso

C2: 141.98.6[.]95

https://www.virustotal.com/gui/file/9c57a2a27b6fcea5bcf1eda791ccdaa0eb3fdbf93781b37283d956332f4d2ceb?nocache=1

VirusTotal

VirusTotal

The #SocGholish TDS first stage has a different set of checks since the last time I reversed it.

It no longer checks if the window is closed or if userAgent contains Windows. But there are two new interesting checks.

It now checks for automation, like Selenium, and browser debug mode. In both cases it lets the TDS know that it matched those conditions, so they know somebody is poking at them.

Also, when I first analyzed this stage on May 21st it was only minified. This time it was obfuscated.

So the #KeitaroTDS offers up at least two paths. One is #SocGholish that I've been tracking and the other is some notification malware that I've seen before but didn't realize they're connected.

When I go to an infected site, I only get served SocGholish. But I see when urlscan goes to it, they get this other scam. What's handy is I can go directly to the KeitaroTDS URLs associated with those scams and see that other path.

backendjs[.]org/kb3xCR3d
cancelledfirestarter[.]org/Qw6YdVL
dailytickyclock[.]org/H9nZW3yw
deeptrickday[.]org/xTHcrXYN
devqeury[.]org/XdQJSbwV
devqeury[.]org/VjCTRDTQ
jqscr[.]com/GPfymwFy
jqscr[.]com/MFkkBGCh
jqueryns[.]com/jbMbKDPn
jsqur[.]com/97rmMy8V

Anybody have a name for this notification scam?

While poking at the #KeitaroTDS used by #SocGholish I noticed a different path. Using torsocks in the hopes of getting different responses, this known #KeitaroTDS URL

dailytickyclock[.]org/Rz7kFbxJ

would return a redirect I haven't noticed.

dailytickyclock[.]org/H9nZW3yw

That in turn was redirecting to here.

greatbonushere[.]life/?u=4dkpaew&o=81yk607&cid=vi0n933mcrfi

That led to a couple of scams. Mostly I got a fake iPhone prize scam that tries to dup you into providing your address and CC info.

Pivoting off the IP for the domain out popped 78 more domains. Block them nasties! 🚫​

https://gist.github.com/rmceoin/9e3fb77686a660374409df467d9711ca

scam domains on 185.155.184.98

scam domains on 185.155.184.98. GitHub Gist: instantly share code, notes, and snippets.

Gist