| Blog | https://www.oblomovka.com/ |
| Homepage | http://www.spesh.com/danny/ |
| ENS | dannyob.eth |
| Work | https://fil.org/ |
I am old fashioned in that I genuinely like client applications, which is why I tried 18 #Mastodon apps on Android, iOS, macOS, and Windows. These were the best ones.
ECtHR decides French councillor is liable for others’ comments on his social media posts
"ARTICLE 19 is concerned that making some users of social media liable for third-party content – namely comments – under their social media posts will have a significant chilling effect on the right to freedom of expression."
"ARTICLE 19 is concerned that making some users of social media liable for third-party content – namely comments – under their social media posts will have a significant chilling effect on the right to freedom of expression."
i am pretty interested in the matching between "vibes" and also corners of the n-dimensional political compass to various basic decentralized social media protocols!
i wonder if it all gets washed out as the networks grow or there are longer-lasting founder effects?
The (very early stage) draft of Merkle Tree Certificates is worth a read if you haven't already: https://www.ietf.org/id/draft-davidben-tls-merkle-tree-certs-00.html
The idea is to store domain name<->public key bindings in a Merkle tree, mirrored by browser vendors or other designated entities to clients and other interested parties. TLS servers are authenticated via a proof of membership in one of these Merkle trees, instead of via a bunch of signatures in an X.509 certificate chain -- which are huge in a postquantum world. This new form of authentication only works for certain types of clients and certain types of situations, so the whole thing falls back to traditional X.509 certificate chains otherwise. You can think of it as a PKI designed from scratch, with CAs and CT smooshed into one system, as an optimization layer on top of today's web PKI.
The main motivation is postquantum cryptography; PQ signatures are huge and this scheme allows a client to verify a domain name <-> public key association with 0 signatures. The Merkle tree proof is no bigger in a PQ world. There are lots of other interesting properties that MTCs lets us explore too, like being able to negotiate trust anchors -- that is, a client can signal which CAs it supports and the server can authenticate itself in a way that works with those supported CAs. In contrast today a server has to configure a single certificate to work with all clients it wants to support. This part isn't fully fleshed out yet but it's exciting. It's a great time to give feedback on the draft.
All credit to my colleagues David Benjamin and Devon O'Brien!
This document describes Merkle Tree certificates, a new certificate type for use with TLS. A relying party that regularly fetches information from a transparency service can use this certificate type as a size optimization over more conventional mechanisms with post-quantum signatures. Merkle Tree certificates integrate the roles of X.509 and Certificate Transparency, achieving comparable security properties with a smaller message size, at the cost of more limited applicability.
California Court of appeal has held that geofence warrants are unconstitutional
For those who don't know, a Geofence warrant, instead of targeting an individual or location like a traditional warrant, forces a carrier such as google or T-Mobile or some other entity to turn over data from ALL users/devices in a given radius.
The California Court of Appeal has held that a geofence warrant seeking information on all devices located within several densely-populated areas in Los Angeles violated the Fourth Amendment. This is the first time an appellate court in the United States has reviewed a geofence warrant. The case is...
Max "Buzzworthy" Eddy
IFEX
Nathan Olsen
Emily Stark
James House-Lantto (He/Him)