In today's episode of "Can It Run Doom": DNS fucking TXT records.

Some absolute madlad (cough Adam Rice cough) compressed the entire shareware DOOM WAD, split it into around 1,964 chunks, shoved them into Cloudflare TXT records, and wrote a PowerShell script that reassembles and runs the whole goddamn game from DNS queries alone. Nothing touches disk. The DLLs are in DNS. THE FUCKING DLLS ARE IN DNS.

RFC 1035 was written in 1987. Those engineers are spinning in their graves fast enough to generate municipal power.

Bonus: this is a fully functional globally-distributed covert data exfil channel that your NGFW will never fucking see if you're not doing deep DNS inspection. Sleep well.

blog: https://blog.rice.is/post/doom-over-dns/

repo: https://github.com/resumex/doom-over-dns

Also lmao @ every blue team that has never once looked at their DNS query volume. How's that DLP policy working out for you.

It was always DNS.

#infosec #dns #doom #itisalwaysdns

@k3ym0 "good luck if you're not doing deep DNS inspection"

iodine, dnscat, and literally every other DNS tunneling technique that has existed in the past 20-ish years: lol. lmao, even.

Still, quite impressive, but saying this shit is a hard to detect covert channel is unmitigated bullshit.

@da_667 iodine and dnscat also have 20 years of signatures, known patterns, and detection logic baked into tooling. This doesn't.

But honestly that's beside the point. "Detectable" and "detected" are two very different sentences. iodine has been detectable for 20 years and I've watched it walk right out of enterprise networks that had no idea. Known technique != mature detection coverage in the median org.

SMB's are running Server 2008r2 with a Watchguard FW and a prayer. Mid-market is logging DNS at the firewall level and calling it done.

"Detectable in theory by a mature SOC" and "hard to detect in most real environments" are not mutually exclusive statements.

@k3ym0 @da_667

Yeah, I tend to agree with this take. Reliably catching techniques like DNS tunneling, DGA, etc., looks trivial until you try it on noisy real world networks with all sorts of idiosyncratic constraints, and also when you realize that what we consider "trivial" is often considered "impractical" or "impossible" for most real world orgs.

@DaveMWilburn @k3ym0 I'm well aware that trying to base your detection on shannon entropy is an exercise in futility, as most cloud providers have the "malware to ops DGA that looks like its very malicious" down pat. But I will still say, if you suddenly are getting assloads of TXT records with the same domain in common, so long as you have DNS logs at all, you can probably do some form of statistical analysis and notice that this number of DNS TXT records from one place looks really fucking jank.
@da_667 @DaveMWilburn @k3ym0 .oO( ip6.arpa PTR )