We are aware of recent reports regarding targeted phishing attacks that have resulted in account takeovers of some Signal users, including government officials and journalists. We take this very seriously.

To be clear: Signal’s encryption and infrastructure have not been compromised and remain robust. These attacks were executed via sophisticated phishing campaigns, designed to trick users into sharing information – SMS codes and/or Signal PIN – to gain access to users’ accounts.

These attacks, like all phishing, rely on social engineering. Attackers impersonate trusted contacts or services (such as the non-existent “Signal Support Bot”) to trick victims into handing over their login credentials or other information. To help prevent this, remember that your Signal SMS verification code is only ever needed when you are first signing up for the Signal app.

To protect people from such phishing, Signal actively warns users against sharing their SMS code and PIN.

We also want to emphasize that Signal Support will *never* initiate contact via in-app messages, SMS, or social media to ask for your verification code or PIN. If anyone asks for any Signal related code, it is a scam. We make this clear when users receive their SMS code during initial signup.

While we build robust technical safeguards, user vigilance is ultimately the best defense against phishing. We will continue to work on mitigating these risks via interface design and signposting throughout the app. In the meantime, please stay alert, and never share your SMS verification code or Signal PIN with anyone.

https://support.signal.org/hc/en-us/articles/9932566320410-Staying-Safe-from-Phishing-Scams-and-Impersonation

Staying Safe from Phishing, Scams, and Impersonation

We provide a privacy-first, end-to-end encrypted (E2EE) messaging and calling platform designed so only you and your intended recipients can communicate securely. Even with strong encryption, attac...

Signal Support
@signalapp recipients who are not native English speakers may not notice the giveaways in this and similar scams.

@ExcelAnalytics @signalapp

Thank you for pointing this out

@ExcelAnalytics for context: this is a big scandal in the German parliament as well. In a somewhat bitter irony, it seems to have impacted many politicians that are trying to put a sledgehammer to signals security by forcing it to break end to end encryption.
@signalapp It would probably help if Signal itself didn't use what looks like a real conversation or story to communicate to the user. It legitimizes phishing attacks like these. And they're annoying features regardless.

@DLink @signalapp this right here.

> We also want to emphasize that Signal Support will *never* initiate contact via in-app messages,

Where is that bold *never* with the "in-app news"?

This is where *you* teach the Average Joe that there may in fact be in-app messages *by you*. Messages nobody actively asked for.

@signalapp implementing authentication using more secure methods (passkeys, physical security keys) could eliminate that risk.

@signalapp as careful as this message is, I think it could be improved. If someone goes to a web page and get phished by being asked to type it into the page, the message will not dter them because it's not someone "asking for the code".

I think the message should say something about where it's intended to be used.

@signalapp you dum dum you just publicly shared it

@FQQD @signalapp

😂

"in a stunning development today, a random mastodon user showed they were able to take over Signal's Signal account. details of the hack remain unclear"

@signalapp

Hmmm, and what about the monthly reminder to enter the personal smartphone code? How to differentiate this from the other?

@unaegeli @signalapp My guess: the reminder is a pop-up dialog. It's not a signal message, email, or text.

I, too, would like to hear Signal's answer to this question.

@joelvanderwerf @unaegeli @signalapp Yes, it is. And it still trains the wrong response, I think. Users _will_ repeat the thing that made the dialog box go away last time. Even if that last time was a different app.

@unaegeli @signalapp I was just thinking of this.

It sounds like Signal is fairly unique in this setup. We're constantly being bombarded with verification requests, and it can be easy to forget one app works differently.

@solitha
I mean it's hard for some non technical users to make them understand what is the "trusted context" and what is not I suppose?

I mean we had that with mail for years, people should know to check the senders mail, yet still Phishing attacks are often successful.
@unaegeli @signalapp

@PupWrafie Even a legitimate sender's email is not enough. Wasn't all that long ago that someone managed to send out emails *from* company addresses via a third-party vulnerability.

Scammers will always find a way. It's up to the company to take all reasonable steps to alert customers.

@unaegeli @signalapp

@unaegeli @signalapp One is an in-app prompt. The other is a message, text or email. They don't look anything alike.
@distrowatch @unaegeli @signalapp
It's a prompt on the phone.
They "are the same".
People don't make the difference.
@gunstick @unaegeli @signalapp Messages that come in are not a prompt and don't look or act like any popup or prompt.
@distrowatch @unaegeli @signalapp now explain that to a non technical user. Good luck with that.
@gunstick @unaegeli @signalapp I know lots of non-technical users who run Signal. None of them have trouble with this.

@distrowatch

Yesyes, you always know better.

Mr. Siebengescheit...

@gunstick @signalapp

@unaegeli
-That's a different code
-It's very clearly a popup, and not in a chat
-To abuse it, one would already need access to the account, i.e. through having completed the other attack

I feel like that reminder is distinct enough as it is
@signalapp

@kainisenni
I think that @unaegeli has a very strong argument. Although different, those reminders condition you to regularly enter a PIN or password. If it happens twice in a row, first the SMS and then your PIN, it's possible to take over an account, especially if you are very busy with something, absent-minded and having a 'blonde' moment.

How can anyone be dumb enough not to remember/write down their PIN, to need reminders??

@signalapp

@unaegeli @signalapp
Those reminders can be ignored.

@signalapp

You should add the ability to sign up with email. I'm not sure that Russian users can log in with a code from SMS.

@izby @signalapp Email registration would turn Signal into a spam and bot cesspool like Twitter, Facebook, Instagram etc.

@Avitus @signalapp

OK. What about WhatsApp or Telegram?

@izby @signalapp I don't really care what happens to them since I rarely use them. It would be better for everyone if the 3B people on WhatsApp and billion on Telegram also used Signal, but that's not currently the case.

WhatsApp has been Zucked since 2016. Constantly screaming about how private and secure it is while not being open-source means it's probably not secure or private, and even more so when it's a Facebook product.

Everything you do on Telegram is stored in plaintext by default on Telegram's servers, it has a long history of sketchy security, was created by a Russian billionaire, and has been banned, unbanned, and could be banned again in Russia. There was a report in October last year that Telegram is very likely an FSB Honeypot: https://rys.io/en/179.html#:~:text=The%20assumption%20seems%20to%20have%20always%20been,this%20is%20much%20less%20of%20a%20consideration.

I have WhatsApp and Telegram, but I don't do much on either but lurk in sports channels.

This is why I stick to Signal for all my communication. They don't have data to hand over because they don't collect it: https://signal.org/bigbrother/

Telegram is indistinguishable from an FSB honeypot

Many people who focus on information security, including myself, have long considered Telegram suspicious and untrustworthy. Now, based on findings published by the investigative journalism outlet ISt

Songs on the Security of Networks

@Avitus

What are you talking about and which of my arguments are you trying to argue with?

My position: registration by phone number is too dangerous and is not available in some regions where Signal is really needed.

Your position: registration by phone number saves you from tons of spam.

So I asked the question: did registering by phone number save you from spam on WhatsApp and TG?

What matters is how my counterargument influences your counterargument. That's how discussion works.

@izby Your pedantry is unwarranted and unappreciated, so I'm exiting this exchange after my next comment:

There was no way to know wtf you were even asking, so I responded as best I could. I've never had spam on Telegram, nor on WhatsApp. Have a good day.