We're happy to announce a long-term partnership with Motorola. We're collaborating on future devices meeting our privacy and security standards with official GrapheneOS support.
https://motorolanews.com/motorola-three-new-b2b-solutions-at-mwc-2026/
We're happy to announce a long-term partnership with Motorola. We're collaborating on future devices meeting our privacy and security standards with official GrapheneOS support.
https://motorolanews.com/motorola-three-new-b2b-solutions-at-mwc-2026/
@navi @lumi Where's the application sandboxing, memory safe languages, modern exploit protections, deep integration of powerful hardware-based security features and everything else we focus on in GrapheneOS?
Aside from any of that, the concept that the Android Open Source Project isn't a Linux distribution is wrong. Linux isn't the userspace software that's largely portable to other operating systems. There was a Debian variant using the FreeBSD kernel which is clearly not Linux.
@GrapheneOS @navi @lumi That doesn't take away from what navi said. Either way. What of the concern that AOSP might not be open anymore at some point? The whole ecosystem is being closed down. I think that's definitely a genuine concern. What's your plan when that happens, if you can disclose? Will you maintain a fork of AOSP with Motorola, or by yourselves? That's kind of what I would like to know so I can feel reassured that there's a future for the platform even if Google further alters the deal.
Edit: This comment was followed up by the type of activity we've all come to expect from whoever seems to run GrapheneOS' social media, but they since deleted their side of it and blocked me... :') I summed it up here:
@GrapheneOS @navi @lumi let me disagree here. Android is fork of Linux.
Fork with huge change-set - hard to review.
With drivers written to "get to market fast", not quality.
With other closed drivers in userspace to avoid open sourcing.
Naaaah, this ain't Linux I'm running on my laptop.
I won't argue — security features of AOSP may be superior. But what runs beneath these features isn't!
> let me disagree here
Okay, but you're objectively wrong.
> Android is fork of Linux.
No, Android isn't a fork of Linux. Android works fine with mainline, stable and longterm Linux kernels from kernel.org. It doesn't have any required downstream patch set.
> Fork with huge change-set - hard to review.
It's not a fork and has no required changes to the kernel.
> With drivers written to "get to market fast", not quality.
Hardware vendor drivers aren't Android.
> With other closed drivers in userspace to avoid open sourcing.
That's not part of Android and is in no way required to use it. Desktop Linux distributions ported to the same hardware nearly entirely relying on the same drivers regardless.
> I won't argue
You're just making objectively inaccurate claims to promote massively rolling back privacy and security by moving to legacy desktop software. Replacing vendor drivers has nothing to do with that whatsoever.
> No, Android isn't a fork of Linux. Android works fine with mainline, stable and longterm Linux kernels from kernel.org. It doesn't have any required downstream patch set.
Show me one vendor of phone shipping clean kernel. One.
Hardware vendor drivers are part of Linux I use, are you implying Android != Linux? 😉
@GrapheneOS @lumi @alexia The current default software stack for desktop Linux is kind of terrible and the lack of coherent threat model or proper ecosystem of sandboxed applications are major issues with desktop right now. What I am still questioning is whether it is even possible to make a proper competitor to ChromeOS (if we ignore the hardware insecurity of basically all PCs).
So example software choices:
systemd -> dinit or s6
sudo -> s6-sudo (setuidless)
glibc -> muslc
glibc malloc or jemalloc -> hardened_malloc, malloc-ng, or mimalloc-secure (which supports more CPU architectures)
bubblewrap (sandbox used by Flatpak) -> #syd (it's written in Rust, has many important exploit protections, and can even be the user login: https://gitlab.exherbo.org/sydbox/sydbox)
GNOME or KDE -> XFCE (when their new Rust Wayland native WM is finished)
gnutils -> *BSD or uutils
The issue of course with most of these alternatives is that they are separate projects and therefore dont have the same goals, methods, or threat models. Also most of these projects are written in C which does not help at all. Also there is of course the lack of a proper chain of trust from the hardware to loading the kernel and userspace.
It may just not be reasonably possible to provide a alternative without millions of dollars of funding and a decade of development. It would be nice for there to be an alternative to AOSP/ChromeOS or even MacOS for desktop computing which actually takes security seriously. It doesnt even need to have be completely on par when it comes to security, just do better than current Linux distros (not a very high bar).
What are your thoughts on what to do in case the day comes that Google kills AOSP?
@zyx @GrapheneOS @lumi @alexia Simpler and cleaner code bass. Much easier to audit. More POSIX compliant.
Uutils is cool, but is intentionally striving for feature parity with gnutils. This means the same feature scope as gnutils which is rather large. Rust code is a definite advantage though.
> systemd -> dinit or s6
Lots of these are giving up even more security features.
> hardened_malloc, malloc-ng, or mimalloc-secure
These aren't the same classes of allocators at all. Neither the musl malloc or mimalloc is a hardened allocator. mimalloc is performance focused and musl's is focused on low memory usage.
> What are your thoughts on what to do in case the day comes that Google kills AOSP?
What about when IBM decides to kill systemd, GCC and GNOME?
1. What security features? I understand these init and service managers lack service sandboxing, but that is what sydbox can provide. systemd is do massive that it isnt reasonable for a small team to audit it (alongside all the other OS components) when considering whether to depend on it for critical systems. Lacking features are better than architectural problems because it is easier to refactor and extend a small projects than do the same for a massive project. Every project starts somewhere, why choose a project based on what it provides now (eg systemd) instead of what we can make another do tomorrow?
2. These may not be hardened memory allocs when compared to GOS' hardened_malloc, but they are definite imptovements over the default memory allocs of most Linux distros. I only mentioned mimalloc because hardened_malloc does not support other archs than amd64 or arm64, which could be useful to someone. Do you know of other hardened memory allocators? I heard of ISO Alloc but idk if is actively developed.
3. This doesn't really answer my question. If you look at my original comment I don't even think that GNOME, systemd, or GCC should be even considered for a developing a secure desktop OS. These projects have decades of technical baggage and would be near impossible to repurpose. My question was what happens if Google kills AOSP, separate from any consideration about trying to use Linux as a base.
None of the projects I mentioned are in a place to be used for a secure OS. None of them use any of the Linux sandboxing or security features in their code to limit access or enforce least privilege. Simpler projects is much easier to extend than trying to detangle and debloat the likes of GNOME, systemd, or GCC. If these projects die there are hundreds to replace them. None take security that seriously, which is an architectural problem with basically all Linux software, but a rival for Android isn't going to just pop out and surprise us without a decade of development. My question also "Is it even possible without a multibillion dollar company to develop a secure OS on par with an Android OS?"
So my question again: what do we do if Google kills AOSP. They aren't right now, they might not ever, but they are malicious and for profit. They will make (more) bad choices that harm the health of their admittedly useful/important projects.
@GrapheneOS @King_of_Ooo @lumi @alexia
What about when IBM decides to kill systemd, GCC and GNOME?
systemd
Between GNU Shepherd, supervise-daemon and runit? 
GCC
You'll have to explain why/how IBM owns GCC. Fairly sure it's an actual FSF project.
GNOME?
RIP lol 
Other than the accessibility stuff most of it I don't care much about, and with the ensloppification going on & Red Hat apparently insisting on it, it might well die anyway.
What are your thoughts on what to do in case the day comes that Google kills AOSP?
This however has real chances of happening and already has a largely closed development process with no community.
Which means it doesn't even need a poison pill contributor agreement, all the necessary rights are probably already in Google's possession for malicious license changes.
Not to mention that the main useful part of Android, the drivers & their documentation, aren't even included anyway. Everything else could be replaced by something better with some work.
@GrapheneOS @King_of_Ooo @alexia @lumi You know, if you're just going to avoid the question you could simply not answer that post, like you did with my mobile modem isolation question.
The overwhelming majority of the BSD tooling that isn't systemd could be ported with a modest effort if systemd died. Note that I linked daemon supervisors earlier, because session managers and init systems are a lot easier to come by.
edit: Ah, my bad, I confused the subthread. You did ignore it and replied to the prior post.
@lispi314 @King_of_Ooo @alexia @lumi
> You know, if you're just going to avoid the question you could simply not answer that post, like you did with my mobile modem isolation question.
Don't know what you're talking about. You're one of hundreds of people.
> The overwhelming majority of the BSD tooling
It has little to do with the desktop software stack. That increasingly only has an incomplete port over to BSD with a growing amount of hacks. It would just roll it back even further.
@GrapheneOS @King_of_Ooo @alexia @lumi
You know, if you're just going to avoid the question you could simply not answer that post, like you did with my mobile modem isolation question.
Don't know what you're talking about. You're one of hundreds of people.
This would be the one (started here).
It has little to do with the desktop software stack. That increasingly only has an incomplete port over to BSD with a growing amount of hacks. It would just roll it back even further.
In conjunction with the daemon supervisors? Very little would be lost that cannot be recovered with some work.
It would be somewhat tedious but hardly catastrophic or deadly, unlike the loss of upsream AOSP for every AOSP derivative.
Or Mozilla upstream for all the downstream. Which with slop is looking increasingly likely to happen.

@GrapheneOS By the way, I'm still very interested in your input on this part.I would hope that such isolation is part of the GrapheneOS safety requirements.@greenpete @bobkmertz @joe9nf