Mathieu Gotteland

Hemedti travels to #Uganda, #Sudan ’s #RSF back on the diplomatic offensive

Despite losing Central Sudan in late 2024 and early 2025, the RSF are not on the backfoot in Sudan, militarily at least. They’ve taken control of the remaining #SAF strongholds throughout #Darfur and West #Kordofan, allied with SPLM-N Al-Hilu in South Kordofan, and launched a further offensive in Blue Nile from #SouthSudan and #Ethiopia. Other SAF positions in Kordofan remain under threat.

https://www.theeastafrican.co.ke/tea/news/east-africa/uganda-s-museveni-meets-sudan-rsf-warlord-hemedti-5366890

Feb 21 at 10:59amWeb
Show threadMathieu GottelandFeb 21

Diplomatically, it’s a different story altogether. The backlash against #UAE proxies throughout Northeast #Africa and reputational damage linked to #RSF atrocities have discouraged direct external engagement, except through other UAE proxies.

#Sudan

Show threadMathieu GottelandFeb 21

All the while, several countries have long felt the current #war is adverse to their core economic and strategic interests, and after the Central #Sudan scare (2024) have decided to back the #SAF captured state.

#Uganda is unlikely to recognize the #RSF Tasis parallel government. But engagement is enough to improve the RSF’s standing, and risk the SAF’s wrath on the host country (like happened in #Kenya last year).

Show threadMathieu GottelandFeb 21
#Uganda has coordinated with and massively supported #SSPDF while also deploying troops in the country since last year. This visit might therefore also signal alignment between two objective allies to the SSPDF governmental forces in #SouthSudan, while evidence is mounting of #SAF support to SPLA-IO, and that country is yet again plunging into its own civil #war.