It seems hard to estimate, but it feels like a number with way too many zeros after it.
@david_chisnall @sophieschmieg I don't believe there is any benefit of hardware offload for PQC.
PQC is only used for key agreement or signature, which is a very small part of a TLS flow. Encryption is still going to stay AES or Chacha.
I believe this was meant for the amount of (human) work required to prototype, collaborate, specify, certify and deploy.
To be honest, the most problematic portion at the moment is the lack of support for secure storage (HSMs, TPMs, yubikeys, ...) of PQC private keys. And this won't happen for a little while.
@sophieschmieg @david_chisnall I mainly work around code-signing use-cases. The larger signatures are definitely hard to retrofit in existing systems.
This is a major engineering cost for us.
@sophieschmieg @david_chisnall That and CPU vendors doing their own thing because why not.
Out of every solutions out there, they made an effort in picking the worst one.