FBI Couldn’t Get into WaPo Reporter’s iPhone Because It Had Lockdown Mode Enabled

Lockdown Mode is a sometimes overlooked feature of Apple devices that broadly make them harder to hack. A court record indicates the feature might be effective at stopping third parties unlocking someone's device. At least for now.

404 Media
In case someone doesn’t know, Android has this option as well.

The ‘lockdown’ option on android just disables biometric unlock, smart lock (staying unlocked when on-body or within a geo-fence), and notifications displayed on the lockscreen, until the device is next unlocked. This has to be explicitly enabled by selecting ‘lockdown’ from the power off screen at the time of locking the device (turning the screen off) every time you lock the device.

Apple’s implementation does quite a bit more; blocking incoming messages, links, and invites from unknown numbers, restricting potentially hazardous web browsing, and restricting wired connections.

Not a big Apple fan, but they did pretty good with this.

I use a PIN and disabled lock screen info. I don’t know of anything that keeps my phone from locking.

I already ignore anything from unknown numbers.

I’ll have to check what happens when I plug the phone into my computer while locked.

@miked
#PostOfTheWeek (season 3):
The FBI has been unable to access a Washington Post reporter’s seized iPhone because it was in Lockdown Mode, a sometimes overlooked feature that makes iPhones broadly more secure, according to recently filed court records.
@miked
The court record shows what devices and data the FBI was able to ultimately access, and which devices it could not, after raiding the home of the reporter, Hannah Natanson, in January as part of an investigation into leaks of classified information. It also provides rare insight into the apparent effectiveness of Lockdown Mode, or at least how effective it might be before the FBI may try other techniques to access the device.
this thread is android phones. I read what happened to the reporter’s iPhone

you can however install Private Lock from f-droid (or directly from github if that’s your jam), which does that stuff automatically when the phone gets shaked/dropped:
f-droid.org/en/…/com.wesaphzt.privatelock/

Still not as good but at least it’s automatic, and afaik in many jurisdictions cops can only force you to unlock it with biometrics, and absolute worst case it makes things slighly more annoying for them so they might give up.

Private Lock | F-Droid - Free and Open Source Android App Repository

Lock your phone from its movement force

TIL about “lockdown mode”

bitdefender.com/…/what-is-lockdown-mode-iphone-ma…

When you enable Lockdown Mode, Apple applies a strict set of rules that block or limit the riskiest paths attackers use to get in:

  • Messages: Most attachment types are blocked; link previews and some features are disabled.
  • Web browsing: Certain complex web technologies (like JIT compilation) are restricted – you can whitelist trusted sites if needed.
  • […]
Apple’s Lockdown Mode Explained: What It Does, Who Needs It, and How to Turn It On

Discover how Apple’s Lockdown Mode protects against spyware and zero-click attacks, who should enable it, and why it’s not for everyone.

Hot for Security
While obviously this is laudable, and better than not having such a mode, it still suffers from that same massive fatal flaw. Apple software is proudly closed source. If we can’t audit their software, in the end we’re just taking their word for it.
Well now you have the FBI’s word for it as well.
Though I have a feeling that they’d keep quiet about what they can’t break and loudly exclaim that something can’t be broken when they find a way to crack it.