GrapheneOS could break Pixel exclusivity in 2026 with major OEM deal
GrapheneOS could break Pixel exclusivity in 2026 with major OEM deal
There are several supported apps, such as Curve Pay, PayPal, and banking apps that have their own tap-to-pay implementation.
shkspr.mobi/…/contactless-payments-with-grapheneo…
grapheneos.social/@GrapheneOS/115295538501760765
You can also use the contactless payments supported tag when searching the GrapheneOS banking app compatibility list on GitHub. github.com/PrivSec-dev/…/issues?q=is%3Aissue+labe…

Google's monopolistic stranglehold on Android results in poor experience for power-users, and artificially restricts choice for those who have older phones. For example, Google Wallet is the de facto way to use NFC payments on Android. There's one problem though - it only works with Google's Android. If you have the temerity to install a 3rd party Android OS - like the hyper-secure GrapheneOS - …
Device hardware, firmware, and software are integrated to protect your most sensitive data from mobile threats. With Moto KeySafe, PINs, passwords, and cryptographic keys are isolated from other device data for an added layer of high-level security.
Yeah this sounds like what Graphene insists on.
That rate limiting can easily be bypassed by an attacker. In order to be effective, the rate limit needs to be enforced by tamper-resistant hardware, i.e. a secure element. Here are some of the requirements for a secure element: developer.android.com/…/keystore#StrongBoxKeyMint
An implementation of StrongBox KeyMint must contain the following:
Its own CPU
Secure storage
A true random-number generator
Additional mechanisms to resist package tampering and unauthorized sideloading of apps
A secure timer
A reboot notification pin (or equivalent), like general-purpose input/output (GPIO)
For details, I recommend reading:
Only devices with a proper implementation of a secure element (Titan M2, i.e. Pixel 6 or later, or the Apple SEP, i.e. iPhone 12 or later) are actually resistant to brute-force attacks by forensic data extraction tools, such as Cellebrite or GrayKey. GrapheneOS has obtained some internal documents from multiple forensics companies. They published the Cellebrite docs at …grapheneos.org/…/14344-cellebrite-premium-july-2…
Specifically, I recommend looking at this chart:
It clearly shows that data cannot be extracted from iPhones with the SEP, unless the device is in the AFU state, meaning that the encryption keys are kept in memory.
Those are the charts for Pixels:
@[email protected] @[email protected] @[email protected] Nearly all phones are either made in China or use a bunch of important components from there. iPhones and Pixels are made in China. It's unavoidable in practice and people would complain about a phone made in the US too.
The phone market is very saturated
I doubt it will have any effect
According to details shared on Reddit, the partnered manufacturer will offer GrapheneOS support on future versions of their existing models, priced similarly to Pixels. These initial devices will feature flagship Snapdragon processors, which GrapheneOS notes provide significantly better CPU and GPU performance compared to Google’s Tensor chips. The Snapdragon platform also bundles high-quality wireless connectivity, eSIM support, and decent image processing capabilities directly into the system-on-chip.
Oh thank you. Let’s hope for something nice for a change.
I’m skeptical. Even knowing how paranoid Daniel is about, well…everything.
Who remembers the last time a custom ROM got an OEM deal? It is the reason Lineage OS exists today…
You’re under-thinking it.
In pseudo-correct but probably not order:
There are industry blueprints for this. Apple is probably the best example of how to implement these shifts, from OS 9 (co-op MT proprietary OS)->OS X (BSD-NextStep-based Unix OS), 68k->PPC, Replacing Unix underpinnings with Apple Frameworks, PPC->Intel, OS X->iOS, Mac from Intel->ARM, etc. etc. They frequently used containerization to keep the old running while the new was built up around it and replaced. It is a solid proven design pattern.
And edit72: I’m not just saying “hey magic people do this” - I’ve done this shit. I’m down to help, and I will. But the project owners need to step up for some actual work instead of just putting potpourri on something someone else built. Annoying side-story, I figured out how to cross-compile/rebuild/fix dependencies on a CPAP app called Oscar so it would be ARM-native on ARM Macs. Couldn’t figure out how to contact the devs after much digging to let them know, so. I have 1 of 1 copy of that app running ARM-MacOS native. Would be neat to help them replicate it though.
manufacturer will offer GrapheneOS support on future versions of their existing models, priced similarly to Pixels.
Great, so I still won’t afford it…
TBH I would actually expect GrapheneOS not to disable these checks. GrapheneOS devs pride themselves to have the best implementation of the official Android security model, and enforcing signature checks is likely part of that…
They might add additional certificates I guess, to allow their own apps, and maybe a selected few others.
Well, good to know.
I was thinking more about the way of Android security models, and that it would make sense for GOS to restrict available storefronts to stay consistent with their way to implement them. But good to know that it will not automatically happen just by updating the google services.
And I would also think that people would likely complain if they where to implement it in a different way.