baatliwalaGrapheneOS could break Pixel exclusivity in 2026 with major OEM deal
Avid AmoebaThere aren’t too many OEMs that sell worldwide. So that would be one of Samsung, Sony, Moto, OnePlus.
Jo MiranI agree, Motorola is owned by Lenovo. They have found middling success with the return of their Razr line and with phones in the lower to mid tier range. But they really want something super flagship. Something like the Think Phone would have probably sold really well with a Graphene option.
Scott
Andromxda 🇺🇦🇵🇸🇹🇼There are several supported apps, such as Curve Pay, PayPal, and banking apps that have their own tap-to-pay implementation.
shkspr.mobi/…/contactless-payments-with-grapheneo…
grapheneos.social/@GrapheneOS/115295538501760765
You can also use the contactless payments supported tag when searching the GrapheneOS banking app compatibility list on GitHub. github.com/PrivSec-dev/…/issues?q=is%3Aissue+labe…
Contactless Payments with GrapheneOS
Google's monopolistic stranglehold on Android results in poor experience for power-users, and artificially restricts choice for those who have older phones. For example, Google Wallet is the de facto way to use NFC payments on Android. There's one problem though - it only works with Google's Android. If you have the temerity to install a 3rd party Android OS - like the hyper-secure GrapheneOS - …
Device hardware, firmware, and software are integrated to protect your most sensitive data from mobile threats. With Moto KeySafe, PINs, passwords, and cryptographic keys are isolated from other device data for an added layer of high-level security.
Yeah this sounds like what Graphene insists on.
deafboyThat sounds like a fancy speak for a Trusted Platform Module. Isn’t some kind of TPM mandatory to obtain a google certification for a new device?
Yeah, a TPM or secure element. I don’t think it’s required.
It (unfortunately) isn’t required. Most current Android devices on the market have serious security issues (most notably, full disk encryption can easily be bypassed due to a lack of effective unlock attempt rate limiting) due to their lack of a secure element.
Are you sure there’s no rate limiting? My phone definitely does rate limit the on-boot disk decryption prompt. Do you mean there’s no rate limiting if someone detaches the NAND and brute-forces it off-device?
That rate limiting can easily be bypassed by an attacker. In order to be effective, the rate limit needs to be enforced by tamper-resistant hardware, i.e. a secure element. Here are some of the requirements for a secure element: developer.android.com/…/keystore#StrongBoxKeyMint
An implementation of StrongBox KeyMint must contain the following:
Its own CPU
Secure storage
A true random-number generator
Additional mechanisms to resist package tampering and unauthorized sideloading of apps
A secure timer
A reboot notification pin (or equivalent), like general-purpose input/output (GPIO)
For details, I recommend reading:
Only devices with a proper implementation of a secure element (Titan M2, i.e. Pixel 6 or later, or the Apple SEP, i.e. iPhone 12 or later) are actually resistant to brute-force attacks by forensic data extraction tools, such as Cellebrite or GrayKey. GrapheneOS has obtained some internal documents from multiple forensics companies. They published the Cellebrite docs at …grapheneos.org/…/14344-cellebrite-premium-july-2…
Specifically, I recommend looking at this chart:
It clearly shows that data cannot be extracted from iPhones with the SEP, unless the device is in the AFU state, meaning that the encryption keys are kept in memory.
Those are the charts for Pixels:
It (unfortunately) isn’t required. Most current Android devices on the market have serious security issues (most notably, full disk encryption can easily be bypassed due to a lack of effective unlock attempt rate limiting) due to their lack of a secure element.