πŸ“’πŸ“’πŸ“’ Urgent call for action against Chat Control!

The EU still wants to pass the infamous "Chat Control" law, that would mandate scanning of all private digital communications, including encrypted messages and photos. This threatens fundamental privacy rights and can transform EU into a digital Gulag. Currently only 3 countries oppose this law, while 15 member states support it and 9 remain indecisive.

This means, the balance can still be shifted! It is very important to influence at least those who are in doubt. For instance, you can contact a MEP (Member of the European Parliament) and demand to oppose to Chat Control.

There is a tool that automates the process of writing and sending such letters:

https://fightchatcontrol.eu/

Please check it out and send at least one letter!

#StopChatcontrol

Fight Chat Control - Protect Digital Privacy in the EU

Learn about the EU Chat Control proposal and contact your representatives to protect digital privacy and encryption.

@Xeniax Wouldn't this be complete counter to the EU's fundamental rights?

"Article 7

Respect for private and family life

Everyone has the right to respect for his or her private and family life, home and communications."
EUR-Lex - 12012P/TXT - EN - EUR-Lex

@Tengu well yeah but... Who cares? 😠😠
@Xeniax I was thinking that it would eventually be blocked or revoked, as it's fundamentally incompatible with the fundamental rights.
@Tengu well, up until now the situation looks scary. I think it's important to show up!
@Xeniax emails sent πŸ‘ very easy. Thanks for sharing!
@mikelgs thanks so much, you are amazing!!!
@Xeniax how many times is it this law is getting voted? Feels like it will be as many times necessary for it to pass. I don't even understand why the design hasn't been abandonned. Actually I do…it's just too attracting for governments. Very very depressing…
@Disreputable_Craftsman I don't really know. But I feel it's important to show up.
@Xeniax you're right. I'll send some mails too.

@Xeniax Thank you so much for your efforts. I'm not an EU citizen, so I may not be able to write directly to MEPs. But this battle doesn't just belong to Europe - it belongs to everyone around the world who's willing to defend privacy.

This isn't about politics, just my technical values :)

@Xeniax All attacks on #privacy are illicit and illegitimate per definition, and merely appealing at authorities is not gonna work.

Anything else is undue leniency in the face of #Cyberfacism!

@kkarhan @torproject What you suggest is a great tactics. Encrypt harder and by default! But contacting MEPs isn't contradictory and might actually work. Of course, I am skeptical about so-called representative democracy, but at this point we need to try all means...

@Xeniax @torproject OFC these tactics ain't excluding each other!

  • Point is that "#EncryptHarder!" helps everyone and can be done by everyone, whereas MEPs can and do routinely ignore their constitutents' opinions!

Case in point: Don't rely on the enemy's mercy for survival or any #HumanRights or #CivilRights!

@Xeniax Is there also a tool to contact government officials or departments?
@eest9 I haven't heard of it. If you find something of that kind, please share
@Xeniax that makes it very easy. Might be worth including a link/revenue to Ross Andersons paper on the subject https://arxiv.org/abs/2210.08958
Chat Control or Child Protection?

Ian Levy and Crispin Robinson's position paper "Thoughts on child safety on commodity platforms" is to be welcomed for extending the scope of the debate about the extent to which child safety concerns justify legal limits to online privacy. Their paper's context is the laws proposed in both the UK and the EU to give the authorities the power to undermine end-to-end cryptography in online communications services, with a justification of preventing and detecting of child abuse and terrorist recruitment. Both jurisdictions plan to make it easier to get service firms to take down a range of illegal material from their servers; but they also propose to mandate client-side scanning - not just for known illegal images, but for text messages indicative of sexual grooming or terrorist recruitment. In this initial response, I raise technical issues about the capabilities of the technologies the authorities propose to mandate, and a deeper strategic issue: that we should view the child safety debate from the perspective of children at risk of violence, rather than from that of the security and intelligence agencies and the firms that sell surveillance software. The debate on terrorism similarly needs to be grounded in the context in which young people are radicalised. Both political violence and violence against children tend to be politicised and as a result are often poorly policed. Effective policing, particularly of crimes embedded in wicked social problems, must be locally led and involve multiple stakeholders; the idea of using 'artificial intelligence' to replace police officers, social workers and teachers is just the sort of magical thinking that leads to bad policy. The debate must also be conducted within the boundary conditions set by human rights and privacy law, and to be pragmatic must also consider reasonable police priorities.

arXiv.org
@waterfordham thanks a lot for this link. In Russia it all started with the law on "protecting children from harmful information" (2012, the official birth date of Russian internet censorship) and ended up with killing Ukrainian children every day (2022-ongoing)...
@Xeniax DUN!
@Xeniax Of course now I'm getting flooded with "We're closed for the summer, you noob" messages.
@Xeniax If its 12 against 15 then forget about it. The EU is going to pass that shit no matter how much we protest against it, as well as the age verification, so at this point the best one could do is to work around it or even weaponize it so that they realize they messed up (or jail us for being "bad people").

Either way they know already this isnt going to help children and everyone knows already this isnt about the children.
@Xeniax uuuggggghhhhh why are the phone numbers all belgian

might call them on holiday in ausland to have roaming tarification then

@Xeniax Note that chat control/spying would be totally useless against encrypted peer to peer chat without a server, and even less effective against direct device to device encrypted walkie-talkie apps.

Such apps would probably have to be distributed outside the app stores for legal reasons. Also they might not be able to live on the same devices as the proposed EU "digital wallet," though if that app is limited to devices with only Play Store apps uptake might be limited.

@LukefromDC I understand that technical solutions exist, that may mitigate some of the damages of Chat Control. But it means basically solving political problems with technical tools that risk to only be used by a minority...

@Xeniax I think being forced to use techical countermeasures in order to watch porn without uploading an ID will generate much broader use than might be expected.

Also those to whom policing is the greatest threat are the most motivated to use techical countermeasures.

@LukefromDC yes, I think you might be right. Though it would be great not to put people in such a situation where they have to learn this way

@Xeniax I believe in using layered defenses. Having technical countermeasures on hand means if we lose the political fight we don't have to choose between submission to totally unacceptable terms and armed resistance. We just fall back to the technical bypass.

There is no guarantee in any house of parliament nor on any battlefield. This is why I never rely on just one layer of defense. I do NOT want this shit passing (whether in the EU, UK, or with modifications in the US). I will always support political campaigns against it, but never bet everything on that campaign winning.