Signal is open source, so our code is regularly scrutinized in addition to regular formal audits. We also constantly monitor [email protected] for any new reports, and we act on them with quickness while also working to protect the people who rely on us from outside threats like phishing with warnings and safeguards.
This is why Signal remains the gold standard for private, secure communications. 5/
@signalapp I disagree because your platform is #proprietary, #SingleVendor, #SingleProvider and doesn't allow for #SelfHosting, #SelfCustody of all the Keys and you demand #PII in the form of a #PhoneNumber which can be used.to track users down!
@pixelcode neither are there reproduceable builds nor is #Signal's #backend opensoirce'd nor is it possible to #SelfHost.
@kkarhan @taylan You could have simply clicked on the link to find out that Signal have published the source code of all their apps and of their server, instead of making false claims out of thin air.
There's literally an entire manual on reproducing builds: https://github.com/signalapp/Signal-Android/blob/main/reproducible-builds%2FREADME.md
Also, nothing and no one stops you from self-hosting the Signal server.
@pixelcode @taylan that is simply not true.
@signalapp is #centralized and there's no way one can verify the code released for the servers is what they actually run.
Unlike your replies my criticisms ain't founded based off "#TrustMeBro!" but systemic issues I highlight which #Signal refuses to address or take seriously!
@[email protected] @[email protected] You could have simply clicked on the link to find out that Signal have published the source code of all their apps and of their server, instead of making false claims out of thin air. There's literally an entire manual on reproducing builds: https://github.com/signalapp/Signal-Android/blob/main/reproducible-builds%2FREADME.md Also, nothing and no one stops you from self-hosting the Signal server.
I did not claim Signal isn't centralised. I did not claim it's possible to verify which software runs on a foreign server.
Unlike you, I substantiated my statements by citing a source – namely a link pointing to Signal's collection of Git repos which contain the source code of their client & server software and a manual explaining how to reproduce Signal's builds, which you continue to ignore.
The one making claims without stating any sources at all are you.
@pixelcode @taylan @signalapp the #centralization, espechally without means to hide it's traffic via @torproject / #Tor makes it trivial to detect and track @signalapp / #Signal users.
And with no self-custody of keys it's trivial to #Room641A the users if the devs get "motivated" under threat of spending the rest of theor lives in jail.
thus subject to Cloud Act
They literally don't store anything about you, other than the phone number you used to sign up, and the timestamp of the last login. They can't fulfill any kind of subpoena, because they simply don't have the data. This was proven in court:
https://signal.org/bigbrother/cd-california-grand-jury/
I don't know what your mission is, any why you're constantly spreading misinformation about a secure communications platform, trying to discourage people from using it, without naming alternatives.
It's pretty suspicious at the very least.
@Andromxda @pixelcode How can you claim something you can't evidence?
It makes you look like one of those folks shilling #VPN|s that ain't logless after all...
At least they should be honest about things and not claim bs, cuz demanding a #PhoneNumber is just #KYC with extra steps like demanding any #SSN or other #PII. Makes them look like chinese MMORPGs that demand ID card numbers for account signups, thus #paywalling the ability to use their service anonymously...
@[email protected] @[email protected] > thus subject to Cloud Act They literally don't store anything about you, other than the phone number you used to sign up, and the timestamp of the last login. They can't fulfill any kind of subpoena, because they simply don't have the data. This was proven in court: https://signal.org/bigbrother/cd-california-grand-jury/ I don't know what your mission is, any why you're constantly spreading misinformation about a secure communications platform, trying to discourage people from using it, without naming alternatives. It's pretty suspicious at the very least.
How can you claim something you can't evidence?
I literally included a link to the evidence. Here's the link again: https://signal.org/bigbrother/cd-california-grand-jury/
Signal got a judicial subpoena from the Central District of California. They were represented by the ACLU, and they responded with the only bits of data they had: the Unix timestamp of account creation, and the timestamp of the last connection.
It seems like you are simply ignoring the evidence (on purpose).
demanding a PhoneNumber
All big messenger apps collect phone numbers, in order to prevent spam. Unlike WhatsApp or iMessage though (I mean technically you can find iMessage contacts by Email address, but no one does that), you don't have to share your phone number with contacts, in order for them to be able to message you. User names exist for this exact purpose: https://signal.org/blog/phone-number-privacy-usernames/
For every messenger there's the risk of someone finding out that you use that messenger (for example when you download the app without a proxy or when you rent a server for self-hosting). So what?
Nothing and no one stops you from voluntarily using Tor to connect to Signal (Orbot, InviZible, Advanced Privacy etc.). For those oppressed by authoritarian regimes, Signal offers easy-to-use censorship-circumvention proxy support built into the app.
https://support.signal.org/hc/en-us/articles/360056052052-Proxy-Support
Neither knowing your phone number nor the Cloud Act nor both in combination gives Signal the magical ability to “snoop” on your end-to-end encrypted chats or to circumvent Sealed Sender, if that's what you're trying to express with your PII argument. https://signal.org/blog/sealed-sender/
Long-term secret keys and session keys are generated and stored on the end-user's device and are never sent to the server. It's called end-to-end encryption for a reason. Wiretapping doesn't change that.
In addition to the end-to-end encryption that protects every Signal message, the Signal service is designed to minimize the data that is retained about Signal users. By design, it does not store a record of your contacts, social graph, conversation list, location, user avatar, user profile name, ...
@pixelcode @taylan Your nonchalant "So what?" gets people publicly murdered by the state in many juristictions...
If things were so easy as in "JuSt UsE sIgNaL!" then @signalapp would be shut down.
If you do think so then you should really get some professional help, cuz you seem rather lost...
It's #centralization is an absolute nightmare and mist be deemed as criminally neglectful!
@[email protected] @[email protected] For every messenger there's the risk of someone finding out that you use that messenger (for example when you download the app without a proxy or when you rent a server for self-hosting). So what? Nothing and no one stops you from voluntarily using Tor to connect to Signal (Orbot, InviZible, Advanced Privacy etc.). For those oppressed by authoritarian regimes, Signal offers easy-to-use censorship-circumvention proxy support built into the app. https://support.signal.org/hc/en-us/articles/360056052052-Proxy-Support
Signal
Kevin Karhan 
Pixelcode 🇺🇦
Andromxda 🇺🇦🇵🇸🇹🇼
