@anderspuck In a recent video you stated Putin would want to avoid using conscripts, as it would increase the chance of discontent among the Moscow / St P bourgeoise as their kids disappear, or come home with major injuries - or in zinc boxes. ISW seem to think they're only pulling small, irregular groups out of the main SE fronts to fight in Kursk. Putting that all together -- could it be Putin's tactic in Kursk is to allow the Ukrainians to over-extend their logistics or spread forces over too large an area to robustly defend?

I also wonder if the same factors that make Ru's incursion north of Kharkiv hard to dislodge will make the Kursk forces hard to dislodge.
[ /uninformed guesswork ]

Edit: ISW and others also speak of confused / unplanned Ru response, eg., with the FSB being given some responsibility but other orgs having C2 involvement. Occam's Razor implies slow & confused Ru response is less a deliberate tactic, than a consequence of incapacity to do otherwise (given Putin's style of governance.)

@anderspuck

Well, for a short special military operation this is taking terribly long… 😉

(and shows the incompetence of the Russian Army and the regime moreover painfully clear)

@anderspuck In my opinion the correct response for Russia would be slow systematic pressure on the invading forces while attempting to exploit weaknesses on other fronts as a lot of most experienced Ukraine forces are tied under Kursk.

It seems this is what Kremlin does.

@anderspuck

It wouldn't surprise me at all if russia would do the same to take back the occupied parts in the Kursk region as they have been and still are doing to advance into Ukraine: completely obliterate *) the territory at the pace of a snail, taking again huge losses.

Putin couldn't care less about what happens to the russian population outside Moscow and St. Petersburg.

*) and of course blame Ukraine