Hey it's totally cool that #Microsoft #GitHub blocked access to one of the repositories in the very center of the #xz backdoor saga.  

It's not like a bunch of people are scrambling to try and make sense of all this right now, or that specific commits got linked to directly from media and blogposts and the like.  

Cool, cool. 

#InfoSec #Backdoor

@rysiek So hang on, that means that code's in copilot.

But what does that even mean?

@onepict hahaha ooooh boy.

Wait, we could totally take a page from AI Hype Brigade's book and publish breathless pieces like:

All Copilot Co-generated Code Might Now Be Backdoored 🙀

Very tempting.

@onepict @rysiek someday some tween in central Europe will convince an online gaming customer service bot to disgorge a nation-state quality backdoor based on statistical analysis and some dice rolls?

@djsundog @onepict @rysiek Doesn't even need to be a bot, just find some lonely ex-military person and you can apparently easily fool them into giving state secrets

https://www.cbsnews.com/news/retired-army-officer-david-slater-sharing-ukraine-classified-information-dating-site/

Retired Army officer charged with sharing classified information about Ukraine on foreign dating site

"Beloved Dave, do NATO and Biden have a secret plan to help us," an unnamed person asked retired Army officer David Slater in one message.

@tanepiper @djsundog @rysiek

Doesn't surprise me, like the times when Ive had a random linkedin invite to connect and it's a total stranger and yes ex military.

@djsundog @onepict @rysiek the world’s gone stupid. I could see it.

@onepict @rysiek I thought that too - it’s not.

The exploit mechanism relied upon an unannounced binary being posted as part of the tarball that’s not supplied when you get the xz utility from GitHub.

The only aspects of the exploit chain reflected on the GitHub are the build script that, when it trips over certain conditions, causes the binary file in the tarball to be unpacked and injected into the build process, installing the actual backdoor at build time.

@onepict @rysiek To get the full exploit, it would have to extract the release tarballs, then extract a couple of random files in the test directory, then feed those into the LLM.

One of the key pieces of the exploit seems to be some intentionally botched checking for whether a certain type of sandboxing is available, so that might be affected.

@rysiek

Seems reasonable reasonable that they would block it. Sources can be made available to people looking into it, assuming they don't already have a local clone.

But leaving available to the public would allow copycats or other bad actors to study the code as well.

@eric that's bull, sorry.

First of all, it's available in hundreds of other places, the cat is way out of the bag here.

But secondly, for figuring out what had happened an *authoritative* source repository is crucial. That GitHub repository is the authoritative one for this project. That's why everybody's been linking to it in the first place.

Now these links are gone, and the situation is ripe for someone to create a faux copy maliciously and try to trick people into analyzing that instead.

@eric it should have been "preserved in glass" instead, so to speak. Switched to strictly read-only, but publicly available.

Microsoft GitHub is actively interfering with the ability of researchers to figure this one out, and with the ability of the broader FLOSS community to learn from this.

Of course, I would have expected nothing less of them.

@rysiek

"for figuring out what had happened an authoritative source repository is crucial. That GitHub repository is the authoritative one for this project"

This makes sense, but there are ways to make the source available to those investigating without making publicly available.

And if the repo required signed commits, wouldn't that still be preserved and auditable in clones of the repo?

I'm no fan of Github/Microsoft but you can't force someone to publicly host malicious code. If they had left it up, I'm sure there would be criticism for them still making it available.

@eric

> This makes sense, but there are ways to make the source available to those investigating without making publicly available.

Again, what's the problem with making it publicly available?

Why force researchers to jump through additional hoops in what is already a difficult situation?

Why add the complexity of explaining to readers, policymakers, the management that yes it's the same repo I did not make it up because commits are signed?

@rysiek

Idk. My initial thought when I saw the repo was taken down was, "That makes sense. They don't want to host malicious code." And I really wasn't expecting my comment to be that much of a hot take.

I would imagine Github has there own security/legal/policy teams that that are calling shots on this, so probably not as simple as turning access back on in ro mode.

I suppose that I'm still of the opinion that you can't force someone/company to publicly host content they don't want to, and they're not responsible for how other people link to there site. (To be clear again, I'm not a fan of Github. It's more just a general statement.)

But I'm not an infosec person, and none of my systems are affected, so I really don't have a horse in this race.

Besides, it's Saturday, it's nice out, the little one is with the grandparents, and I've committed myself to cleaning up the garage.

I'll just duck out of this one.

@eric fair enough. Have a good weekend and enjoy your time with your family. 
@[email protected] GoToSocial is hosted on github, and i am only saying that, because posts from your implementation don't translate well here on Hubzilla. In fact i can't even connect to you. Don't have this problem with other AP software.
As i am not using Github i can't file a bug report (or i don't want to, there ;) Just FYI.

@rysiek @eric There is a reliable archival copy at https://archive.softwareheritage.org/browse/origin/directory/?origin_url=https://github.com/tukaani-project/xz&snapshot=bcdaf33e1b3864c1c5f52dca8389a8f68d679e03

Still, the same sorts of concerns apply to the availability of meta discussion on GitHub for analysis. The release tarballs seem especially crucial, though I expect these also are archived e.g. by Debian.

Directory - 490e369/ - HEAD - origin: https://github.com/tukaani-project/xz – Software Heritage archive

@LiberalArtist @rysiek

"the same sorts of concerns apply to the availability of meta discussion on GitHub for analysis"

Yeah, comments on issues/PR would still need to be made available for those investigating, and that wouldn't be available in the git logs.

@LiberalArtist @rysiek @eric That doesn't help with existing links that are now broken by GitHub's actions. Besides that, the Software Heritage Archive has a lot of problems (e.g.: https://cohost.org/arborelia/post/5169338-the-software-heritag) that make it a bit suboptimal to rely on.
@rysiek it's almost like Microsoft has experience hiding evidence or something
@rysiek
It was a mistake for people to keep their repos on GitHub after MS bought it.