@HcInfosec @jeroen Yes, and every technical expert who has seriously studied online voting as come to the same conclusion about the risks, because there are fundamental problems and requirements that preclude building an Internet voting system sufficient for civil elections.
It's not that scientists don't think Internet voting would be nice. Just as physicists don't think perpetual motion machines wouldn't be terrific. It's just that they understand fundamental reasons we can't make them.
@HcInfosec @jeroen You want an Internet voting system? You have two choices. One is to relax some of the basic requirements and civil rights associated with voting (at least in the US), such as the secret ballot. The other option is to have elections where we can never be sure who actually won, and that are vulnerable to disruption by anyone connected to the Internet.
Neither option seems great.
@HcInfosec @ssylvan @mattblaze @jeroen
Typically you sign the outside of a sealed envelope. That is checked before it is opened and the unsigned ballot sent to be counted. If it's not opened mechanically (by a machine without a scanner!) then there will be observers to make sure people who see the signatures also don't stop to read ballots. They don't have time for that, anyway.
Election officials take their jobs seriously. Anything you think up off the top of your head will already be addressed by standards and best practices.
@HcInfosec
One advantage of polarized politics is that each side worries the other will cheat, so there are all kinds of controls, procedures, observers, and audits to prevent everything that anyone has ever thought up.
That's why the real battle is over who votes, not how. The "how" gets argued over because it makes voting easier for the wrong people or harder for the right people, and the arguers disagree on who those are.