@dalias @campuscodi That extension is designed to protect users from being deanonymized via ETags sent from malicious servers to their browser.
This attack is different
This is how I understand it, but I may be wrong:
- the adversary finds the onion server and notes down the ETag returned
_ the adversary uses something like shodan to find an exposed webserver which returns the same ETag
- same ETag = same content & same server
- so that IP is the IP of the onion
- now that we know the IP of the onion, we can do anything we could do to a clearnet server (send abuse reports, find where that server is, etc)
So this isn't deanonymizing the user, it is figuring out what server is hosting an onion domain (thus deanonymizing the server)
Hope this doesn't make this more confusing.
@iampytest1 @campuscodi I'm pretty sure this ETag bs bypasses firstparty-isolate to let cross-site embedded resources reidentify you from one site they're embedded on to another. 🤬
If so, that makes it a threat to Tor Browser users in that sense too.
The ETag (or entity tag) HTTP response header is an identifier for a specific version of a resource. It lets caches be more efficient and save bandwidth, as a web server does not need to resend a full response if the content was not changed. Additionally, etags help to prevent simultaneous updates of a resource from overwriting each other ("mid-air collisions").
@iampytest1 @dalias @campuscodi So basically this is the same old "don't expose #darknet servers to the #clearnet" thing?
I'd be wary of even reusing the same server across different #darknets, and spinning up a VM for each is cheap-enough to do with little-enough hassle there's really no good reason not to do it.