The problem with consciousness research is that we have Paleolithic emotions, medieval theories, and god-like technology (to paraphrase E.O. Wilson)

Let's use the data provided by this technology to develop new theories of consciousness. Our attempt:

https://psyarxiv.com/vkdt2

#consciousness #dendrites #thalamus #anesthesia

@jaanaru

I worry that the brain is some complex that there are too many. degrees of freedom in explaining consciousness. By this I mean sensory awareness, not what happens from sleep or anaesthesia to wakefulness. Hakwan Lau and Joe LeDoux's paper also explains the phenomenology.. What we need are theories that make testable predictions that other theories don't make.

@dickretired many thanks! As our theory stems from doing experiments on the nitty gritty details of neurobiology, it can and also will be tested at this level. Indeed, that's why we proposed it: we know the tools are there to check this ✅

@jaanaru

But what is critical is that it makes predictions that other theories cannot make. Remember that David Marr's theory of how the cerebellum worked made a major prediction about modifiable synapses on the Purkinje cells, and the evidence that this was true (found by Ito) was only discovered after David had died. And that was a simple prediction!

@dickretired agreed! If you will ever peek into our paper you can see that we make quite precise predictions about the role of specific parts of pyramidal cells, which can be targeted in experiments. No other theory of consciousness is currently at this level of testability. That's why our theory can also quickly be taken down, but I will be glad if this happens.

@jaanaru

It is, as you say, really important in science that it be possible to take down a theory/hypothesis quickly. That's how we make progress. But if the pyramidal cells are in prefrontal, it is possible that Hakwan Lau or Stan Dehaene might make a similar prediction. The difference is that they think prefrontal to be essential whereas you are suggesting a mechanism.

@jaanaru

It is usual to distinguish two issues, what happens when we are anaesthetized and how to account for subjective awareness (eg that I am seeing red). The former seems to me to be the simpler problem and certainly involves subcortical to cortical connections. It is not clear to me that the second problem can be explained in this way. Adrian Owen and others tackle the first problem and Hakwan Lau and Stan Dehaene the second. I think it the second problem that is really tricky.