MicroWorld Technologies confirms an update infrastructure access incident affecting a regional eScan server on Jan 20.

Unauthorized modification of an update component led to endpoint behavior changes, while core product code remained unaffected. Infrastructure was isolated, credentials rotated, and remediation updates issued.

What controls are most effective against update-path compromise?

Source: https://www.bleepingcomputer.com/news/security/escan-confirms-update-server-breached-to-push-malicious-update/

Follow @technadu for objective infosec coverage.

#SupplyChainSecurity #EndpointSecurity #ThreatAnalysis #UpdateIntegrity #InfosecCommunity

China isn’t decoupling. It’s weaponizing interdependence. Supply chains, standards, payments — all levers. Neutral business is over. Choose a bloc or get crushed. #China #GeoEconomics #supplychainsecurity
https://deeppressanalysis.com
Deep Press Analysis — January 29, 2026

Daily global press synthesis: Authoritarian fragility, China's economic warfare, US industrial policy shifts, bioethics gaps, and America's semiquincentennial risks.

Deep Press Analysis
Leanpub Book LAUNCH 🚀 Code, Chips and Control by Sal Kimmich #books #cybersecurity #ai #technology

YouTube

I’ve published a new post on how the @EclipseFdn is strengthening supply-chain security in the Open VSX Registry, and the steps we’re taking to improve verification, review, and long-term security:

https://blogs.eclipse.org/post/christopher-guindon/strengthening-supply-chain-security-open-vsx

#SupplyChainSecurity #OpenSource #DevTools

Strengthening supply-chain security in Open VSX

The Open VSX Registry is core infrastructure in the developer supply chain, delivering extensions developers download, install, and rely on every day. As the ecosystem grows, maintaining that trust matters more than ever. A quick note on terminology: Eclipse Open VSX is an open source project, and the Open VSX Registry is the hosted instance of that project, operated by the Eclipse Foundation. This post focuses primarily on security improvements being rolled out in the Open VSX Registry, while much of the underlying work is happening in the Open VSX project. Up to now, the Open VSX Registry has relied primarily on post-publication response and investigation. When a bad extension is reported, we investigate and remove it. While this approach remains relevant and necessary, it does not scale as publication volume increases and threat models evolve. To address this, we are taking a more proactive approach by adding security checks before extensions are published, rather than relying only on reports after the fact. Why pre-publish security checks matter Developer tooling ecosystems, including package registries and extension marketplaces, are a popular target, and we see the same types of issues repeatedly: Namespace impersonation designed to mislead users Secrets or credentials accidentally committed and published Malicious or misleading extensions Supply-chain attacks that spread quietly over time Relying only on after-the-fact detection leaves a growing window of exposure. Pre-publish checks help narrow that window by catching the most obvious issues earlier. Similar pre-publication and monitoring approaches are increasingly standard across large extension marketplaces as developer tooling ecosystems mature. How we’re approaching this work To move faster and add specialized expertise, we are working alongside security consultants from Yeeth Security. These experts are helping us design and implement a new verification framework, while keeping overall direction, decision-making, and long-term stewardship firmly within the Open VSX project and the Eclipse Foundation as operators of the Open VSX Registry. Most of this work is happening in the open. We are keeping a small set of security-sensitive details private to reduce the risk of abuse or circumvention. What we’re building Together, we’re introducing a new, extensible verification framework. Over time, it will enable Open VSX Registry to: Detect clear cases of extension name or namespace impersonation Flag accidentally published credentials or secrets Scan for known malicious patterns Quarantine suspicious uploads for review instead of publishing them immediately, with clear feedback provided to the publisher If you want to follow along, the work is tracked here: https://github.com/eclipse/openvsx/issues/1331 This framework is designed to grow with the ecosystem, so we can add new checks as threat models evolve. A measured rollout We’re approaching this effort with a focus on ecosystem health. The goal and intent is to raise the security floor, help publishers catch issues early, and keep the experience predictable and fair for good-faith publishers. Our current plan is to: Begin monitoring newly published extensions in February, without blocking publication Use this monitoring period to tune checks, reduce false positives, and improve feedback Move toward enforcement in March, once we’re confident the system behaves predictably and fairly This staged rollout gives us room to get it right before it impacts publication flows. What publishers and users should expect Publishers may start seeing new messages when potential issues are detected. In most cases, these are meant to be helpful nudges, not roadblocks. We also want to thank the thousands of extension publishers who already act responsibly and help make the Open VSX Registry a trusted resource for the broader developer community. The goal is to: Catch accidental mistakes early Make expectations clearer Reduce the likelihood that risky content reaches users Human review will remain part of the process, especially for edge cases. We will also continue to provide clear remediation guidance in our wikis and project documentation. For users, the outcome is straightforward. Pre-publish checks reduce the likelihood that obviously malicious or unsafe extensions make it into the ecosystem, which increases confidence in the Open VSX Registry as shared infrastructure. Security is ongoing work Security isn’t a one-and-done project. It evolves alongside the ecosystem it protects. We see this work as ongoing, and we’ll continue to share what we’re doing, why we’re doing it, and what we learn along the way. Looking ahead Strengthening supply-chain security is a shared responsibility. As the Open VSX Registry continues to grow, investing in proactive safeguards is essential to protecting both publishers and users. These changes are an important step forward, and part of a longer journey. We’ll keep iterating, learning from real-world use, and adapting as the ecosystem evolves. Community feedback plays a critical role in that process, and we encourage publishers and users to share their experiences as this work rolls out. We would also like to thank Alpha-Omega for supporting this work, and for their broader support of the Eclipse Foundation’s security initiatives. Our goal is simple: to keep the Open VSX Registry a resource developers can depend on with confidence. Growing with the ecosystem The security work outlined above is part of a broader effort to scale the Open VSX Registry responsibly as adoption continues to grow. That includes investing not just in tooling and processes, but in the people doing the work. We’re actively expanding the Open VSX team, including roles focused on security, platform engineering, and ecosystem stewardship. If you’re interested in helping build and protect critical open source infrastructure, you can find our current openings on the Eclipse Foundation careers page!

Eclipse Foundation Staff Blogs

Die NIS2-Richtlinie verschärft die Anforderungen an die Informationssicherheit deutlich – insbesondere auch in den Bereichen Zugriffskontrolle, Vorfallserkennung sowie Transparenz und Sicherheit der Lieferkette.
Seit Inkrafttreten des deutschen Umsetzungsgesetzes am 6. Dezember 2025 ist klar: Handlungsbedarf besteht jetzt.

Akamai beleuchtet in diesem Webinar das Thema praxisnah in zwei Teilen:

Teil 1 – NIS-2: Anforderungen & Einordnung
👉 Dr. Christoph Wegener gibt einen Überblick über die technischen Anforderungen der NIS-2 und zeigt typische Herausforderungen aus der Praxis auf.

Teil 2 – Technische Umsetzung
👉 Christian Krakau-Louis zeigt, wie sich NIS-2 mit modernen Zero-Trust- und Microsegmentation-Ansätzen umsetzen lässt.

📅 Jetzt informieren & anmelden:
https://cirosec.de/news/nis-2-und-supply-chain-sicherheit/

#NIS2 #CyberSecurity #SupplyChainSecurity #ZeroTrust #Microsegmentation #ITSecurity #Webinar

The EU Cyber Resilience Act changing game for software transparency. Say goodbye to voluntary best practices—mandatory SBOMs are becoming a legal condition for market access.
https://jpmellojr.blogspot.com/2026/01/new-regulations-are-elevating-software.html #SBOM #EUCRA #SupplyChainSecurity #CyberSecurity

An alleged ransomware incident involving Apple partner Luxshare highlights ongoing supply-chain exposure risks.

RansomHub claims access to internal engineering data, though details remain unverified and no confirmation has been issued by the company.

The case reinforces the importance of third-party risk management, incident verification, and measured public communication.

Follow TechNadu for factual, non-speculative cybersecurity reporting.

#Infosec #Ransomware #SupplyChainSecurity #ThirdPartyRisk #CyberSecurity #TechNadu

Black Kite’s TPRM 2026 report warns of escalating cyber risk in retail & wholesale supply chains.

Ransomware, exposed credentials, and vendor blind spots remain critical issues.

https://www.technadu.com/wholesale-and-retail-sector-faces-critical-supply-chain-risks-black-kite-tprm-2026-report-says/618831/

Thoughts on continuous vendor risk monitoring?

#InfoSec #TPRM #SupplyChainSecurity

Ingram Micro says a ransomware attack affected 42,000 people — scale amplifies impact when distributors are hit. Resilience in the channel is now critical. 📦🔒 #Ransomware #SupplyChainSecurity

https://www.bleepingcomputer.com/news/security/ingram-micro-says-ransomware-attack-affected-42-000-people/

Ingram Micro says ransomware attack affected 42,000 people

​Information technology giant Ingram Micro has revealed that a ransomware attack on its systems in July 2025 led to a data breach affecting over 42,000 individuals.

BleepingComputer

One of the most effective modern attacks does not target users directly. It targets the software supply chain. Build systems package managers and update servers have become high value targets because compromising them lets attackers reach thousands or millions of machines at once.

This is not theoretical. Real world incidents have shown malicious code injected into libraries long before users installed them, sometimes hiding for months. In response reproducible builds verifiable signatures and independent build verification are becoming critical defenses. Trust is no longer about where you downloaded software from, but whether anyone else can independently prove that the binary you run matches the source you expect.

Modern hacking is quieter and cleaner than it used to be. No exploits popping shells. No visible break in. Just altered code flowing through systems exactly as designed.

#Infosec #SupplyChainSecurity #ModernHacking #OpenSource #Trust