📢 Citizen Lab expose deux campagnes de surveillance télécom via SS7/Diameter et SIMjacker
📝 ## 🔍 Contexte

Publié le 23 avril 2026 par le Citizen Lab (Université de Toronto), ce rapport de rec...
📖 cyberveille : https://cyberveille.ch/posts/2026-04-24-citizen-lab-expose-deux-campagnes-de-surveillance-telecom-via-ss7-diameter-et-simjacker/
🌐 source : https://citizenlab.ca/research/uncovering-global-telecom-exploitation-by-covert-surveillance-actors/
#CSV #Diameter #Cyberveille

Citizen Lab expose deux campagnes de surveillance télécom via SS7/Diameter et SIMjacker

🔍 Contexte Publié le 23 avril 2026 par le Citizen Lab (Université de Toronto), ce rapport de recherche documente deux campagnes distinctes de surveillance télécom menées par des acteurs désignés STA1 et STA2, identifiés comme des vendeurs commerciaux de surveillance (CSV) opérant probablement pour le compte d’États. L’investigation a débuté fin 2024 suite à l’analyse de logs de pare-feu de signalisation mobile, en collaboration avec Cellusys, Telenor Linx, Roaming Audit et P1 Security.

CyberVeille

Surveillance vendors caught abusing access to telcos to track people’s phone locations, researchers say

The Citizen Lab found two separate surveillance vendors abusing the backbone of cellular networks to spy on several victims across the world.

#cybersecurity #diameter #israel #location-tracking #privacy #security #ss7 #surveillance
https://techcrunch.com/2026/04/23/surveillance-vendors-caught-abusing-access-to-telcos-to-track-peoples-phone-locations-researchers-say/

Interesting and comprehensive report about sophisticated telecom surveillance campaigns involving mobile operator signaling infrastructure https://citizenlab.ca/research/uncovering-global-telecom-exploitation-by-covert-surveillance-actors/ and identifying three gateways to surveillance (019Mobile, Airtel Jersey, Tango Networks UK) #3gpp #gsm #gsma #ss7 #diameter
The Citizen Lab Bad Connection: Uncovering Global Telecom Exploitation by Covert Surveillance Actors

Our investigation uncovers two sophisticated telecom surveillance campaigns and, for the first time, links real-world attack traffic to mobile operator signalling infrastructure. The findings expose how suspected commercial surveillance vendors (CSVs) exploit the global telecom interconnect ecosystem, leverage private operator networks, and conduct covert location tracking operations that can persist undetected for years.

The Citizen Lab

Huh, I just learned that apparently ϕ is shorthand for diameter?

Oh, wait. I get it. Because it looks like a circle.

Except this installation manual I was reading was using φ! That doesn't look like a diameter anymore.

Engineers, I have questions.

#phi #diameter #engineering

#diameter : a straight line which bisects a system of parallel chords drawn in a curve

- German: durchmesser

- Italian: diametro

- Portuguese: diâmetro

- Spanish: diámetro

------------

Thank you so much for being a member of our community!

#CanyonDiablo meteorite refers to the many fragments of the approximately 50 m (160 ft) #diameter[3] asteroid that created #MeteorCrater (also called Barringer Crater),[4] Arizona, United States. Meteorites have been found around the

#diameter : a straight line which bisects a system of parallel chords drawn in a curve

- German: durchmesser

- Italian: diametro

- Portuguese: diâmetro

- Spanish: diámetro

------------

Thank you so much for being a member of our community!

My Green Frankenrocket — will she fly straight and true? ❔🚀

#2025 #54mm #ameritech #balls #black #boys #desert #diameter

▶️ 1 new picture from Individuals (Flickr) https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:My_Green_Frankenrocket_%E2%80%94_will_she_fly_straight_and_true%3F_%2854810401689%29.jpg

File:My Green Frankenrocket — will she fly straight and true? (54810401689).jpg - Wikimedia Commons

📡 IMS and SIP: The Brains Behind Telecom Services — and Prime Targets for Attackers

Modern telecom systems rely heavily on IMS and SIP to deliver multimedia services across prepaid and postpaid platforms. But with great flexibility comes major exposure:

⚠️ SIP spoofing, session hijacking

⚠️ IMS DoS and third-party app vulnerabilities

⚠️ Weak authentication and interception risks

In our blog post, we break down:

🔍 How IMS and SIP actually work

🔍 Where the most critical vulnerabilities lie

🔍 How telcos can reinforce their infrastructure — both technically and operationally

🔗 Read the full article here:

💡 Want to go deeper? Our TS-250 training helps security teams and operators master IMS vulnerabilities: https://online-training.p1sec.com/course/ims

#TelecomSecurity #IMS #SIP #VoLTE #MobileNetworkSecurity #P1Security #VulnerabilityManagement #TS250 #Training #5G #Diameter #Smishing #SessionHijacking

IMS Security (TS-250)

Learn about modern telecom and mobile system and networks in the context of IMS and NGN core networks. The trainee will learn also about the core evolutions of the legacy telecom networks into IMS networks and the reuse of IETF-based protocols in the context of IMS along with its main benefits.

P1 Academy