Army of John Hunyadi and Matthias Corvinus

Recruitment and organization

John Hunyadi

Both Hunyadis utilized army which was a combination of mercenaries and feudal banderia (banners – Exercitus Banderialis). Occassionally the army would be supplemented by Exercitus Generalis – a general call to arms, which would basically mean everyone capable of bearing arms. This Exercitus Generalis may be the source of a media trope of feudal armies composed primarily of untrained, unequipped peasants – but in reality, such armies were an exception, not the rule. Exercitus Generalis itself was in existence since 14th century, but it was called for the last time in 1439. by king Albrecht. He gave up and dismissed people to their homes after two weeks. Primary way of recruiting troops was, since 1435., banderial system. Banderia – which could vary in strength from less than a hundred to more than a thousand men – were raised and maintained by the king, bishops and magnates. While this system theoretically allowed the kingdom to maintain large number of professional soldiers, in practice the owners of banderia were not motivated for war until they themselves were in danger. Banderial system thus was incapable of stopping the Ottoman expansion, and was only really effective in constant civil wars.

John Hunyadi had fought against Hussites as a youth, specifically under king Sigismund near Prag in 1420. and Visegrad in 1421. Hussites were citizens and peasants who rebelled against Church and high nobility. They were poorly equipped and could not withstand the impact of a charge of heavy cavalry. Therefore, they adopted approach of eastern nomads, using wagons to defend the camp. While these were ordinary peasant wagons, they later built specialized battlewagons with artillery. Near the enemy wagons would move in multiple columns, allowing them to quickly form a square when necessary. Women, children, cattle and horses would be placed in the middle of the camp, which wold be additionally fortified with earthen rampart if time allowed. Such a fort could only be attacked on foot. Many experienced commanders were left after the end of Hussite wars, and Hunyadi took them into his service.

Hunyadi utilized heavy infantry equipped with half-plate and polearms, and Czech and German mercenaries equipped with pavises and either crossbows or hand cannons. Light infantry was formed from poor peasants and citizens, and armed with composite bow and either a sabre or a sword; their task was to engage Turkish light infantry, retreating behind the wagons or heavy infantry as necessary. Main striking arm was heavy cavalry. For heavy cavalry Hunyadi utilized predominantly German or Italian mercenaries, who were organized into lances (Gleve). Each lance consisted of a knight, a less-armoured serjeant (also called a coustillier – one who finishes a defeated opponent) and one or more mounted crossbowmen. Crossbowmen supported their knight by loosing bolts at nearby enemies before retreating for a short time to reload the crossbow. This system did not exist in Croatian-Hungarian kingdom, hence the need for king Sigismund to explicitly order (in 1396.) that each knight has to bring two mounted crossbowmen (thus making two heavy/shock cavalrymen and two mounted crossbowmen per lance). Light cavalry protected other troops from Ottoman light missile cavalry (Akincis).

Hungarian-Croatian army was very cavalry-heavy. Kaiser und Konig Sigismund in his reforms in 1432. predicted raising 80 000 cavalry in whole country, of which 12 000 just in Croatia. At least a portion were light cavalry, armed with a sword, bow or crossbow, and a lance, and armoured either lightly or not at all. Considering the population of 4 000 000 would give military as 2% of population, it would appear that reforms did not predict raising any infantry at all. Sekeljs were nomads divided into 12 tribes giving 400 cavalrymen each – a total of 2 400 cavalry. This cavalry was equipped only with a bow, saber, lance and a shield. Saxons, which were settled in Transylvania, gave 1 600 soldiers to the king. Their equipment was much like that of Germans in the West, and their cities had advanced metalworking, armour and cannon production.

Hunyadi strained against the limits of feudal military organization. He started war against Ottomans with smaller armies composed of 10 000 – 15 000 mercenaries and his own soldiers. Core of this army were few thousand veterans who were highly reliable, motivated and determined. Feudal system had disadvantage in its inability to train large coherent forces: only individual banderia could really train together, but banderia themselves only came together in case of major conflict where multiple magnates came together. At best, 2 000 – 3 000 men could be formed into a coherent body of troops, much less than was the case with ancient Rome or else Byzantine Empire – or indeed Ottoman Empire, which had inherited Byzantine military model. As wars against Ottomans escalated, Hunyadi’s armies were larger, but he also climbed the state hierarchy. When he went to war in 1448., Hunyadi had to secure his position in the kingdom with several thousand loyal troops before leaving on campaign. And since he waged the war with army of the kingdom, and not just his private army, his nominal subordinates were often large magnates and other powerful nobility with its own interests. This might have been a reason why infantry – usually one of key elements of Hunyadi’s battle tactics – was mostly ignored at Varna and Kosovo, being few in number and likely structured for sieges as opposed to open battles.

Matthias Corvinus

General organization

Main innovation of the new king was the standing professional army. Armies he led were very cavalry-heavy. When it comes to banderial army, he introduced provincial banderies. These could be kept under arms for three months every year, and used both within and without the kingdom. Each noble had to give one soldier. Nobles themselves had to raise their banderies to defend the kingdom, but were not required to participate outside its borders.

Matthias had no problem raising medium to large armies for the time. Szilagy had 8 000 men in Belgrade in 1458. and attempted to help Serb despot Jelena. Matthias himself defeated an Ottoman army in Srijem large enough that 5 000 Turks died just trying to run away across Sava, after which Mihail Szilagy took 3 000 men from Kovin to Belgrade. Hungarian army of 3 000 was defeated near Kormend by Austrian troops 2 000 strong in 1459. In 1461. Matthias sent 4 000 cavalry and 1 200 infantry to help Albrecht.

By 1463. Matthias Corvinus already had a standing army of 5 000 infantry and 2 000 cavalry. He also requested nobles to raise one cavalryman per 10 houses – previous standard was one per 20 houses – thus giving (assuming family size of 5, as is standard assumption) army size as 2% of population. Prelates and barons had to send him 12 000 cavalry. If kingdom had population of 4 000 000 – 5 000 000, then Matthias’ army could have numbered 80 000 – 100 000 troops, similar to what Sigismund thought to raise (compare to 40 000 – 60 000 or 1,2% of population in 1454.). Such a number certainly could be reached if conquered Moravia and Sillesia as well as allied Moldavia and Wallachia were counted. Matthias Corvinus himself may have had up to 30 000 troops from his own estates. As noted, Matthias crossed Sava on 11th September 1464. with 17 000 cavalry, 6 000 infantry and 7 000 crusaders. This again shows cavalry-heavy nature of Hungarian armies in the time. In 1468. Matthias fielded an army of 22 000 men, 2 000 wagons and 50 cannons, and in 1469. took an army of 10 000 men. In 1474. he had 10 000 men and 900 war wagons in a field army, and later raised an army of 60 000 – 70 000 men and 100 ships. Black Army in 1487. had 20 000 cavalry and 8 000 infantry.

Standing army of king Matthias – the “Black Army” – originally had 6 000 mercenaries. Full army of kingdom included banderial troops as well as Moladvian and Wallachian dukes; thus an army overall could have been 148 000 – 163 000 according to some sources. Venetian ambassador specifically stated that the army had 3 000 battle(?) wagons, 30 bombards, 30 long cannons, 24 two-wheeled wagons with 2 cannons each, 12 great bombarding wagons with 6 cannons each, 8 wall-breaching bombards, 8 wall-destroyer machines and 10 great bombards. As for army, ambassador counted 6 000 heavy Silesian-Moravian cavalry, 10 000 infantrymen, 10 000 Hungarian heavy cavalry, 4 000 crossbowmen with pavises, 16 000 Szekely mounted archers, 16 000 Szekely footmen, 400 riflemen, 80 artillery masters, 10 000 soldiers of noblemen of Transylvania, 2 000 Wallachians of Transylvania, 12 000 soldiers of voivode of Transylvania, 20 000 infantrymen and artillerymen, 8 000 riders of Moldavia, 30 000 footmen. Total: 144 480 men, of which around 106 000 were of the kingdom. Army had heavy and light infantry (of which 20% had gunpowder weapons), heavy and light cavalry, artillery and navy. An Italian report places navy at 364 ships, with 2 600 sailors and 10 000 soldiers. Of these 10 000 soldiers, 1 700 were men-at-arms, 1 200 infantry with pavises, and remainder crossbowmen and handgunners. Among ships, 16 were galleys with four great bombards and 300 gunmen each. Of 364 vessels of the navy, there were 330 actual ships and additional 34 sloops at Belgrade. Each sloop had 18 oars and 18 soldiers with a rifle and two artillerymen. Bombards on large ships could fire a ball weighting 300 lbs. This military force required over a million florints per year, thus forcing Matthias to constantly ask for extraordinary taxes. But a lot of money was also spent on supporting the art, and in his time first printing works appeared in Hungary and Croatia.

Black Army

Black Army was the core of Matthias’ army. It was a standing army formed first from former Czech Hussites. It gained its nickname most likely from one of its commanders, “Black” John Haugwitz. While theories exist that soldiers of Black Army painted their armour black, this is unlikely – black armour did not appear in mass until 16th century. Images where armour does look black are likely ones which utilized silver-based silver colour, which due to oxidization would become black – this is also the reason why flag of Matthias Corvinus is sometimes shown with red-and-black instead of actual red-and-white colour pattern.

Standing army was required, as feudal army of the kingdom depended primarily on large magnates, which were – mildly put – unreliable. Hussites had utilized battle wagon tactics to counter otherwise nearly-unstoppable charge of feudal heavy cavalry. Combination of battle wagons and infantry armed with firearms and protected by pavises proved a powerful defensive tactic. John Hunyadi and Matthias Corvinus also formed light cavalry as a separate combat arm, significantly improving mobility and scouting capacity of the army, while also significantly reducing relative combat power of Ottomans whose tactics were based heavily on utilization of light cavalry.

Matthias Corvinus improved on his father’s model by forming regular logistical support and also regularly paying soldiers. In the end, Matthias’ standing army will reach strength of 30 000 men, 2 000 wagons, 100 cannons and 200 ships on Danube and Sava. This is almost the same as what entire Hungary was able to field for Battle of Mohacs in 1526. (25 000 – 30 000 soldiers, 5 000 carts and 85 cannons). And while original Black Army was made up of foreign mercenaries, by 1480. it consisted mainly of native troops. Among troops of Black Army, one in five carried harquebus, which was extremely high proportion of gunpowder small arms for the time.

Strategy

John Hunyadi

Hunyadi’s army was comprised primarily of mercenaries. This heavily influenced his choice of an agressive, offensive strategy. Losses of mercenaries did no harm to kingdom itself, and by transferring war to enemy’s land, Hunyadi prevented them from harming his own kingdom. This also forced Ottomans to defend instead of attacking. Ottoman military was structured around jihad, and contained a significant number of soldiers with no lands or incomes, whose only “wages” were whatever they acquired in war. This meant that the Ottoman Empire depended on permanent consquest and expansion for proper functioning; yet Hunyadi turned the situation on its head. Hunyadi also used this strategy against Counts of Celje; only when he devastated Slovenia – then part of Holy Roman Empire – did they becalm themselves. Hunyadi likewise forced Friedrich III to abandon his designs on Hungary by devastating parts of Austria. His losses did no damage to the kingdom as his soldiers were mecenaries.

Matthias Corvinus

Matthias Corvinus likewise preferred to go on the offensive. In this however he was significantly constrained by his many enemies within the kingdoms. He was also too occupied by affairs of central Europe. Matthias failed to assist either Serbia of Stjepan Tomašević or Bosnia of Stjepan Tomaš. Only after the latter fell did he take serious steps for defense against Ottoman threat. This however was not wholly his fault. Friedrich III. Hapsburg was actively seeking crown of Hungary between 1459. and 1463., and again in 1474. and 1484. – 1490., as did Polish prince from 1472. to 1474. As early as February 1459., he made a declaration in which he called Friedrich a parasite who is seeking to exterminate Hungarians and their language; thus Matthias called people to arms – showing that a form of (ethnic?) nationalism existed at least this early. Matthias was also aware that resources of Hungarian-Croatian kingdom were limited, and sought to increase them by expanding his rule to Austrian lands.

His success however was in his ability to focus on one opponent at the time. When that was not possible, he was usually still able to keep his enemies divided, physically if not in war aims, and to defeat the weakest enemy first.

Weapons and equipment

Pavise Carriers (Clipeati)

Clipeati are well armoured infantry armed with a polearm and paired with a servant who carried a large pavise shield and equipped with light armour – or just a helmet – and likely armed with a long spear or pike for repelling cavalry attacks. Pavise shield was rather large. A pavise shield used by army of Matthias Corvinus cca 1485. was 115 cm tall, 61 cm wide and weighted 10 kg. This particular shield however was lost or destroyed during battles for Budapest in 1945. Shields could be larger – 125 cm and 11 – 12 kg.

Clipeati in Matthias’ service formed a solid shield wall which other elements of infantry could fight from. This might be tactic similar to that of Hussites, who used man portable mantlets to create a second line of defence within their Tabors.

Heavy Infantry (Armati)

Armati were heavy armoured infantry which fought alongside clipeati, and had same equipment. They could fight in support of / within battle wagons or behind clipeati. Armati were armed with two-handed weapons – two examples being a poleaxe (or, rather, polehammer) and a spear. Polehammer was a two-handed weapon with a warhammer head – specifically, a head which consisted of a hook for piercing plate, a long square spike for stabbing between plates, and a warhammer. Another common weapon was short (1,8 m) spear with a very long single-bladed hewing head – that is, spearhed designed for both stabbing and cutting. Backup weapons were a one-handed or hand-and-a-half longsword and a dagger.

Infantry armour was lighter and cheaper in make than that of heavy cavalry, as latter was expected to stop impact of heavy spear. Helmet was typically sallet without visor, with faceplate attached to breastplate. Because of this, soldier could easily open and close vision slot simply by raising and lowering his head. Infantrymen usually did not have leg armour: partly for greater mobility in close combat, partly perhaps for financial resouns, and partly because – in army of John Hunyadi and Matthias Corvinus at least – first ranks had their legs protected by pavise wall.

Some may have carried hand-held pavises. These shields were much smaller than “static” pavises used by crossbowmen for protection, perhaps around the size of a heater shield. Pavise of Matthias Corvinus shows two horizontal straps top and bottom, and loose strap in the middle. It is likely that soldier would use the shield with hand gripping one of the handles near ends, with large strap being then tightened over forearm.

Light infantry

Often mentioned, but their equipment is unknown. Crossbowmen were definitely counted among light infantry, as they are mentioned nowhere else. However, tactics as described above also indicate a significant presence of melee-armed light infantry.

Crossbowmen used pavise shields as a protection when reloading crossbows. These shields could be equipped with two straps and carried as a backpack, in which case crossbowman would reload crossbow with back turned towards the enemy before turning around. By time of Matthias Corvinus however much larger pavise shields were utilized, requiring a dedicated shield-bearer. Heavy crossbows with steel bows could reach distances greater than 300 meters (compare with 250 – 300 meter range for English longbow), and were drawn with mechanical devices. These crossbows could even pierce plate, as an example of a helmet pierced from both sides by a crossbow bolt shows. Windlass crossbows however were usually only used in forts, while in the field crossbows were loaded with one-handed teethed mechanism or else with “goat leg”. With such devices, rate of fire was around two bolts per minute. Light crossbows with wooden bows, often used by city militias, were drawn manually with two hands, and had range of 110 meters with heavy bolt and 130 meters with light bolt.

Pushkars used first firearms (whose name – pushka – used here comes from Slavic word “pušiti” – “to smoke”). But these early pushkas (handguns) were not effective weapons in open field battles and required protection, such as provided by a wagonburg. Matthias Corvinus had 2 000 pushkars in 1475. Pushkars also used pavise shields for protection in a manner similar to crossbowmen. Hand cannons were used as early as Hussite wars, and had lethal range of 50 meters. At distance of cca 10 meters, hand cannon’s ball could pierce even plate armour, something no other ranged infantry weapon could do unless it hit a weak spot. Hand cannons were also very easy to learn, and had rate of fire of 10 – 15 shots per hour.

Up until Hunyadi, archers were the mainstay of Hungarian infantry. They represented poorer elements of various levies, and tradition of mounted archery in Hungary made inevitable the appearance of foot archers as well. During Louis the Great foot archers carried sabres and composite bows. Janos Hunyadi relied on Transylvanian and Szekely foot archers.

In Black Army itself, every 4th soldier had a gun – with 8 000 infantry, this would suggest that all pushkars were part of the Black Army.

Saxons

Saxons were a significant German population settled in Transylvania, whose migration there started in 1150. Largest settlement was around town of Sibiu (Hermannstadt), situated on one of few easily navigable routes through Carpathian mountains to the Black Sea. Thus it was a major trading town and defensive stronghold. Like Szekelis (see in cavalry section), Saxons were granted practical autonomy in exchange for special tax and military obligations. These obligations included supplying 500 warriors for internal defence and 100 warriors for foreign service. Aside from area around Sibiu, there were two more Saxon districts, centered around Brasov (also on a route through Carpathian mountains) and Kyralia – Rodna – Bistrita. These also enjoyed rights similar to those given to Sibiu. In 1430., Saxon military obligation was 1 600 men. Their troops were likely similar to those of Germany proper – knights, spearmen, crossbowmen, and in later period handgunners.

Mounted crossbowmen

Mounted crossbowmen were rarely used in the West, and so are not well represented in Western military literature. What mounted crossbowmen do appear in Western accounts are exclusively mounted infantry: that is, they used horses for transport but fought afoot. John Hunyadi and Matthias Corvinus however used them as part of their offensive cavalry arm. This employment is most similar to that of 10th century Byzantine missile cataphracts (which will be described in one of later articles), or later combined-arms units, where a wedge or column would be formed with heavy melee cavalry in outer ranks, and inner ranks formed of heavy missile cavalry. In combat, crossbowmen would likely “soften” enemy ranks with missile barrage before reloading and targeting enemy men-at-arms’ horses when close combat unfolded.

Heavy cavalry

  • Knight armed and mounted, ready for battle. Hand-colored woodcut of a 19th-century illustration

Hungarian-Croatian heavy cavalry (nehec lovassag) of second half of 15th century was army’s primary striking force. It was recruited from major and middle nobility, as well as foreign mercenaries. Cavalry utilized gothic plate armour. Weak point of armour was helmet (sallet) which sat directly on top of head, and thus every strike fell directly on head (and neck). But it also had significant advantage in that it allowed easy head movement and thus easy visibility, and also impeded hearing much less than a fully enclosed helmet attached to armour. Armour for rider weighted 26 kg. Heavy lance was helped by arrest mounted on armour; this and deep saddle allowed rider to transfer much more of force (around 1 ton) to target.

Main weapon was heavy lance around 4 meters long. Only very rich warriors could afford full horse barding; much more common was armour for head only, which was not rare. Full barding had weight of 33 kg. With armoured rider and saddle horse will have carried around 140 kg, which meant that such a horse had to weight at least 560 kg. Heavy cavalry was main striking force, and Hungarian and Croatian armies of the time were both mostly cavalry. Hungary had major advantage in its horses, which were some of the best in Europe.

Hungarian knights were different from their Western counterparts in multiple ways. Emperor Sigismund made a specific order for the Nicopolis campaign of 1396 that Knights should be accompanied by two mounted archers, showing that they did not normally come with combat support group, unlike their Western counterparts. Hungarian nobles however were much superior to their Western counterparts in temperament. There are no examples of Hungarian heavy cavalry displaying the impetuous recklessness of their Western (especially French) counterparts, which is likely a consequence of Hungarian experience in fighting against horse archers (from Mongols to Turks).

Also present were mercenary knights from Hungary and Western Europe. These were disciplined professionals, and were organized in lances consisting of a knight and three to five less well equipped retainers. Hungarian mercenaries appear during Luis’ reign, with knights in King’s household recruiting 50 – 80 men-at-arms, and each man-at-arms also supplying a support group of 2 – 3 mounted crossbowmen. Mercenaries came mostly from southern Germany, Bohemia, Hungary itself and Balkans.

Light cavalry

As only rich nobility could afford full plate armour, many if not majority of cavalry were light cavalry. In order of battle, first rows consisted of heavy cavalry with progressively lighter cavalry as one moved towards the rear ranks. Typical equipment was light infantry spear serving as lance, sword, sallet helmet and shield. Armour could be mail, coat of plates, brigandine, gambeson, or nothing.

Light cavalry also employed missile weapons (bow and crossbow). Mounted crossbowmen were usually placed behind heavy cavalry and supported it with missile fire. Light horsemen also acted as skirmishers and counter-skirmishers, in order to clear away Turkish light cavalry (Akinji skirmishers in particular). These were mostly foreign specialists and mercenaries, or Tatars from within Hungary; native Hungarian cavalry appears to have been incapable of acting in this role. Light cavalry also harassed enemy flanks, lines of supply and reinforcements entering the battlefield.

Many light cavalrymen were from Wallachia and Moldavia, or else Transylvania – with Rumanian (Roman) refugees in particular being an important source of cavalry. Each heavy cavalryman had to bring two light cavalrymen for missile support.

Hussars

Hussars were very numerous in Matthias’ service – according to some sources he could have raised 20 000 of them. Generally one Hussar was recruited for every 20 peasants. Hussars had originated after Serbia had fallen under Ottoman rule in 1427. With Turkish raiders and also bandits penetrating the borders, border districts recruited their own cavalry to counter them. Hussars were thus elemental in countering Turkish Akincis, be it their raids or in scouting role. By time of John Hunyadi’s Long Campaign, units of Rac horsemen played significant part in the campaign. Number of hussars rose dramatically after Serbia was formally absorbed into Ottoman Empire in 1459., sending a wave of refugees into Hungary.

Typical armament is heavy lance, sabre and half-circular shield, as well as recurve bow. Of protection, they often wore none, but could have a helmet and mail armour. Shield could also be so-called “Hungarian shield”. They acted as raiders, and during wars against Poland, they took cities of Poznanj and Crarow. Hussars also completely destroyed Polish logistics, which led to their adoption by Poles.

Szekely

Szekelys were separate ethnic group from Magyars, possibly descendant from Huns, and were largest Hungarian speaking group in Transylvania. Szekely lands were largely ethnically homogenous, forming a block of some 12 000 square kilometers in south of Transylvania. Lands were divided into seven districts (szeks). As they were outside the Hungarian law, even Voivode of Transylvania had no authority inside their borders, and administration fell to the Count of Szeleky, who was also often Voivode of Transylvania as well. From 1462., two offices were combined on a permanent basis.

Szekely remained semi-nomadic people who lived from horse and cattle breeding, and were thus regarded as some of the finest light horsemen available to the King of Hungary. Their only obligation was to supply troops for military service, and their value as light horsemen allowed them to maintain their lifestyle. Szekely were divided into six tribes, of four branches each. Each branch was obligated to provide Hungarian Crown 100 horsemen for military service, for 2 400 horsemen total. This professional force was further supplemented by militia obliged to serve 30 days. This militia consisted of those that serve with three other mounted men, individual horsemen, and infantry.

Venetian reports however state that Matthias’ army of 1470. had 16 000 Szekely horsemen, which may indicate recruitment of Szekely mercenaries beyond traditional feudal obligations.

Bombardiers

Bombardiers were specialists who manned bombards (cannons). Bombards were cannons with very short barrel. In second half of 15th century bombards were equipped with a wheeled carriage as well as primitive barrel elevation mechanism. When at position, cannon was protected by a wooden pallisade with a door which could be opened to allow firing. Range was 200 – 300 paces.

Battle Tactics

John Hunyadi

West had heavy cavalry – knights – unstoppable in a charge. Ottoman sipahis could not withstand their charge, and were thus usually placed behind the infantry. Ottoman infantry was placed in the center and deployed unusually deep. As feudal cavalry was usually not capable of cycling the charge (charge-retreat-charge), their charge would drown in the mass of infatry, rendering them static and easy prey for sipahis. Once knights were eliminated, Christian infantry was easily taken care of.

John Hunyadi solved this problem by utilizing a segmented battle line. Normal Western tactic of the time called for heavy cavalry to be placed in the front to deliver a charge all across the line, with infantry behind the cavalry to mop up. Results of such tactic when utilized against Ottomans were already described in the previous paragraph. Instead of doing this, Hunyadi placed infantry in the center. Flanks and the rear of the infantry were protected by battle wagons, and cavalry was placed on the flanks. This forced Ottomans to either be encircled or else face Western heavy cavalry with their own sipahis, either of which was a bad idea. When sipahis started to weaken, Hunyadi would support flank which made more progress with his own heavy cavalry reserve.

In 1443. – 1444., Ottoman army had little in terms of field artillery. This meant that they were incapable of effectively dealing with Hungarian Wagenburg tactics. In their first encounter with such force in September 1442., at Ialomita against Hunyadi, Ottoman army was decisively defeated as their cavalry could not penetrate wagons protecting Hunyadi’s flanks. In 1443., battle wagons again proved an insurmountable obstacle to Ottoman cavalry, and the only way to defeat them was by siege.

Matthias Corvinus

Matthias Corvinus also used tactics similar to John Hunyadi, and he took his father’s mercenaries into his service. It is precisely his father’s mercenaries that formed the core of Matthias’ standing army. However, tactics seem to have evolved with time, becoming more defensive.

In 1480., Matthias Corvinus described his army’s tactics as follows: “…some are light infantry, others heavily armoured, and some are clipeati, which receive double wage as they have servants. Also counted are experts gunners, but they are not as effective as other infantry; they are best behind pavises at beginning of the battle or during sieges. Our rule is that a fifth of infantry are pushkars [note: infantry armed with first matchlock muskets]. …We hold heavy infantry to be immovable wall, and they will die all to one at place they are standing on. If opportunity shows itself, light infantry will break out and attack, but if their attack loses momentum or if they are heavily pressed, they will retreat behind heavy infantry. …All infantrymen and pushkars are surrounded by armatis and clipeatis as a fort. Pavises seem as a fort, behind which light infantry is protected as if behind the walls, from which they attack in proper moment.”. This indicates tactics essentially same as those of Italian mercenary armies.

Another text, likely written also by Matthias, describes tactics of light infantry as such: “…Main task of both lines is protection of third line of pushkars and fourth line of light infantry armed with bows, spears and axes…”, “…during the attack they would approach enemy lines protected by fire of musketeers [note: likely pushkars, archers and crossbowmen], and once enemy attack had been broken, light infantry would come forth to hand-to-hand combat…”.

Thus tactics of infantry can be reconstructed in phases as follows:

  • Clipeati are in first row (servant with shield and spear and clipeati). Behind them are crossbowmen or puskars, and in the rear heavy infantry.
  • When enemy reaches range, shield-bearers and clipeati kneel. Crossbowmen (or puskars) fire over their heads, walking in circle much like 17th century musketeers: first row releases a salvo, and then goes to rear to reload, while second row steps forward to fire.
  • Enemy has closed in; this means that crossbowmen pull back, and armati step forward to reinforce the defense of pavise wall.
  • At this point, cavalry would make a sortie to catch the enemy in the rear. Pavise wall might have been supplemented by battle wagons.

    harci szekerek=war wagons; ágyúk= cannons; könnyű lov.= light cavalry; nehéz lov.= heavy cavalry; nehéz gyalogság = heavy infantry; könnyű gyalogság = light infantry, puskás gyalogság = infantry with rifles; poggyász szekerek = luggage wagons; the three dots = the line of armored infantry with shields;

    Conclusions

    As it can be seen, John Hunyadi and Matthias Corvinus had built up a highly professional, versatile and adaptible force capable of meeting any challenge – be it from Western feudal states or Ottoman Empire. It would not be amiss to consider Hungarian army between 1440. and 1490. the most sophisticated and powerful military force in Europe.

    However, unlike Ottoman army, Hungarian army of the time had little in terms of structural adaptability. Much like Byzantine Komnenian and Paleologian armies, it depended directly on capabilities of the leader. This is seen in battle of Mohacs. Despite the disbandment of Matthias’ standing army, Hungary of Jagellon times still in fact maintained significant military capability. Army of 25 000 – 30 000 men, fielded at Mohacs, was not much smaller than armies of John Hunyadi, though it was only half the size of largest armies led by Matthias Corvinus. This army however displayed clear lack of tactical sophistication which had characterized armies of John Hunyadi and Matthias Corvinus. While Ottoman army had increased in sophistication by that time, Hungarian did reverse – and so it was medieval feudal army which faced modern Ottoman army at Mohacs.

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    Social Background of the Army Organization

    Any army is a reflection of society which creates it. Thus it is society, more than anything else, which will determine how army is shaped. This is evident throughout history: many attempts at replicating Roman armies failed because underlying society was incapable of supporting such an army. In modern day, Arab states proved completely incapable of creating and maintaining effective Western-style militaries. They always easily acquired hardware due to their oil-provided wealth, but they also always proved laughably incompetent at translating said hardware into battlefield performance.

    Tribal Society

    Romans faced tribal armies in Iberia, Gaul and some other areas. Characteristic of tribal armies is a much closer link between social order and army – its structure, tactics, organization and even weaponry – than is the case in more advanced societies.

    Gaul was the most advanced of these societies, in process of transition into urban society when Rome attacked. But its army was still tribal. Gallic nobility fought mounted, but they never developed effective cavalry arm. Infantry likewise was relatively well-equipped, but Gallic emphasis on individual valor caused them to mount frontal attacks which squandered their numerical superiority. Gallic (and also Germanic) habit of bringing whole tribe to the battlefield meant that a defeat meant genocide against the whole tribe.

    Gallic society was governed by aristocracy of nobles surrounded by armed retainers who acted as a warrior class – not unlike medieval feudal states. Most of rest of social order were free farmers and tennant farmers, many of whom were serfs. Typical feudal jockeying for power among nobility precluded effective alliance against Romans, or formation of a national army capable of standing up to Roman legions.

    As in later feudal societies, primary fighting arm was cavalry. Gallic cavalry had no cataphracts, (and even cataphracts were nowhere as effective against infantry as later mounted men-at-arms were). Excessive individualism of nobility meant that cavalrymen were accustomed to fighting as individual combatants, with absolutely no battlefield coordination either within cavalry or with infantry.

    Infantry itself was comprised of ill-disciplined rabble incapable of any degree of tactical sophistication. Gallic infantrymen were lightly equipped swordsmen, with little use of spearmen or archers. Only mounted nobility wore armour, while infantrymen fought only in clothes, and sometimes half-naked. However, infantrymen were still highly motivated due to nature of tribal army, tied together by ties of tribal loyalty.

    City State

    City State was a normal state of affairs for much of Antiquity in the Mediterranean, and also – again in Mediterranean – for many medieval states. This held true especially for Ancient Italy and Greece, as well as Medieval Italy.

    City states such as Greek poleis and Rome had citizen militias, and serving in the military was part of the price of citizenship. Such armies were usually based around spearmen or, later, pikemen, supported by archers (or crossbowmen), often but not always with limited to nonexistent cavalry. Tactics utilized by such citizen armies were by necessity relatively simple and straightforward: spear phalanx or a pike block, designed to maximize impact of cohesion and discipline instilled by the communal feeling. One good aspect was large number of soldiers: Athens had 240 000 inhabitants of which 100 000 full citizens; this allowed it to field some 30 000 hoplites.

    But as noted, due to being comprised of amateurs, such armies are likely to have had relatively simple and straightforward organization. This limits their tactical flexibility, preventing them from carrying out complex maneuvers. Greek hoplite armies had extremely simple organization (compared to something like Roman legion, Macedonian phalanx or Byzantine meros or thema). This directly caused them to quite badly underperform in sieges and urban assaults.

    Problem with such armies – especially Greek ones – was that they were logistically limited. Campaign season was limited by the need for citizens to help with harvest, and armies were also – especially Greek ones – relatively logistically unsophisticated. And this is consequence of the very reason why such citizen armies were possible: warfare was between city-states, several hours to – at most – several days away from one’s house. It is thus not surprising that Greek logistics were awful. Hoplite armies moved with insufficient tools (no portable grain mills, no engineering tools), but with huge numbers of personal servants. As a result, they were – unlike ancient Macedonian and Roman, or medieval feudal armies – completely incapable of year-round campaigning. Sparta was incapable of sustaining operations in Attica – 230 km (10-day march) away from Sparta and 90 km away from friendly Corinth. Spartans did manage to regularly invade Attica, but never to actually sustain operations there to the point of causing significant damage. All their armies disperse due to lack of supplies. Athens was capable of operating at much greater distances – as far as Sicily, in fact – but this was largely a consequence of its naval strength. But these were exceptions. In general, hoplite armies fought within their own neighbourhoods – wars were between neighbouring poleis, just few hours away, and so there was no need for logistical support beyond a packed lunch (and maybe dinner) and a water bag. In fact, hoplites were supposed to provide their own rations – Athenian standard was three days’ worth. Most hoplites were attended by a personal slave.

    Defensively, however, such armies had several important advantages which they share with tribal armies. They were very numerous and relatively cheap. At the same time, fact that they were rooted in civilian society meant that they were highly cohesive, and required little organization and limited drill to be effective on battlefield, as they naturally replicated social organization. At the same time, a city state is much more capable of organizing such training and education than a tribal society is.

    Feudal State

    Feudalism was as much a consequence as the cause of dominance of heavy cavalry in Western European warfare. After facing Byzantine cataphracts during Justinian’s wars in the West, Western European barbarian states quickly developed heavy cavalry of their own. Emphasis on heavy cavalry was significantly increased due to contact with Arab agressors. This was made possible by a slew of technological improvements. First Germanic tribes made breakthrough in horse breeding in 3rd century. The 6th century saw introduction of war saddle with single girth, and iron stirrup was common by the 7th century, as does curb bit. Iron horseshoe appeared in 9th century, and spurs in 11th. By 12th century Western knights had high saddles which helped transfer much of force of the charge into lance; in late 12th century rigid backplate was also developed which further enhanced this ability.

    Destrier, or war-horse, was absolutely necessary for late medieval heavy cavalry. Horses which made up destrier bloodline came from central Asia and Arabia. The “great horse” originated in Low Countries, and was further reinforced with Arab bloodlines during the Crusades. Over time, with selective breeding, destrier’s size and strength increased – by 15th century, horses could reach well over 700 kg. At the same time, armour gradually improved – first the extent of coverage by mail armour increased, followed by addition of bits and pieces of plate reinforcement in 13th century and early plate armour in early 14th century. Where 11th century knights relied on mail hauberk and large kite shield, 15th century plate armour made a shield wholly unnecessary. Horses themselves received protection as well, with mail armour being common in 13th century, and plate armour being widespread by 15th century, though most often only partial protection was used (e.g. Chafron and peytral instead of whole set).

    But heavy cavalry is expensive, and it was this need combined with limited administrative capabilities which helped transform formerly tribal societies into feudal ones. Only large landowners could afford heavy armour and large horse – even after improved grain yield made cavalry armies practical in the first place. These same landowners were also logical choice to fill in the sociopolitical niche left empty by the dissolution of administrative state. Local (peasant) militia did exist, but was singularly ineffective against heavy cavalry or even professional infantry; thus it could not form basis of social structure which would have led to perhaps a more democratic government.

    As a result, wealthy landowners took over political role. But engagement in politics required administrative centres, and their duties as governors meant need to secure protection. This led to development of castles and armed retinues. At lowest level, castle was a slightly-bigger-house, and armed retinue just a bunch of armed peasants.

    As society developed however, system became more layered. Armed peasants, sufficient for suppression of brigands, could neither be expected to campaign over long distances, nor were particularly effective in battle. As a result, military professionalized. Instead of conscripting peasants, a group of hearths was expected to provide for a single semi-professional soldier. Soldiers were then organized into highly standardized units. This system of “banners” (banderia) developed, as it provided large numbers of reasonably professional soldiers. This reinforced – or in many parts, introduced – feudalism, as it meant that tribal militia could no longer stand up to feudal armies.

    Further developments reinforced tendency towards professionalization. Introduction of crossbow made horse archers powerless against infantry, while pikemen made heavy cavalry charges much more dangerous. Both of these however required discipline to use. To counter them, cavalry also had to develop combined-arms techniques as well as discipline required to implement said techniques. This in turn led towards further professionalization of military, and thus increased centralization as professionalization necessitated development of financial structures.

    Feudalism ended because of introduction of gunpowder. Cannons meant that nobles were no longer safe in their castles: enemies had to be intercepted in the field. At the same time, firearms proved some level of counter to heavy cavalry: knights now had to wait for an opportunity to charge. Further, necessity of organizing production and supply of artillery train as well as forts capable of resisting enemy gunpowder artillery meant that feudal lords could no longer truly keep up, and cities gained importance. All of this had the effect promoting centralization, as nobles had lost the ability to oppose the king, while increasingly more numerous armies required support of state apparatus and bureaucracy to function. This created a self-reinforcing circle.

    But in a typical feudal state – one which did not advance much down the road towards centralization – warfare was low-level. It was endemic, but it was nowhere as destructive as warfare in more centralized societies. Wars between kings – such as a Hundred Years War – could be large-scale and destructive (but even this was only relative to standards of the time: they never reached the scale or destructiveness of Roman, Byzantine or Ottoman wars). But majority of warfare was between lords with small holdings, with armies numbering in dozens or perhaps low hundreds of soldiers. Early English and Britonnic sources all give armies that number in low hundreds and in low thousands, respectively. Anglo-Saxon law states that “We use the term “thieves” if the number of men does not exceed seven, “band of marauders” [or “war-band”] for a number between seven and thirty-five. Anything beyond this is an “army” [here]”. Hugh V of Losignan takes only 43 horsemen to win a castle and some land in 1028., but said expedition is large enough that his lord – Count of Aquitaine – is aware of it and orders him back to the court. Likewise, noncombatants were protected by social mores and code of conduct (code of chivalry); breaking that protection was grounds for abandonment of loyalty to person who broke them.

    Even Agincourt, one of largest feudal battles, had armies of “only” 9 000 on English and 35 000 on French side – and majority of French force were actually armed auxilliaries (peasants). This is nowhere close to Roman battles, where each side could field up to 100 000 men in some cases (and even such cases were exceedingly rare). Purely feudal armies simply do not have the ability to scale up forever. Such an army is a retinue of retinues, based around personal relations: vassal receives land from senior in exchange for bringing him troops. But as his administrative abilities too are limited, high-ranking vassal will further pass on lands to people – thus becoming their senior – who will bring him troops which then he brings to his senior. This relationship stretches in a pyramidal from from king at top to landed knights at bottom of military hierarchy. Each of landed knigths will have a (small) retinue, which they will bring to their senior to be part of his overall retinue, and so on until king and overall army of the kingdom.

    Problem with such a system is that it does not have the ability to scale up forever. Average retinue is five men, but retinue sizes are typically (though not always – see Hungarian banderial system) not standardized. Large retinues are combination of smaller retinues. But the system as such is based on personal relationships, and thus cannot scale up endlessly. Even if it could, fact that retinues often vary in size with little standardization means that sizes of armies are limited for simple reason of logistics. Organizing supply for such an army would be nearly impossible, which is why Hungarian kings introduced standardized banner sizes with multiple nobles forming a single banner – or a single major noble’s force being split into multiple banners. But Kingdom of Hungary was relatively centralized and well-organized to begin with, which is why such reform was possible in the first place. Especially under king Matthias, Hungary was a centralized Early Modern state. But even so, no field army was anywhere close to 100 000, and typical army was less than 20 000 strong. In a fully feudal army – with no such standardization – it would be impossible to distribute supplies among various retinues, meaning that even lower end of Hungarian army sizes would be difficult to reach. As a result, Medieval warfare was nowhere as destructive as warfare of either antiquity or modernity. It is precizely modernization of society – specifically, of government – which caused massive increase in destrutiveness of warfare post-1450., whereas previously nature of feudal society sharply limited the capacity for violence.

    Secondly, feudal states were generally incapable of fully mobilizing their resources towards either offense or defense. Only times when resources were fully marshalled were for the occasional large-scale civil wars (and even those were rare). Against external threats however, only lords whose lands were directly threatened by an invasion could be relied on to supply troops.

    In a feudal army, most of the professionals will be in cavalry. In Hungary, Sigismund predicted raising 80 000 cavalry, of which 12 000 in Croatia. Infantry is barely mentioned. While infantry can be raised, most of it will consist of conscripts recruited for a specific campaign – very few will be professionals. Even in Hungary, which had to introduce disciplined infantry to counter Ottomans (and also faced such infantry in its wars against Hussites), cavalry outnumbered infantry at ratio of some 2-1. Even more significant is the lack of coordination and training for large-scale battles. Even when effective infantry was available, it was difficult to train more than several thousand men to perform as a unit. Doing so would require removing control of armed forces from bannermen, which would require centralized administration – which is to say, a state that is not feudal.

    Federal State

    In a federal state, army is likewise likely to resemble the state. This is to say, army will be organized around territorial units making up the federation. Each federal state will field its own armed forces, and these will be commanded primarily by the state itself. However, central government may request these forces when facing outside enemies, in addition to fielding an army directly answerable to the central government.

    A good case for that is the Holy Roman Empire, as well as Swiss cantons. In such setups, each state within federation will have an army of its own. What this means is that, while such a thing does not happen often, organization of armies may vary – one state in federation may have feudal army and another citizen militia. This is however rare. What almost certainly will vary is their numerical strength. While Army of Holy Roman Empire had 12 000 cavalry and 28 000 infantry in 1681., numbers supplied by each circle varied from less than 2 000 to over 8 000, with no standardization in units. As such, where Austrian Circle had 2 552 cavalry and 5 507 infantry, Frankonian Circle had 980 cavalry and 1 902 infantry. Other circles had similarly random numbers.

    Territorially Organized State

    This is a state that is neither federal nor centralized. Provinces are just that – provinces – but they enjoy wide autonomy. This was the situation in Middle Byzantine Empire.

    In such a situation, central government has power to dictate organization of the army to an extent: whether army will be infantry- or cavalry- -dominant will depend on state’s resources. But most of the army itself will be commanded primarily by provincial governors.

    Consequence of this is a regularized army organized along territorial lines. Unlike in feudal or federal state, basic structure of the army will be highly standardized, with all units beyond level of individual province being of equal size. On level of province, exact size of provincial army will depend on size of said province, but said size will always be in multiples of largest formalized division (e.g. so if division is standardized at 5 000 men, all provincial armies will be in multiples of 5 000). Provincial armies will be backed up by a standing army maintained by the central government, which will be better paid and better equipped than provincial armies, but much less numerous. This central army will serve to protect against usurpation by provincial commanders and also to provide a mobile central reserve. Armies for major campaigns are formed by agglomeration of a central army and several provincial armies.

    This was, in essence, the Byzantine thematic system. Basic division of the army was the theme, which was essentially an army given a province (or rather a group of provinces, which eventually were merged) to support it. Soldiers were given lands, and geographically distributed according to their own units, from themes downwards. Thus each military unit had its own area on which soldiers lived and drew support from. This made for a highly efficient logistical and financial support system at the cost of distributing soldiers all over the Empire. This however is an extreme example. If soldiers are not supported from lands, then each army can be supported by resources of a province without need to distribute soldiers all over it. That system is what Early Byzantine army utilized unti Arab invasions, as each army had assigned area of responsibility; but all armies were still financed from central tax system, which means that closer analogue might be circles of Holy Roman Empire. Such armies would be less numerous and more distant from society they defend compared to thematic-model armies.

    Unlike feudal army, this army will be much less reflective of the society. Central government will be able to much more easily adapt the army to strategic situation and active threats, changing proportions of cavalry to infantry and of different types of cavalry and infantry in order to counter current enemies. This Byzantine Empire did: cavalry was the basis of the army when there was need to counter Arab raiders, to the point that armies of the themes were referred to as “ta kaballarika themata”, or “the cavalry armies”. When the Empire went back on the offensive however, majority of armies were comprised of infantry: a 10th century army described in Nikephoros Phokas’ Praecepta Militaria had infantry outnumber cavalry on a 2:1 ratio.

    As a result, armies will also be much more numerous on average. Armies may also be equipped by state armouries, though it is more likely that soldiers of provincial armies at least will buy their own weapons and equipment from private producers. As such, standardization of equipment will not be as high as in centrally-equipped armies. Central army is more likely to be equipped from state armouries while provincial armies are more likely to rely on individual procurement by soldiers.

    Just as in the federal state, territorially-organized military system (“regimental system“) will result in military structure with pronounced regional identities and loyalties. Troops will identify with their provinces (as opposed to feudal loyalty to noble families), and leadership will also be broken down according to territorial lines. Since each regiment is responsible for education, training and organization of troops and also had its own history, traditions, recruitment and function, significant vertical and horizontal loyalties will develop within the regiment, but also between the regiment and local society. Military service is valued, both by servicemen and by the society at large. As a result, even part-time provincial soldiers are likely to be highly effective and cohesive force.

    Unlike feudal system, however, much flatter organizational pyramid and greater standardization require intensive administration. Land ownership has to be tracked and counted, as it forms the basis of the military structure and responsibilities – military service depends on land wealth. As a result, this system depends on relatively effective (though not necessarily all that extensive) administration, and is thus somewhat more centralized than a feudal system.

    Centralized State

    Centralized state is both a consequence and a cause of utilization of fully professional standing army. Greater centralization is enabled by significant monetization of the society combined with developed administrative apparatus which allows the government to tap into that wealth.

    As a result, military organization of a centralized state is likely to be fiscally-intensive. Army will be based around one or both of following options: standing army of full-time professionals, or armies of mercenaries (stipendiary or contract army). Mercenary army may also be full-time, with mercenaries being under permanent contract, which rather blurs distinction between national standing army and a mercenary one. Majority of mercenaries however will be employed transiently, contracted as necessity requires. It is possible for army to also be based around citizen-soldiers, much like armies of city-states were. Essential difference is thus between production of the army, or production of the wealth required to hire an army.

    The consequence of this however is that wars are extremely destructive. Centralization means that field armies are much larger, as they are tightly organized and supported by apparatus of the state. They can also stay in the field year-round. Such large armies however still had to be supplied by foraging when outside their own territory, which turned them into elemental forces of destruction which wrecked countryside they passed over.

    Further, because wars are no longer between the lords but between the states and even peoples, entire populace becomes a valid target. In Ottoman wars, it was normal – and for Ottomans, actually expected – to burn down enemy villages and slaughter civilians in order to destroy enemy economy and social structures. Their enemies quickly adapted this mindset; but such a mindset was not normal in feudal wars, which – with some exceptions towards tail end of Middle Ages – typically happened above the heads of populace.

    Romans were even more “extreme” as they saw and described wars as being against peoples, not states or rulers (with the exception of their wars in Hellenistic East). Their wars were against Celtiberi or Carthageneans, not against “Carthage” as a state. Natural consequence was extreme cruelty in carrying out the war. Thus the typical Roman conduct of war, as described by Polybius: “When Scipio thought that a sufficient number of troops had entered the town, he gave leave to the larger number of them to attack those in it, according to the Roman custom, with directions to kill everything they met, and to spare nothing; and not to begin looting until they got the order to do so. The object of this is, I suppose, to strike terror. Accordingly, one may often see in towns captured by the Romans, not only human beings who have been put to the sword, but even dogs cloven down the middle, and the limbs of other animals hewn off. On this occasion the amount of such slaughter was exceedingly great, because of the numbers included in the city.”. Such a slaughter was normal against a city which attempted to hold out. While such slaughter did happen in Middle Ages on occasion (such as Crusader sack of Jerusalem), it was always presented in sources as being shocking and unusual – even by members of the army which carried out the slaughter. Raymond d’Augliers states about Crusader sack of Jerusalem that “If I tell the truth, it will exceed your powers of belief”; but to Romans, such conduct was normal.

    All of the above applies primarily to professional national armies. It also applies to mercenary armies: unpaid mercenaries could be – and were – extremely destructive. Unlike national armies however, they were comparatively casuality-averse and also unreliable. A mercenary army could decide to switch sides if it saw an obviously losing battle or war. Further, mercenary warfare was highly technical, designed to minimize casualties while maximizing maneuver.

    Because they are removed from the structure of the society, professional armies need to have very strict drill and complex organization to replicate social structures and their cohesive principles. This also lends itself to the highly technical nature of warfare already noted as being employed by mercenary and other professional armies. And unlike all other armies, soldiers themselves are also removed from structure of the society, which makes an army of full-time professionals potentially dangerous to the very society it is supposed to defend.

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