Intel and AMD trusted enclaves, the backbone of network security, fall to physical attacks

The chipmakers say physical attacks aren’t in the threat model. Many users didn’t get the memo.

Ars Technica
Today's #ACSAC2023 paper preview is by Li et al. who researched Temper, a technique to speed up #PrivacyPreserving #AI services on the #cloud, through securely reusing #TrustedEnclaves and efficiently partitioning large AI models.
https://www.openconf.org/acsac2023/modules/request.php?module=oc_program&action=summary.php&id=172
ACSAC2023 OpenConf Abstract Submission, Peer Review, and Event Management System

For those interested in the number of ways Intel's SGX has been broken there is now a fine site:

https://sgx.fail

The introduction to the site reads:

Intel's Software Guard Extension (SGX) promises an isolated execution environment, protected from all software running on the machine. In the past few years, however, SGX has come under heavy fire, threatened by numerous side channel attacks. With Intel repeatedly patching SGX to regain security, we set out to explore the effectiveness of SGX's update mechanisms to prevent attacks on real-world deployments.

More specifically, we survey and categorize various SGX attacks, their applicability to different SGX architectures, as well as the information they leak. We then explored the effectiveness of SGX's update mechanisms in preventing attacks on two real-word deployments, the SECRET network and PowerDVD. In both cases, we show that these vendors are unable to meet the security goals originally envisioned for their products, presumably due to SGX's long update timelines and the complexities of a manual update process. This forces vendors to make a difficult security vs. usability trade off, resulting in security compromises.

#SGX #TrustedEnclaves #SpeculativeExecution #Intel #PowerDVD #

SGX.Fail