Peirce's 1870 “Logic of Relatives” • Selection 3.3
• https://inquiryintoinquiry.com/2014/01/30/peirces-1870-logic-of-relatives-selection-3/
Comment on ❝The Signs of Inclusion, Equality, Etc.❞
Peirce's use of a square bracket \([t]\) to indicate a mapping from logical terms to numbers provides a basis for the computation of frequencies, probabilities, and other statistical measures constructed from them, thus affording a “principle of correspondence” between probability theory and its limiting case in the forms of logic.
This brings us once again to the relativity of contingency and necessity, as one way of approaching necessity is through the avenue of probability, describing necessity as a probability of \(1,\) but the whole apparatus of probability theory only figures in if it is cast against the backdrop of probability space axioms, the reference class of distributions, and the sample space we cannot help but abduce on the scene of observations.
Aye, there's the snake eyes. And with them we can see there is always an irreducible quantum of facticity to all our necessities. More plainly spoken, it takes a fairly complex conceptual infrastructure just to begin speaking of probabilities, and that setting can only be set up by means of abductive, fallible, hypothetical, and inherently risky mental acts.
Pragmatic thinking is the logic of abduction, which is another way of saying it addresses the question: What may be hoped? We have to face the possibility it may be just as impossible to speak of absolute identity with any hope of making practical philosophical sense as it is to speak of absolute simultaneity with any hope of making operational physical sense.

