#JuarreroBook Ch. 7 Part 2

The remainder of h. 7 focusses on “catalytic closure” – closed loops of process or reaction that are self-reinforcing and hence self-sustaining mechanisms.

J’s first example is the Belousov–Zhabotinsky (BZ) chemical reaction, which involves an autocatalytic step (where the same catalyst is both an input and an output embedded in a loopy 4 step hyper-cycle, whereby the product of the reaction in the last step catalyses the first. Because this recursive process self-renews the “hypercycle itself becomes an enabling constraint that induces its own production and maintenance.”

As such, it is ‘self causing’. Following Montevil, Ruiz-Mirazo, Moreno, and Mossio, J maintains that this kind of autocatalytic system “still depends on externally set (context independent) boundary conditions over which they have minimal influence”. Their constraint regimes are “not yet self-constraining”.

This is achieved through “closure of constraint” which gives rise to life (and with it self-determination and autonomy).

“As articulated by Montevil, Mossio, and Moreno, the word closure in closure of constraint refers to a specific mode of dependence between constraints whereby recursion in the chain [of constraints] “folds up and establishes mutual dependence” (Moreno and Mossio 2015, 20) among constraints. To wit: Formally, “a set of constraints C realizes closure if, for each constraint Ci belonging to C: Ci depends directly on at least one other constraint of C (Ci is dependent); There is at least one other constraint Cj belonging to C which depends on Ci (Ci is enabling).” (Moreno and Mossio 2015, 20)”

(comment on Context Changes Everything, p. 102)

BookWyrm

Social Reading and Reviewing

1 of 4: Juarerro’s clocks illustration makes me wonder — Could a comparable resonance have birthed primordial “attention” in our distant past, i.e., through a natural resonance with low-frequency environmental rhythms? Is that how attention began?…

#JuarreroBook #neuroscience

@uh @[email protected] @[email protected] what did you think of this recasting of the epidemiology stuff in terms of contextual and 'mereological' factors? It struck me as just a terminological variant that does not add much. I'm also a bit confused as she seems to be going into context-dependent constraints before she actually explains what they are, which is supposed to happen in the next chapter...

#JuarreroBook

Dimitri Coelho Mollo (@[email protected])

810 Posts, 732 Following, 800 Followers · Assistant Professor in Philosophy of AI at Umeå University, working on and at the foundations of the sciences of mind and cognition. Searchable through tootfinder.

Sunet Social

#JuarreroBook Ch. 4 goes into more depth on the nature of context-independent and context-dependent constraints.

"Context- independent constraints take conditions away from equilibrium. They render conditions, events, and processes that were equally likely no longer equiprobable (Gatlin 1972). They establish the boundaries of uneven possibility landscapes (like fields) within which energy can flow and other constraints can emerge. Context-independent constraints turn the space of possibilities in which a system’s events and processesp lay out nonuniform or inhomogeneous. They induce nonequilibrium." e.g., gradients of inclined planes, polarities, diffusion or concentration gradients, the epigenetic possibility space of an organism (see Waddington's epigenetic landscape)

they 'initialize the prior probability distribution, of the possibility space'

"Context- dependent constraints are defined as constraints that take particles of matter and streams of energy flow away from independence from one other. They weave together streams of matter and energy into the coherent and covarying pattern of a coordination dynamic. They make distinct entities and processes interdependent without fusing them into a monolithic entity"

"In contrast to context-independent constraints, context-dependent ones generate complex forms of coherence such as multiply realizable interactional types, degeneracy, pluripotency, individuation, and evolvability. Context-dependent constraints also underlie metastability"

(comment on Context Changes Everything, p. 58)

BookWyrm

Social Reading and Reviewing

@uh @[email protected] @[email protected] @[email protected]

#JuarreroBook

Nice summary! What were your thoughts about the merits of the proposal?

As I mentioned earlier, I'm rather bothered by the rhetoric, unexplained jargon and lack of argumentation, which still persists in this chapter, which should not be introductory any more. Cases are briefly mentioned, e.g. major transitions in evolution, are then claimed to be examples of constraints operating, but no argument is provided to back those claims and little detail on what those constraints are is provided.

From what I could understand, the proposal seems to be the normal sort of complex system analysis of things, right? What does the chapter add to the tools of that sort of analysis?

I was also puzzled by the fact that she lists several scientific examples from several fields in which there is attention to constraints and dynamics. But I had thought that part of the motivation for the book is that science has neglected that kind of approach. Or is that criticism moved just against modern science (thus understood as the period roughly between XVIII-XIX)? Her points about space being seen as a passive container in modern science at the beginning of the chapter, followed in the end by some points about spacetime becoming a gravitational influence would suggest that reading (i.e. in XXth century science we stopped seeing space as a passive container).

If so, then I'm unclear on the dialectics: instead of being a radical revision of scientific ontology, it would rather be providing philosophical treatment of ontological views already operant in much of science.

What do you think?

Dimitri Coelho Mollo (@[email protected])

810 Posts, 732 Following, 800 Followers · Assistant Professor in Philosophy of AI at Umeå University, working on and at the foundations of the sciences of mind and cognition. Searchable through tootfinder.

Sunet Social

@uh Thanks for this summary, @[email protected]! I think this captures well the main message of this chapter, and apparently of the book in general.

The chapter also made clearer to me where her approach comes from, as she cites a few times in key points some of the mid-90's work that tried to apply dynamical systems theory tools to explaining cognition (like Kelso, other attempts included work in developmental psychology by Thelen and Smith - in philosophy this was taken up for example by van Gelder and some radical embodied cognition researchers). As far as I see, those attempts were mostly unsuccessful, failing to scale up from explaining simple things to more truly cognitive stuff (my view of this is though rather partial).

In general, I'm quite bothered by the style so far. This chapter, for example, is jargon-filled, and being at the beginning of the book, the jargon is not explained. I struggled to understand most of it. There was lots of rhetoric, which clashes with my view of what makes for good philosophical writing. Too much telling, too little showing. Hopefully this will change in future chapters (though I found ch.3 to be similarly disappointing).

@[email protected] @[email protected]

#JuarreroBook

Ulrike Hahn (@[email protected])

9.07K Posts, 1.71K Following, 2.13K Followers · Academic @Birkbeck, Univ. of London Centre for Cognition, Computation, and Modelling was just at Netherlands Institute for Advanced Study working on Digital Democracy with Davide Grossi and Michael Maes and then at the Munich Centre for Mathematical Philosophy, LMU now back in London works on #rationality #argumentation #testimony #SocialNetworks #misinformation #ComputationalSocialScience #DigitalDemocracy

FediScience.org

@uh @UlrikeHahn

Comments on "Identity" in ch 1.

"Wisdom is seeing the edges" is a thought that struck me strongly in a moment back in the 70s while I was enjoying an altered state of consciousness and listening to Pink Floyd. I wrote a reminder to consider it later.

What I meant was that what matters about knowing something is not its "essence", whatever that might be, but its interactions—how it behaves at the edges, its interface with its context. That thought stuck with me and has been key to unraveling many of the common philosophical conundrums of "identity", "consciousness", "the self", moral agency at multiple levels of organization, and more.

It's reassuring to see Juarrero coming to a similar understanding seen from different angles. The main difference in our views appears to be my emphasis on the ineluctable role of the observer in any _description_ of reality.

"Paradox is always a problem of insufficient context—in the bigger picture all the pieces must fit."
- Jef

#JuarreroBook #identity #buddhism #paradox

@uh @MolemanPeter @[email protected] @[email protected]

#JuarreroBook

Thanks for your thoughts Ulrike and Peter! I agree that those seem to be the aims of the book as stated in this chapter. However, I rather disliked this chapter. It provides a rather partial, oversimplified, and partly false historical reconstruction of many of the topics mentioned, making the dialectical setup rather unconvincing to me. In more detail: - the points about relations, interactions and context being seen as irrelevant or causally impotent fails to take into consideration the past 20 years or so of work on neo-mechanistic explanation, e.g. Bechtel, who tackle these things explicitly - similarly, the supposed mainstream consensus that cause and effect are purely a matter of energy-transferring processes does not exist. Currently (one of) the most influential theories of cause-effect is manipulationism (e.g. work by Woodward), in which energy-transfer plays no central role - it is not true that the consensus is that tokens of a kind differ only in secondary properties. Her own example of scorpions belonging to the same species denies this, as each scorpion differs from each other in many of their primary properties. There seems to be a conflation between primary properties and essential properties in her treatment. - saying in p.8 that the reason Darwin's theory of evolution by natural selection was controversial due just to its rejection of essence and immutability is a wild oversimplification - the whole depiction of reductionism is rather uncharitable, focusing exclusively on its crudest version, which pretty much no philosopher subscribes to today. Moreover, reductionism has been attacked and rejected by many philosophers of science already starting in the 70's, so it's very far from being anything like being the mainstream view - same for causation being only to be found at the level of quarks and electrons (actually, it's the opposite, it's difficult to make sense of causation at that level). Very few philosophers subscribe to this strong view. - there is a crude misinterpretation of the nature and motivations of Chalmers' Hard Problem of Consciousness, oversimplifying the whole debate. - on p.17, she seems to imply that naturalistic accounts of mind are just a no-go in current philosophy. The opposite is the case. Since at least the 1950s very few are dualists, and from the 70s on there has been a flurry of work on how to naturalise the mind, with a rather broad consensus around some version of functionalism + teleosemantics today. - the ontological picture she claims to be mainstream in philosophy today, the desert landscape sort of approach, is anything but. Since the 70's philosophers have been claiming that ontology, natural kinds, etc., are legion and go much beyond the kinds posited in physics.

In brief, I found this first chapter very frustrating. Hopefully the positive view she wants to put forward will not suffer from the weakness of this first, mostly negative chapter.

What do you think?

Ulrike Hahn (@[email protected])

9.07K Posts, 1.71K Following, 2.13K Followers · Academic @Birkbeck, Univ. of London Centre for Cognition, Computation, and Modelling was just at Netherlands Institute for Advanced Study working on Digital Democracy with Davide Grossi and Michael Maes and then at the Munich Centre for Mathematical Philosophy, LMU now back in London works on #rationality #argumentation #testimony #SocialNetworks #misinformation #ComputationalSocialScience #DigitalDemocracy

FediScience.org

@uh @UlrikeHahn

I see that Juarrero defines "coherence" as the property of complex systems whereby their parts are integrated and coordinated into a unified whole. This integration and coordination is brought about by constraints, which operate across different scales and dimensions to weave together streams of energy, matter, and information flow.

It's a good definition, in my estimation. I have been concerned with the question of "coherence" and how relative coherence of two systems might be measured and compared, for a couple decades now, My specific interest is in application to comparing different models of (human) values, hierarchical and fine-grained. [I often refer to this in terms of "increasing coherence over increasing context"]

The best approach I have envisioned so far is in terms of maximizing flow through a network, and I'm inspired by her reference to weaving together streams of energy, matter, and information flow. I see some parallels to notions of trophic flow in ecological networks, and a certain "resonance" with Ulanowicz's thinking on "Ascendancy".

#coherence #context #ArrowOfMorality #JuarreroBook

@uh @UlrikeHahn

I will focus here on "context" as more than the "space and time" in which something is observed to be/happen. I would emphasize that this sense of "context" is always _relational_ and is always plays some active role in shaping/constraining the perceived object system.

You may notice my use of words such as "observed" and "perceived". I may be taking this notion further than Juarrero, but I have long thought that _any_ meaningful description of a system is incomplete without including the context of the _observer_. (Often the observer goes without saying, but is always there.)

I am reminded of my high school physics class back in the 1970s, where I baffled and frustrated the instructor by my insistent questions asking for clarification of his definition of "entropy" as disorder. I kept trying to get him to see that the state of disorder must (it seems to me) be relative to the state of some observer. He never got it. I gave up and answered his test question about whether a scrambled egg has more entropy than a pristine egg in the shell, neglecting that the state of scrambledness may have been precisely the outcome for which work was done, to constrain the outcome.

Still bothers me... I'll sit down now and behave.

#entropy, #context, #constraint #JuarreroBook