Voice of Vietnam (and why less may be more)
Voice of Vietnam’s (VoV) Mandarin service told its listeners in its mailbag program on Sunday that their language service had received about 500 letters (this may include email), about the same number as in 2024. 2024 itself had seen an increase in correspondence by ten percent, according to last year’s year-end mailbag program. 2025 Website traffic was also similar to 2024, and social-media interaction (Weibo and Facebook are mentioned) have reportedly increased. Among all language services, the Chinese online pages rank among VoV’s top-three, together with the English and Vietnamese-language websites.
All this may not sound like a lot, but East Asian politicians are clearly more prepared to invest in external broadcasting, than their Western colleagues. This is palpable both in South Korea’s external broadcasting work, in Vietnam’s, and in China’s (the latter flooding shortwave with broadcasts – scheduled and for jamming purposes – with an intensity only seen from the USSR before). Even Japan doesn’t seem to be prepared to do away with its foreign radio service completely, despite serious budget issues.
The feeling that their countries have to catch up in terms of international prestige is one likely driver of these transmissions. But KBS World Radio and Voice of Vietnam also have a kind of "personality" among listeners that Voice of America, China Radio International and also Radio Japan (the latter usually referring to itself as "NHK World" now) are lacking. KBS World Radio have done their best to water down their station’s identity (they used to broadcast under the much catchier handle of "Radio Korea"), but they are still recognizably South Korean.
In contrast, both Chinese and U.S. foreign-broadcasting organizations have turned into rather confusing networks during the past decades, as their reach went far beyond shortwave and internet broadcasting, with many regional and local partners taking their content, too. In contrast to what has been the China Media Group (CMG) since March or April 2018, the U.S. Agency for Global Media (USAGM) gave rather detailed accounts on its global efforts (while they lasted), while the CMG’s work isn’t only confusing, but opaque.
Few people in the Americas, Europe, or Oceania would like to be accused of propaganda, but in a number of Asian countries, it isn’t even an accusation. That’s true for China and Vietnam alike, and VoV never hesitates to point out to its big neighbor that there is a big "East Sea" problem, while China can’t see the problem in the "South (China) Sea" (because they believe it’s all theirs anyway).
Given differences like these, being among the top-three of VoV’s programs means something. Most Chinese correspondence with VoV appears to be sort of ritualistic, polite to the extreme, and curious about the country. Oddly, what may also help is that VoV’s programs aren’t exhaustive in presenting the country. Much of the coverage reflects the views of the dictatorial political system, and when you hear "ordinary Vietnamese" citizens speak in front of a microphone, their statements are even more ritualistic than the audience’s.
That leaves a lot of room or your own research as a listener, and that may be considered a weakness, or a strength, depending on what your criteria are.
The weaknesses of this format is probably obvious. But its strength lies in piqueing curiosity among listeners. Indeed, not too many of an accidental audience may get into the Vietnamese rabbithole, but those who really do may become contacts for years to come.
The VoV Mandarin mailbag show certainly prides itself on its Chinese audience, some of whom actually pay visits to the station when travelling the country.
You get the picture, don’t you?
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#China #ChinaMediaGroup #foreignRadio #KBSWorldRadio #NHK #publicDiplomacy #territorialDisputes
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