| Blog | https://medium.com/@tanukisec |
| https://twitter.com/TanukiSec |
| Blog | https://medium.com/@tanukisec |
| https://twitter.com/TanukiSec |
The 2026 Sophos Active Adversary Report is out — and despite the hype, we saw no AI-driven sea change in the threat landscape, based on the 600+ IR and MDR cases that made up our dataset. Attackers mostly stuck with what already works.
Abuse of legitimate tools remained consistent, as did the lack of blocking categories of tools that are known to be routinely abused.
Missing telemetry continued to make it difficult for blue teamers to spot the signal in the noise, and an ongoing lack of phishing-resistant multifactor authentication (MFA) gave the criminals a quiet way in.
The most concerning change has been years in the making: The dominance of identity-related root causes — brute-force attacks, phishing, and other compromised-credential tactics — for successful initial access.
This constellation of tactics leverages weaknesses that can’t be addressed by simple patch hygiene and occasionally acts as a bonus multiplier for attacks in progress.
Key takeaways:
1️⃣ GenAI adds speed, volume, and noise to the threat landscape… but for now, that’s about it.
2️⃣ Identity-related tactics such as compromised credentials, brute-force attacks, and phishing, are by far the most common reason attackers gain initial access.
3️⃣ Attackers have made few changes to specific tools, tactics, or procedures — though one weird blocking trick may make a huge difference for many enterprises.
4️⃣ Saving money by minimizing telemetry collection might be penny-wise, but it’s definitely pound-foolish.
5️⃣ Prevention still beats detection, both in outcomes and in time and effort spent defending.
Read the report here: https://www.sophos.com/en-us/blog/2026-sophos-active-adversary-report
Man... MS Security Co-pilot is the worst.
Slow, expensive and useless.
https://www.jumblebee.co.uk/auction/detail/auction_id/charityauction2025
Association of Animal Artists’ Charity Auction 2025 for Wild Welfare is live if anyone wants to pick up some nice art and feel charitable.
@jerry https://www.jumblebee.co.uk/auction/detail/auction_id/charityauction2025#buzz_expend_319034 There are even pieces that might entice you :)
BIDDING OPENS ON THE 1ST AUGUST - PLEASE CHECK ARTWORK SIZE BEFORE BIDDING AS ARTWORK RANGES IN SIZES. PLEASE NOTE THAT DUE TO GPSR REGULATIONS WE CANNOT ACCEPT BIDS FROM EUROPE OR NORTHERN IRELAND. The Association of Animal Artists’ annual charity art auction is back again for 2025 and this year it's our biggest yet as we raise money for the fantastic Wild Welfare!The Association of Animal Artists is a diverse membership of over 450 artists, printmakers, sculptors and more whose passion for animals transcends the art they create. We strive to bring the sphere of wildlife conservation in line with that of our members artistic pursuits through continuous fundraising, and have donated thousands of pounds to various animal charities since our inception in 2009.Our biggest fundraising drive of the year comes through our annual charity art auction, for which our members kindly donate small artworks (all under A5 in size) to be auctioned to the public. We have been overwhelmed with donations of gorgeous artwork this year, and we are so excited to be bringing you a fantastic array of creativity to win!All proceeds from this auction will be donated to our 2025 charity partner - Wild Welfare, to support their work improving animal welfare for animals held in zoos, aquariums and sanctuaries across the globe! You can read more about Wild Welfare and the work that they do here!
By making minor changes to command-line arguments, it is possible to bypass EDR/AV detections.
My research, comprising ~70 Windows executables, found that all of them were vulnerable to this, to varying degrees.
Here’s what I found and why it matters 👉 https://wietze.github.io/blog/bypassing-detections-with-command-line-obfuscation
Defensive tools like AVs and EDRs rely on command-line arguments for detecting malicious activity. This post demonstrates how command-line obfuscation, a shell-independent technique that exploits executables’ parsing “flaws”, can bypass such detections. It also introduces ArgFuscator, a new tool that documents obfuscation opportunities and generates obfuscated command lines.
Hey everyone,
I'm micr0, the creator of @altbot, the open-source bot that helps generate alt-text for images on the Fediverse to make content more accessible.
I have some exciting news to share - Altbot no longer uses Google's services! Many of you expressed concerns about privacy when I first launched Altbot using Google Gemini, worried about your images being processed on their servers and potentially used for training.
I promised to fix this, and I'm thrilled to announce that Altbot 2.0 is now running entirely on my own hardware using the Ovis2:8B model. Your images are processed locally with absolutely zero data retention - your content never leaves my server and isn't used to train any models.
The new system is fully GDPR compliant, and descriptions are even better across all 11 supported languages. What's also cool is that the setup is significantly more energy efficient, with 36% of power coming from clean sources. Altbot now even shows you how much energy was used for each request!
The only things Altbot 2.0 records are that a request happened, how long it took, and what language was used. No images, no content, no personal data - nothing that could identify you.
Building this upgrade was more expensive than planned - I needed a more powerful server with an A5500 GPU, which exceeded my budget by about $900 that I covered out of pocket. If you appreciate this commitment to privacy and accessibility, any support through my Ko-fi page would help recover these costs and keep Altbot free for everyone: https://ko-fi.com/micr0byte/goal?g=18
Thanks so much for your support! I built Altbot because I believe accessibility shouldn't compromise privacy, and now that vision is reality.
Feel free to boost or reach out with any questions! For press inquiries: [email protected]