In case there are any Qubes OS users here: we just released Qubes Security Bulletin #29 for a critical Xen bug in PV memory virtualization allowing VM escape (XSA-212):
https://github.com/QubesOS/qubes-secpack/blob/master/QSBs/qsb-029-2017.txt
In case there are any Qubes OS users here: we just released Qubes Security Bulletin #29 for a critical Xen bug in PV memory virtualization allowing VM escape (XSA-212):
https://github.com/QubesOS/qubes-secpack/blob/master/QSBs/qsb-029-2017.txt
So, we are currently invading mastodon.social on two fronts - French social media, and the migration of #infosec from twitter :P
We should probably make @Gargron 's life easier and help the guy out; https://www.patreon.com/user?u=619786
Please boost! (it's the new RT, right?)
x86: broken check in memory_exchange() permits PV guest breakout
The XSA-29 fix introduced an insufficient check on XENMEM_exchange
input, allowing the caller to drive hypervisor memory accesses outside
of the guest provided input/output arrays.
IMPACT
======
A malicious or buggy 64-bit PV guest may be able to access all of
system memory, allowing for all of privilege escalation, host crashes,
and information leaks.