Hello, World! Welcome back! I have new blog :-)
Previously: Golem Foundation/Wildland, Qubes OS, hardware/virtualization/OS security research.
Previously: Golem Foundation/Wildland, Qubes OS, hardware/virtualization/OS security research.
Hello, World! Welcome back! I have new blog :-)
Does anyone happen to have a buidroot definition for encfs package (for Raspberrypi)?
(In case you wonder why I like encfs? Because it's the only cross platform fs-based encryption (so perfect for using over Dropbox) for which there is also an iOS app available (Boxcryptor Classic).)
Introducing Qubes Admin API:
Qubes Security Bulletin #31: Several Xen bugs, practical impact unclear (XSA 216-224):
Congrats to the Xen Team for finding most of the bugs and to Jann Horn of Google Project Zero for the remaining two!
Here's my quest for a project planning & tracking software:
https://github.com/QubesOS/qubes-issues/issues/2823
Some features I want:
1. Decompose projects into sub-projects, & further down,
2. Balance incomes & expenses,
3. Dependencies which can span multiple projects,
4. Take declarative description of projects, tasks, deps, people's availability, various constrains, etc,
5. Calendar-time and resource limitations aware.
So far TaskJuggler seems best, anything better/similar?
Organizations all over the world should DEMAND from Intel ability to disable ME/AMT code. For good. There are likely many more bugs there.
Intel should provide means to disable all ME code which runs AFTER host CPU init is complete, i.e. all the UNTURSTED-input processing code.
1. Details by the original discoverer: https://www.embedi.com/files/white-papers/Silent-Bob-is-Silent.pdf
2. Independent rediscovery: https://t.co/l0rDyFlb0N
TLDR: trivial auth bug in the AMT web server...
What consequences should face those, who build web servers into our CPUs?
Remember Intel's been keen on mocking OSS for its lack of security & liability. Here's a fragment from the 2014 book by Intel ME architect: