| Pronouns | She/Her |
| GitHub | https://github.com/dot166 |
He downplays the large number of default enabled Google services added by /e/ with extensive privileged access. Contrary to his claims, it does use Google Play binaries both in apps using it and ones downloaded by microG which they enabled by default.
Murena previously claimed server side encryption was good enough for their audience and comparable to actual end-to-end encryption. They ended up leaking highly sensitive user data across accounts for their services:
https://community.e.foundation/t/e-foundation-ecloud-security-notice-june-15-2022/42420
We have confirmed, based on a recent investigation, that limited user data was leaked on Sunday, May 29th 2022 impacting 26 of our cloud users. During an unexpected state of our services due to a service migration, we encountered some authentication conflicts. During this time window, these conflicts led to some users connecting to our services (379 users in total) to being wrongly authenticated and potentially seeing some other users’ files belonging to 26 impacted users, restricted to files t...
Duval makes many false claims about /e/ in this article.
He repeats his extraordinarily false claim that they ship the latest security patches each month across devices which they don't do on a single device let alone all of them. Shipping backports of AOSP patches is not providing all the security patches.
He once again misleads people about their speech-to-text service sending user data to OpenAI. Running it through their own servers first is not anonymizing it.
https://community.e.foundation/t/voice-to-text-feature-using-open-ai/70509
Thank you a lot for your positive and supporting comments about our new /e/OS Voice-to-text! Regarding its implementation in /e/OS, I’d like to explain a few things to explain why we have chosen an OpenAI STT API to implement it and how it’s going to evolve in the future: What we have learned from our experimentations with STT models that run locally on the smartphone for speech recognition: they work quite poorly, they make a lot of mistakes in voice recognition they are not able to mix la...
2nd recent example of Duval portraying serious privacy/security protections as being for pedophiles:
https://www.clubic.com/actualite-604786-murena-e-os-interview.html
Translation:
> But above all, we must not confuse the issue: /e/OS allows its users to avoid the massive collection of personal data that takes place on smartphones currently on the market—it is not designed to help child sex offenders evade the law. In other words: /e/OS is not a system designed for enhanced security that would be useful only to specific individuals.
Gaël Duval a cofondé Mandrake Linux en 1998. Près de trente ans plus tard, le fondateur de Murena et de /e/OS n'a pas changé de combat, mais le monde, lui, commence à rattraper ses convictions.
Duval has a history of claiming serious privacy and security protections only help pedophiles, criminals and spies. He has explicitly smeared GrapheneOS this way repeatedly, but also attacks privacy projects in general as he did there.
/e/ and Murena products have poor privacy and atrocious security. Here's information on that with links to coverage by third party experts:
We can make an expanded article with more info and more links to 3rd party experts included too.
This is an extreme misrepresentation of both what Gaël Duval said in this interview and our response to it. What he clearly said is that /e/ and Murena aren't providing security hardening which he claims is only useful for pedophiles, criminals and spies. Gaël Duval has repeatedly said this in his posts including ones where he directly says GrapheneOS is only useful for pedophiles, criminals and spies. We can show archives of numerous posts with him saying exactly that.
Here's a paywall bypass for the 2 paywalled articles above:
These are among the most egregious cases of France's corporate and state media presenting highly inaccurate state smearing of GrapheneOS as fact but there's much more.
GrapheneOS