#weis2024 is on an accelerated timeline this year.
The Submission deadline is 30 November 2023.
| website | https://www.danielwoods.info/ |
| bird | ieltop |
| business | https://www.linkedin.com/in/daniel-woods-82555199/ |
| work | https://www.inf.ed.ac.uk/people/staff/Daniel_Woods.html |
#weis2024 is on an accelerated timeline this year.
The Submission deadline is 30 November 2023.
Almost the entire world can use Google's chatbot Bard except Europe. The reason remains vague, so far.
With some quotes from me (In Dutch). I speculate that the Google is unsure how to comply with the GDPR, such as the GDPR's transparency requirements.
'Bijna de hele wereld kan Google’s chatbot Bard gebruiken behalve Europa, de reden blijft (nog) vaag'
https://www.volkskrant.nl/nieuws-achtergrond/bijna-de-hele-wereld-kan-google-s-chatbot-bard-gebruiken-behalve-europa-de-reden-blijft-nog-vaag~bd12f913/ #tech #bard #google #ai #llms #chatgpt #law #EU #dataprotection #gdpr
Microsoft announce an IR panel "designed to work with cyber insurance vendors".
The idea that BigTech firms would design their offering to interface with insurance would've been ridiculous just 5* years ago.
*the exact number is debatable
https://www.microsoft.com/en-us/security/blog/2023/03/27/microsoft-incident-response-retainer-is-generally-available/
Incredible graph tracking the price of cyber insurance
from the Economic Report of the President.
It could just as easily track the cybersecurity level required of policyholders.
Are hard insurance markets better for society? 🤔
Latest by @alphacentauri and me. Two years of strenuous data collection funneled into what I think is one of the most rigorous analyses out there for #cybercrime data.
We employ and extend the cyber risk model by @danielwwoods and Böhme to contextualize and evaluate which victim characteristic drive #cyber attackers preferences when launching #impersonation attacks.
The paper will be presented at Usenix Security 2023 this summer. Preprint: https://arxiv.org/pdf/2303.03249.pdf #cybercrime #infosec
Beazley launched a $45m cyber cat bond [1].
HannoverRe just tapped ILS investors for $100m of capital [2].
Coalition secured $300m of capital from private equity to launch an independent reinsurer [3].
It's premature for governments to rush in with backstops while there's so much innovation going on.
[1] https://www.ft.com/content/a945d290-a7f1-427c-84a6-b0b0574f7376
[2] https://www.artemis.bm/news/stone-ridge-retro-cyber-quota-share-hannover-re/
[3] https://www.prnewswire.com/news-releases/coalition-and-bdt-capital-partners-announce-the-launch-of-ferian-re-301648173.html
Imo the market needs to mature.
Some cyber insurers used harder market of 2021 to start tightening security conditions on policyholders.
This is a *good thing*, why would govt policy seek to unwind this.
Not to mention that investors are willing to take these risks, and the govt should see how far that can go before jumping in.
E.g. Tom Johansmeyer writes about appetite for ILS investors for cyber products
https://hbr.org/2022/03/the-cyber-insurance-market-needs-more-money
As cyber risk is growing, the cyber insurance market has stalled. Insurers are taking bigger losses, seeing tighter margins, and relying more heavily on reinsurance to cover their own risk. The result is that companies are getting less protection for more money. Insurance linked securities (ILS) could help give insurers the breathing room they need to keep growing — and meet customers’ growing needs — by helping insurers hedge against rare, catastrophic events.
UK Treasury considering a similar policy option, in addition to discussions in the US
https://www.ft.com/content/84221be3-2beb-4710-9970-5bccac2a98ed
Why a cyber insurance backstop is premature
tl;dr There's no evidence market conditions are restricting online economic activity (unlike post-9/11 which necessitated TRIA), and a backstop may reduce incentives for insureds to improve security
https://www.lawfareblog.com/federal-cyber-insurance-backstop-premature