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Have you considered using techniques like conditional PUT to enable multiple writers?
https://aws.amazon.com/about-aws/whats-new/2024/08/amazon-s3...
https://docs.aws.amazon.com/AmazonS3/latest/userguide/condit...
> ECC algorithms with smaller key sizes would be more vulnerable to a
quantum attack, as it would require a currently theoretical quantum computer with fewer qubits than would be required for an RSA key with the same cryptographic strength [25].
This is what keeps me skeptical about ECC. RSA is really chunky, and maybe that's a fundamental advantage from an information theory perspective. Compromising on the crypto scheme because we can't fit inside UDP seems like a cursed path.
We give precise quantum resource estimates for Shor's algorithm to compute discrete logarithms on elliptic curves over prime fields. The estimates are derived from a simulation of a Toffoli gate network for controlled elliptic curve point addition, implemented within the framework of the quantum computing software tool suite LIQ$Ui|\rangle$. We determine circuit implementations for reversible modular arithmetic, including modular addition, multiplication and inversion, as well as reversible elliptic curve point addition. We conclude that elliptic curve discrete logarithms on an elliptic curve defined over an $n$-bit prime field can be computed on a quantum computer with at most $9n + 2\lceil\log_2(n)\rceil+10$ qubits using a quantum circuit of at most $448 n^3 \log_2(n) + 4090 n^3$ Toffoli gates. We are able to classically simulate the Toffoli networks corresponding to the controlled elliptic curve point addition as the core piece of Shor's algorithm for the NIST standard curves P-192, P-224, P-256, P-384 and P-521. Our approach allows gate-level comparisons to recent resource estimates for Shor's factoring algorithm. The results also support estimates given earlier by Proos and Zalka and indicate that, for current parameters at comparable classical security levels, the number of qubits required to tackle elliptic curves is less than for attacking RSA, suggesting that indeed ECC is an easier target than RSA.
Title for the back of the class:
"Prompts sometimes return null"
I would be very cautious to attribute any of this to black box LLM weight matrices. Models like GPT and Opus are more than just a single model. These products rake your prompt over the coals a few times before responding now. Telling the model to return "nothing" is very likely to perform to expectation with these extra layers.