We'll put our support behind a ban on root-based attestation as long as pinning-based attestation is still allowed. Pinning-based attestation doesn't have the same issues with being used to restrict competition and user choice. Our Auditor app is primarily based around pinning-based attestation with little faith put in the initial root-based attestation. A single leaked key from the least secure devices can be used to bypass root-based attestation. It's absolutely not a serious security feature.

GrapheneOS will fight against attempts by the Canadian government to take control over what people are allowed to use on their devices rather than building a system to enable it. Volla is building a system governments will be able to use to control which hardware and software people are allowed to use. The only usage of attestation should be to protect users as our Auditor app does, not to control what they can use as a growing subset of banking and government apps are doing. That should stop.

GrapheneOS exists for the purpose of creating highly private and secure devices which are highly usable and compatible with all of the apps people want to use. GrapheneOS doesn't exist to provide a Canadian smartphone OS and eventually hardware. It's based in Canada because it was a pragmatic decision and we believe it's currently a better location for privacy projects than the US or EU. If that significantly changes, we're open to creating a non-profit elsewhere and moving our operations there.