A bit of commentary on the recent #Ukraine UAV crews beat #NATO in military exercise in #Sweden - hereâs what First Corps âAzovâ of the National Guard of Ukraine wrote[^1]
FPV crews from First Corps Azov of the National Guard of Ukraine took part in the multinational Aurora 2026 exercises in Sweden, serving as OPFOR, a simulated adversary for NATO forces and partner nations.
Then, this part touched the nerves of some European military commentators:
During a mechanized assault repelling drill, Ukrainian crews working alongside Swedish pilots from the Sweden UAV Center notionally destroyed 28 of approximately 32 vehicles. In another episode, they defeated a military airfieldâs defenses in under 20 minutes without losing a single airframe, hitting every designated target.
Canât say about Sweden but in Polish military circles this caused a lot of rather silly tribal offense with comments like âwhat a success propagandaâ, âthey didnât stick to rulesâ, âit was completely different from real battleâ etc.
I will just quote one Polish UAV expert Tomasz DarmoliĹski whom I know and who spent more time in Ukraine exchanging experiences with UAV operators than most of any Polish soliders:
This is not simply a matter of claiming that âthe Ukrainians defeated NATOâ. It was a training exercise, not a real battle. A more important conclusion is this: Ukrainian units, which have for years operated in an environment saturated with drones, electronic warfare, imagery reconnaissance and rapid decision-making loops, already operate according to a different battlefield logic than many Western formations.
If youâve ever been into #infosec wargaming, thatâs precisely what is happening here. You repeatedly fail and lose in a sandbox environment, so that you can learn why you failed. Such exercises are the best possible place to make these mistakes, because, unlike in real battle, you have infinite lives.
What remains a new training domain for some NATO armies is an everyday combat environment for Ukraine. There, FPV is not merely an add-on to manoeuvres. It is an element of reconnaissance, striking, blocking movement, isolating the combat zone and forcing the enemy to change tactics.
What he describes is not some Copernican paradigm shift - itâs a major change in operational philosophy and procedures, and thatâs precisely why it has to be trained over and over again.
The key conclusions are quite stark. Firstly, the classic practice of concentrating vehicles, columns and support elements in a single area is becoming extremely risky. Ukrainian operators had already pointed out during the earlier Hedgehog 2025 exercises in Estonia that Western habits of maintaining a tight formation are almost suicidal in conditions of mass drone use.
And the above is a very concrete lesson, if you remember massive Russian columns burning on the approach to Kyiv in 2022.
Secondly, FPV forces dispersal, camouflage, reduced signature and a constant focus on survivability. It is not enough to have system-level air defence. One must be aware that the immediate threat may come from a small platform, with a very short reaction time. Thirdly, commanders must understand drones not as âoperatorsâ equipmentâ, but as part of the combat system. Ukrainian operators emphasised that Western forces have the potential, but must develop tactics, counter-drone measures and the level of understanding of this domain at the command level more quickly. Interviewees quoted by the AP in its report on the exercises shared a similar view.
This is the most important lesson from Aurora 26: the advantage did not stem from miraculous technology. The Kyiv Post notes that the Ukrainians used rather standard solutions familiar from the front line, including FPV, tablets, goggles and simple controllers. The advantage stemmed from practice, procedures, the integration of reconnaissance with strike operations, and experience gained in real warfare.
[^1]: https://xcancel.com/azov_media/status/2054955335664734510?s=20
[^2]: https://xcancel.com/DarmolinskiT/status/2055550247355478415?s=20






