ARINC SelfServ vMUSE devices are down in airports in EU, they do self service check in. They’re connected to navAviNet aka ARINC Ground Network, managed by Collins Aerospace, who are owned by RTX.
An attacker got onto to the shared network.
To find your org on .@shodan search for:
"acSamlv2Error=" "webvpnc=" "Cache-Control: no-store"
Then add org:YourOrg or ssl:YourOrg
ARINC SelfServ vMUSE devices are down in airports in EU, they do self service check in. They’re connected to navAviNet aka ARINC Ground Network, managed by Collins Aerospace, who are owned by RTX.
An attacker got onto to the shared network.
To back up ReliaQuest - this is the exploit LAPSUS guys have running around with on SAP Netweaver, just had a look this evening after acquiring the exploit. https://reliaquest.com/blog/threat-spotlight-reliaquest-uncovers-vulnerability-behind-sap-netweaver-compromise/
There’s a metric ton - over 5 figures - of these boxes directly internet facing. Worse; from version printing, less than 5% are patched for the two CVEs being exploited.
New by me: Citrix forgot to tell you there was a zero day RCE vulnerability used widely since at least May in Netscaler.
Nobody released any technical information until now.
It has been used to pop "critical" organisations in the Netherlands and worldwide.
What to do:
Help request. My brother has Stage 4 colorectal cancer.
His life insurance has refused to pay out on a technicality, meaning he and his loved ones cannot afford the mortgage on their home.
I've never asked for anything in return for infosec stuff, but if you have anything spare, please chuck it this direction instead:
The individuals operating under the DragonForce banner are using social engineering for entry.
Defenders should urgently make sure they have read the CISA briefs on Scattered Spider and LAPSUS$ as it's a repeat of the 2022-2023 activity.
Links: https://www.cisa.gov/sites/default/files/2023-08/CSRB_Lapsus%24_508c.pdf
https://www.cisa.gov/sites/default/files/2023-11/aa23-320a_scattered_spider_0.pdf
I would also suggest these NCSC guides on incident management: https://www.ncsc.gov.uk/collection/incident-management
and effective cyber crisis comms: https://www.ncsc.gov.uk/guidance/effective-communications-in-a-cyber-incident
A company paid a ransomware group.. then had their info leaked by the same ransomware group anyway. Not isolated at all, eg UnitedHealthcare paid $20m and then got extorted again by the same person.
Stop paying ransomware groups. You are directly funding serious organised crime. https://www.bleepingcomputer.com/news/security/pandabuy-pays-ransom-to-hacker-only-to-get-extorted-again/
Also, to be super clear nobody should panic about #XZ as the Postgres developer who found this basically caught it quick enough that almost no businesses or devices will be running the code.
So everybody should be chill about this specific issue as that guy saved everybody’s bacon.
To give an idea of the scale of OpenSSH usage, it’s absolutely huge, it dwarfs RDP by a huge margin (think ten times), and had this survived for a long period of time it would have been unbelievably bad.
I accidentally found a security issue while benchmarking postgres changes.
If you run debian testing, unstable or some other more "bleeding edge" distribution, I strongly recommend upgrading ASAP.