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For those who missed my #Asahilinux #39c3 talk, it's available at https://media.ccc.de/v/39c3-asahi-linux-porting-linux-to-apple-silicon now.

I've also just pushed my slides to https://github.com/svenpeter42/39c3 and uploaded them as PDF to https://cfp.cccv.de/39c3/talk/YGHB9K/

Asahi Linux - Porting Linux to Apple Silicon

media.ccc.de
Apple added new mitigations to iOS: SPTM, TXM, and Exclaves. Even in the case of a kernel compromise, various components stay protected. You can read about more technical details in Moritz' thesis: https://arxiv.org/abs/2510.09272
Modern iOS Security Features -- A Deep Dive into SPTM, TXM, and Exclaves

The XNU kernel is the basis of Apple's operating systems. Although labeled as a hybrid kernel, it is found to generally operate in a monolithic manner by defining a single privileged trust zone in which all system functionality resides. This has security implications, as a kernel compromise has immediate and significant effects on the entire system. Over the past few years, Apple has taken steps towards a more compartmentalized kernel architecture and a more microkernel-like design. To date, there has been no scientific discussion of SPTM and related security mechanisms. Therefore, the understanding of the system and the underlying security mechanisms is minimal. In this paper, we provide a comprehensive analysis of new security mechanisms and their interplay, and create the first conclusive writeup considering all current mitigations. SPTM acts as the sole authority regarding memory retyping. Our analysis reveals that, through SPTM domains based on frame retyping and memory mapping rule sets, SPTM introduces domains of trust into the system, effectively gapping different functionalities from one another. Gapped functionality includes the TXM, responsible for code signing and entitlement verification. We further demonstrate how this introduction lays the groundwork for the most recent security feature of Exclaves, and conduct an in-depth analysis of its communication mechanisms. We discover multifold ways of communication, most notably xnuproxy as a secure world request handler, and the Tightbeam IPC framework. The architecture changes are found to increase system security, with key and sensitive components being moved out of XNU's direct reach. This also provides additional security guarantees in the event of a kernel compromise, which is no longer an immediate threat at the highest trust level.

arXiv.org
@codecolorist 真的是OBTS的荣幸
@thomasking2014 悄悄贫穷,生怕别人知道
@banty Yeah, exactly. Too bad that means I won’t get the chance to learn from the very best researchers.
I think today’s iOS security research is richer, more interesting, and covers more layers than ever before. Unfortunately, I didn’t find a single serious talk about it at Black Hat USA 2025.
@codecolorist 发财!

Two new https://arm.jonpalmisc.com updates:

- the search bar should now return better results thanks to better page indexing; and

- when it doesn’t, there are now “all instructions” and “all registers” pages you can CMD+F manually.

Jon's Arm Reference

This site offers reference documentation for the AArch64 instruction set and system registers defined by the Armv8-A and Armv9-A architectures.

@codecolorist 等你请吃饭呢,好饿