Just in case you missed it: The Shadow Brokers has published a rant and the password for their tool dump.

https://medium.com/@shadowbrokerss/dont-forget-your-base-867d304a94b1

Password for c&p is:

CrDj"(;Va.*NdlnzB9M?@K2)#>deB7mN

Files, for those needing them, at:

https://pastebin.com/hur8kVYM

(thanks to @kript3ia for reminding me)

For someone definitely active in the 90s this Equation Group dump is exactly as described by @osxreverser: a trip down memory lane.

There's exploits for Apache running on Linux for DEC Alpha, Netscape Enterprise Server, RedHat 5.x and stuff that you probably haven't heard except in "greybeard's storytime".

If you wander over to the birdsite @osxreverser is posting headers of all the interesting exploits he finds.

There is also an OpenSSH one (KWIKEMART): https://twitter.com/osxreverser/status/850678952138067969

# KWIKEMART
###################################3
# SSH-1.5-1.2.27
# SSH-1.5-OpenSSH-1.2.3
# SSH-1.99-OpenSSH_2.1.1
# SSH-1.99-OpenSSH_2.2.0

So, KWIKEMART, in /bin/km (not found source yet) has pearls such as the following in its strings:

echo CHRIS CHRIS
No Crash, might have worked
Reply from remote: %s
CHRIS
No Chris not found and since we can't live without her .. searching on
error on read, continuing

It looks suspiciously like we might have to RE them all to find out if the holes are all patched...

Oh, this is interesting (but expected):

#######################################
### ELITEHAMMER
#######################################
### Runs against RedFlag Webmail 4 (software install)
### Gives you user nobody, not root;
### Need a local to get root (EVENTSTART or ELASTICBANJO?)
### Webmail port is usually 80 or 443

For ref: Red Flag Linux is a, now defunct, Chinese distribution (see https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Red_Flag_Linux)

Another adorable "from the past" entry, interesting choice of name (CICADA, see https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Cicada_3301 and engage your conspiracy theories):

#########################################################
# ELVISCICADA
#########################################################
### only up to ealry Sol2.9; Sol2.10 not vulnerable

### snmpXdmid (/usr/lib/dmi/dmispd) daemon program (RPC program 300598 version 1)

This one is pure "History Channel" material:

############################################
# EXPOSITTRAG
############################################

# exploit pcnfsd version 2.x (fails on v.1 or 3+)

I cannot imagine many people in 2017 even remember pcnfsd: I used to run it so it brings back those pangs of infinite pain associated with something which should never have been born in IT.

...and what would life be without a little Samba?

###################### ECHOWRECKER #####################
# samba server vulnerability

# Samba 3.0.2a-9AX and Samba 3.0.5 are currently vulnerable
# Samba 2.x on Redhat 7.3, 8.0, and 9.0 are vulnerable

Ah, this one I have in my private stash from a friend, but without the codename :D

###################### ELECTRICSLIDE #####################
# Heap Overflow in squid 2.5.STABLE1-2 redhat 9.0
-scan 3128 TARGET_IP

Definitely remember this one being used.

Now for a little something for those oft-forgotten admins using Exim (hey, I have been a Sendmail user since the heady days of "real" BSD so I am allowed to be cynical):

###################### ERRGENTLE ##########################
# exploits vulnerability Exim 3.22 thru Exim 3.35 Mail Transfer Agent
# brute force

"History Channel" again, this one combines an ancient daemon with operating systems of a different era:

############################################
# TOOLTALK -DEC, IRIX, or Sol2.6 or earlier
############################################

-scan rpc TARGET_IP

# look for 100083 1 tcp 30889 ttdbserverd

We are talking CDE here (http://www.kb.cert.org/vuls/id/387387). You know KDE? No, CDE...

This one is very local :)

################################################
### VS - VIOLET
### You need to do this exploit from a box very close (ideally on the same net)
### as the target because of the traffic it generates.
### Reference the README file in /current/bin for help on the new version
################################################
#Start Xserver on local ops machine prior to logging in

I haven't looked at it... but XDCMP ;)

We've *all* used this one...

# PTRACE/FORKPTY

### new exploit is ptrace-kmod; it's a kernel exploit, no suid needed.
### works on linux 2.2 -> 2.4, ex) RH8.0 and MDK 9.0
### might have to run it twice before it works.
### other ptraces are older and need to run against a setuid program that won't log
# find / -fstype nfs -prune -o -type f \( -perm -4000 \) -user root -ls > o
# get o

This is very intriguing:

########################################
# SAMPLEMAN / ROUTER TOUCH
########################################

Clearly hits Cisco via some sort of redirection via a tool on port 2323...

A favourite on the History Channel:

########################################
# ENGAGENAUGHTY
########################################
# Apache and SSL exploit on Linux on Dec ALpha
# ssl must be OpenSSL 0.9.6d or earlier

This is almost endearing.

Perhaps my History Channel programme should premiere with this:

# EGGBASKET

# Remote exploit against the Netscape Web Server which leverages
# a buffer overflow to obtain remote access

# Netscape Enterprise/3.6 and Netscape Enterprise/3.6 SP1
# works against AIMC Netscape servers also with right versions

Adorable foray into AIX history:

###################### EXCEEDSALON-AIX #####################
## local elevation for AIX
## does not log but check anyway
# elevation as user
mkdir /tmp/.pci
cd /tmp/.pci
# use ftshell, uudecode copy/paste, telnet/nc, or wget to put
# /current/up/xp_lquerypv-aix5.1 up as s
./s

How many of your remember Cobalt boxes (https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Cobalt_Qube)?

###################### ESTOPFORBADE #####################
# local root elevation against gds_inet_server under
# Cobalt Linux release 6.0
# for complexpuzzle

# on target from nopen

We've done Sendmail, we've done Exim so here's Postfix!

########################################
# Exploits a vulnerability in the Postfix mail server.
# Postfix runs on FreeBSD, Linux, Solaris, and most Unix servers.
# This exploit works for the default binary packages in SuSE 9.0-9.2, ASP Linux 9, and Debian 3.1

This one is smart and elegant: fix RPMs so you cannot tell they have been modded.

DIZZYTACHOMETER
# Most Linux distributions contain a RPM database which stores information on installed files. Thus, if a system file is
# modified, the rpm "Verify" command easily alert the sysadmin of the changed file. DIZZYTACHOMETER alters a computer's
# RPM (4.1 or higher) database in order to hide a modified file.

This one is almost not worth mentioning... I mean, phpBB? We've all used an exploit on that!

############################ ESMARKCONANT ##################################
# Exploits a vulnerability in the phpBB forum software.
# No authentication is required.

# target to be running phpBB less than version 2.0.11

Finally something sexy: kernel level implant.

# SUCTIONCHAR
# 32 or 64 bit OS - solaris sparc 8,9
# Kernel level implant - transparent, sustained, or realtime
# interception of procoess input/output vnode traffic.
# retrieve later

# filter: ssh, telnet, rlogin, rsh, password, login, csh , su

HP-UX:

# TRIGGERING HPUX INCISION via JACKLADDER and JACKLADDERHELPER
### HP-INCISION provides process and file hiding.
### HP-JACKLADDER differs from other JACKLADDERs because it requires the use
### of special source ports for triggering.
### JACKLADDERHELPER is an "instant-grat" version listening on an extra port.
### JACKLADDER will take over once the target reboots.

Just a quickie, Adam Caudill put up a GitHub for everything out of The Shadow Brokers dump:

https://github.com/adamcaudill/EquationGroupLeak

Love this AIX-specific implant:

# SLYHERETIC v1.0.5.0
### SLYHERETIC is a light-weight implant for AIX 5.1 and AIX 5.2 Uses Hide-in-Pl
ain-Sight techniques to provide stealth.
### SlyHeretic_Persistent: This installer injects a backdoor into a system proce
ss and persists across system reboots.
### SlyHeretic_OneShot: This installer injects a backdoor into a system process
and does not persist across system reboots.

A classic Solaris RPC exploit (RPC was always a boon for exploits in the 90s):

EBBISLAND
(Exploit for Solaris 2.6, 2.7, 2.8, 2.9 and 2.10)

First ensure that the vulnerable rpc service(bootparam) is running. You must
be able to reach the target system's TCP port that the designated target RPC is listening upon.

Ooh, SquirrelMail, remember that? So many ISPs ran it because it was free webmail... This one is explicitly known to be "public":

# ELIDESKEW v1.0.0.1
### Public known vulnerablity in SquirrelMail versions 1.4.0 - 1.4.7
### Patched for versions => 1.4.8
### Tested on CentOS and FreeBSD successfully
### will be apache on target; use approprate tool( if available) to elevate

Sendmail...

# EARLYSHOVEL
## publicly known vulnerability
## remote exploit available for linux RH7 running sendmail
###Supported targets:
### "ASPRH73": ASP Linux 7.3 or RedHat 7.3 running Sendmail 8.11.6
### "RH70": RedHat 7.0 running Sendmail 8.11.0
### "RH71": RedHat 7.1 running Sendmail 8.11.2
### "RH73": RedHat 7.3 running Sendmail 8.11.6
### requires valid user name ( 7.1 and 7.3)
### may also require valid domain for (7.3)

History Channel: X11 now!

ENGLANDBOGY
## local exploit against Xorg for the following versions:
## Xorg X11R7 1.0.1, X11R7 1.0, X11R6 6.9
## Includes the following distributions:
## MandrakeSoft Linux 10.2, Ubuntu 5.0.4, SuSE Linux 10.0,
## RedHat Fedora Core5, MandrakeSoft Linux 2006.0
## Fails-on - Xorg X11R7 1.0.2 and greater and less than Xorg X11R6 6.9.
### Requirements - Target needs to have the Xorg binary as SETUID root.

Oracle on HP-UX (INCISION is mentioned):

# DITTLELIGHT (HIDELIGHT)
### To run the unix oracle db scripts, you must do them outside of an INCISION process
### therefore, you can use DITTLELIGHT (HIDELITE) to unhide your nopen window
### You must run HIDELIGHT on a process with a parent PID of "1" so
### do a callback to your redirector and run hidelite on the callback window

Public Service Announcement: the chances of you becoming rich & famous with the vulnerabilities in the Shadow Brokers dump are close to zero.

Come for the vulns, stay for the fascinating historical perspective and the chance to have an insight into TAO.

Believe me, I had nowhere near the organisation & planning that are in this dump in 1986-1996, not even close and I got my first root in 1985.

Goodness, the drama on the birdsite over The Shadow Brokers is unbelievable. This is closer to screaming teenagers because Justin Bieber farted than proper analysis.

Of course, there might be something of interest like a long-missed local kernel exploit but most of the stuff isn't even used any more!

I have decided to name it like a History Channel episode to try and clarify the matter: "Mummies of TAO".

Some further recommended reading for *analysis* of the targeting:

bin/tn.spayed
bin/tn.spayed.oldkey
bin/pyside/targets.py

The first two are all INTONATION and it is quite an eclectic mix: gov't, universities, some "hot" stuff in 1990s like ITRC (Iran Telecommunications Research Centre) but overall I'm still calling it a telco attack staging system.

Looking through the code and, in particular, at the targets I am surprised that there appears to be nothing for either VMS or NSK (Tandem) both of which used to run the vast majority of telcos in the 90s.

I assume the targets, being mainly "non-aligned countries" (to use an old name), might have used cheaper technology but I am pretty confident some of those (e.g. Taiwan) would have used the "Western standard tech".

To give you an idea there were telcos even in poorer European countries which, thanks to monopoly status giving them a license to print money, ran their billing (and therefore call records, CDRs) on VMS or Tandem.

I was personally acquainted with the Sprint Tandem setup, the Telecom Italia one and CyTA's VMS. I am therefore rather puzzled as to why other "non-aligned countries" did not use them or were not targeted via these systems.

@cynicalsecurity The .hu uni INTONATION server was pwned routinely back then (both by students and outsiders). Pretty sure it wasn't a target but a jump host or similar. Appeared in previous leaks too.
@cynicalsecurity such a mean CW... also when you reply to something with a CW (without expanding it) the reply screen expands it :\ ugh.
@cynicalsecurity I was just thinking this myself. Everything is meticulously documented and nothing is left to chance, it's a flowchart almost.
@femme whilst people might not like saying so they are professionals and it shows. You are not looking at a group of teenagers forming a hacking collective here: this is a professional operation, most likely against telcos, and masked to appear Chinese (the zh_cn locale).
@cynicalsecurity innocent question: do you at the present have such level of documentation for your vulns or is it scattered all over the place? I ask inqiisitively because I'm struggling in finding a way to keep all my vulns. so far is just folders with names,version, type of bug,repro for the bug....have you found anything more efficient? thanks

@p3t3_r3c0n honest answer: no. The really good stuff is on a separate lab network in a safe location and fully documented but day-to-day stuff is in various directories in different states of documentation.

I use DEVONthink to keep day-to-day stuff organised and filed but not the good stuff which is simply something I need to physically go to a place to work on. Day-to-day includes vulns but also research papers, my working notes, etc

The "production stuff" is different.

@cynicalsecurity hmm thanks alot. I will look at a document management solution
@p3t3_r3c0n the only reason I use DEVONthink is that it allows me to have multiple databases for my various interests, from nukes to vulnerabilities via crypto. It also has a pseudo-AI which, after several years of use, is trained to file documents in the inbox pretty well which is the most time-consuming exercise (e.g. it recognises PHP vs. C!).
@cynicalsecurity wow awesome,will have a look at it and similar doc managers. thanks alot for the tip!
@p3t3_r3c0n BTW: OS X only, I should have warned you beforehand and the mobile version is unbelievably bad/useless.