Jeff Fortin T. (風の庭園のNekohayo)

Looking at https://support.google.com/pixelphone/answer/6300638 and https://www.androidcentral.com/how-does-android-save-your-fingerprints, I'm curious what y'all think about modern #Android devices' "Trusted Execution Environment" storing #fingerprints (for authentication, unlocking, etc.) in, allegedly, a TPM-backed secure enclave that the OS doesn't have access to (really?)… For Pixel phones, Google claims biometrics never leave the TEE enclave, never touch servers, etc.

I wouldn't use it to travel… but local? I saw some geek friends using it.

#biometrics #security

It's fine even for travel, just poweroff/Lockdown
It's fine for local use (not travel)
I'm unsure / I don't know
Absolutely don't trust the system!
Poll ends at .
Understand fingerprint security - Pixel Phone Help

Your fingerprint data is stored securely and never leaves your Pixel device or Nexus phone. Your fingerprint data isn't shared with Google or any apps on your device. Apps are notified only wheth

Jun 16 at 3:28amTuba
Show threadmaymage2d ago
@nekohayo *obligatory pixel->grapheneos comment*
Show threadJames Just James2d ago

@nekohayo All mainstream phones (at a minimum) are completely insecure. It's by design. TBQH if I had the extra cash, I'd experiment with GrapheneOS, but they have ulterior motives too, so TBQH I'm quite disenfranchised with "mobile" computing atm.

https://arstechnica.com/gadgets/2025/10/leaker-reveals-which-pixels-are-vulnerable-to-cellebrite-phone-hacking/

Leaker reveals which Pixels are vulnerable to Cellebrite phone hacking

Cellebrite can apparently extract data from most Pixel phones, unless they're running GrapheneOS.

Ars Technica
Show threadJeff Fortin T. (風の庭園のNekohayo)6h ago

@purpleidea Very interesting link! Though that's the whole "protection against the gubbermint unlocking your phone" kind of stuff, which… they can always compel you to do so anyhow 🤷

I'm rather interested in whether the fingerprints (which the governments already have anyway) can be slurped by Google or some system vulnerability wrt the TEE enclave, instead…

Additionally I'm curious to hear what "ulterior motives" you see the GrapheneOS folks having…

Show threadJames Just James6h ago
@nekohayo All these tpms and secure enclaves are apparently so secure but I don't buy it that better funded organizations can't get data out of them.
Show threadJames Just James6h ago

@nekohayo GrapheneOS is militantly anti-copyleft. They have ulterior motives to have their own lock-in and proprietary ecosystem I would guess.

Same challenge with some of the server sovereignty people suggesting proprietary alternatives that are just hosted elsewhere. Eventually you'll be in a different bind. Nobody wins this. Just make the code fully open and copyleft and at least there will be no lock-in and no sneaky games and no losers. (But no hegemons either which is what many want.)

Show threadJasper Vinkenvleugel2d ago

@nekohayo on Arm, this uses TrustZone: https://source.android.com/docs/security/features/trusty

For my master’s thesis I worked a bit on hardware security, specifically side-channel analysis, and at the same time someone else in the group was working on clock glitching and TrustZone if I remember correctly. From this, my takeaway is: actually leaking anything useful is at the same really easy and really hard, at least from a hardware perspective.

Trusty TEE  |  Android Open Source Project

Android Open Source Project
Show threadTorx2d ago

@nekohayo I assume this is only related to #degoogled phones like #GrapheneOS?!

On devices where Google-Software runs unrestricted trust is broken