Why do they want non-hybrid KEMs and signatures, anyway? Seems like a bad idea to protect all of everything with nothing but unproven crypto.
@argv_minus_one I have an introductory chart https://blog.cr.yp.to/20260221-structure.html showing the arguments and counterarguments.
Most common argument from proponents: NSA is asking for non-hybrids, ergo support non-hybrids. This argument works for (1) companies chasing NSA money, (2) companies that take any excuse for extra options as a barrier to entry for competitors, and (3) people who think that "NSA Cybersecurity" isn't a conduit for https://www.eff.org/files/2014/04/09/20130905-guard-sigint_enabling.pdf but rather an independent pro-security agency.
Everything I wrote is simple and consistent and, if you look at the context of when they were made, easy to follow. For those just jumping in.
1. As a long-time person involved with the IETF I have not seen any hidden/coercive NSA involvement.
2. I accept that the EFF budget piece is accurate.
3. The term "crazy conspiracy thinking" referred to your blog posts on this topic.
I do not argue with NSA/NIST and pointed out why they could do that in the past. I find it amusing that ISO refused to standardize NSA's Simon and Speck. Perhaps they're not as good at influence as they used to be.
@rsalz @darkuncle Okay, so you're not disputing the authenticity of https://www.reuters.com/article/us-usa-security-rsa-idUSBRE9BJ1C220131220/ regarding NSA paying the RSA company to roll out Dual EC.
Now let's look at an IETF part of the Dual EC story. Are you disputing the accuracy of, e.g., https://web.archive.org/web/20251229182801/https://blog.cryptographyengineering.com/2017/12/19/the-strange-story-of-extended-random/ and https://web.archive.org/web/20260331174508/https://sockpuppet.org/blog/2015/08/04/is-extended-random-malicious/ saying NSA paid your colleagues Paul Hoffman and Eric Rescorla to coauthor with NSA a series of IETF drafts on "Extended Random" etc.? The payment is again overt leverage towards the consultants.