End-to-End Encryption is good but metadata protection counts as much. Names, group descriptions and memberships, avatars, who talks to whom ...

Both #deltachat and #signal go to great length to protect all the metadata that WhatsApp grants itself gratuitously. #Matrix stores similar scales of metadata on their servers, even if you can choose which server stores it.

Everything is better than #Telegram which additionally stores message contents in all group chats/channels and most 1:1 chats.

@delta i don't even believe WA's e2e encryption is real. When you reactivate whatsapp from a new phone, without the transfer protocol, but from the same number, you can see the plaintext of all messages you missed. If the key was in your "end" (old phone) only, there would be no possible way to see those messages.

Whereas for Signal if you don't explicitly back up and transfer keys, you won't be able to decrypt messages your received in the meantime.

@ebrum This is likely caused not by decrypting queued messages, but by the sender automatically re-encrypting the messages to your new device and resending them when key change is detected, see https://signal.org/blog/there-is-no-whatsapp-backdoor/ (and https://www.theguardian.com/technology/2017/jan/13/whatsapp-design-feature-encrypted-messages for the referenced article).
There is no WhatsApp 'backdoor'

Today, The Guardian published a story falsely claiming that WhatsApp’s end-to-end encryption contains a “backdoor.”

Signal Messenger
@delta very interesting, thank you!