The United States was not ready for this war.
Secretary of State Rubio publicly acknowledged the structural mismatch before the operation began:
Iran produces more than 100 ballistic missiles per month,
against six or seven interceptors that the United States can manufacture in the same period.
The Shahed-136 drone costs between twenty and fifty thousand dollars to produce.
-- The PAC-3 interceptor that destroys it costs four million.
The THAAD interceptor costs twelve point seven million.
The twelve-day war in June 2025 had already consumed approximately 150 THAAD interceptors
— roughly a quarter of the entire global supply.
The first nine days of Epic Fury burned through an additional 40 THAAD,
90 Patriot, and over 180 carrier-based interceptors.
Current THAAD production runs at approximately eight missiles per month.
The January 2026 contract with Lockheed Martin to quadruple production to 400 per year requires seven years to reach full capacity.
New interceptors will not arrive in meaningful volumes before 2028.
The Stimson Center’s analysts put the timeline to critical arsenal depletion at four to five weeks.
At that point, the United States faces a choice that no American strategic planner has been willing to articulate publicly
— who to defend: Israel, Taiwan, or tankers in the Gulf.
Because defending all three simultaneously has proven beyond American capacity.

