LafargueAlright - with apologies for platforming this Nazi bastard, I regret I'm going to start a thread for notes on 'Being and Time' - yet another bite at this thing
I think I'll do page references to the Blackwell edition, not to the original pagination
From page 55, then - the section on 'The Concept of Logos'. Page 57:
"If, as has become quite customary nowadays, one defines "truth" as something that 'really' pertains to judgement, and if one then invokes the support of Aristotle with this thesis, not only is this unjustified, but, above all, the Greek conception of truth has been misunderstood."
[Compare Brandom's reworking of Hegel as a neo-Aristotelian for whom truth is exactly Logos as judgement]
Page 70: "Because Dasein's characters of Being are defined in terms of existentiality, we call them "existentialia". These are to be sharply distinguished from what we call "categories" - characteristics of Being for entities whose character is not that of Dasein."
Page 73 (summarizing Scheler): "Acts are something non-psychical. Essentially the person only exists in the performance of intentional acts, and is therefore essentially *not* an object."
Page 89: "When Dasein directs itself towards something and grasps it, it does not somehow first get out of an inner sphere in which it has been proximately encapsulated, but its primary kind of Being is such that it is always 'outside' alongside entities which it encounters and which belong to a world already discovered."
Ok, pretty sure I've reached the point (in the discussion of Descartes) where I gave up last time I tried to read this, so it's all progress from here
I will say, it's much easier to read this thing having worked through Aristotle's Metaphysics somewhat carefully. Presumably it would be easier still if I knew the scholastics.
One of the interpretive challenges with Heidegger, imho, is to distinguish the bits of his apparatus that are broadly irrationalist from the bits that are specifically fascist. Fascism is a subset of irrationalism - there are plenty of non-fascist or indeed anti-fascist irrationalisms.
Page 160: "According to the analysis which we have now completed, Being with Others belongs to the Being of Dasein, which is an issue for Dasein in its very Being. Thus as Being-with, Dasein 'is' essentially for the sake of others."
Quite funny that you have all this maximally abstract stuff about the existential analysis of Dasein as preparatory to fundamental ontology's uncovering of the forgotten question of the meaning of Being, etc. etc., but he can't stop himself from sharing this little mini-rant about how horrible public transport is
I don't really understand what he's doing in Chapter V - 'Being-in as such'. The discussion of "projection" (pages185-6) is I guess somewhere in the space of Aristotelian potential? not sure.
General architectonic so far has been reasonably clear. Introduction: We've forgotten the question of Being, we need to revive the question. That's because we've been using the wrong philosophical approach - both the standard interpretation of Aristotelian categories, and then the Kantian version of that categorial approach in German idealism, bind us to categories that occlude the real ontological issues, keeping us at the level of the 'ontic' - Aristotelian substance (beings) rather than Being
So we need to start by outlining a successor-concept to the Aristotelian/Kantian categories of the understanding. That is, we need an analysis of the nature of 'Dasein' (human cognition/agency). Heidegger distinguishes between 'categories' (which apply to non-human objects of understanding, etc.) and 'existential' analysis, which applies only to Dasein itself. So the whole book is basically an 'existential' analysis of the framework via which Dasein processes the world.
The idea is that if we get these existential categories right, we open a way to some kind of contact not just with substance/beings/the ontic but with Being itself, because we're no longer occluding our relationship to Being with crappy categories.
Then the early chapters are: I) Outlining the project of the existential analysis of Dasein; II) Dasein's basic relation to the world; III) physical space (analogous to Kant's treatment of space, though Heidegger takes Descartes as his contrastive case); IV) a first pass at intersubjectivity - relation between Dasein and other subjects (in the form of the disgusting masses - the "They');
p. 186: "Understanding is either authentic, arising out of one's own Self as such, or inauthentic."
p. 200: "Our fore-sight is aimed at something present-at-hand in what is ready-to-hand." [in Brandom's neopragmatist terms, we're talking about the transformation of skillful coping disposition into explicitated assertion.]
Getting out over my skis a bit here, but Brandom interprets Heidegger as a pragmatist on the basis of sections like this one. That is, Heidegger is saying that "presence-to-hand" in the form of our relation to objects available to description via assertion (the logos) emerges out of "readiness-to-hand": for Heidegger ontology has been stuck at the level of this kind of presence-to-hand of the logos (what Derrida will later call 'logocentrism').