Giorgio ComaiFeb 21

RE: https://mastodon.social/@giocomai/116105019666162289

As I reflect on the reasons for my own incredulity about Russia's invasion of Ukraine in the weeks and months before it was launched, I often come back to the public rhetoric and practices that Ukraine's leadership was pursuing at the time, in early 2022.

Surely enough, I thought a full scale invasion did not make much sense. But my thinking was also based on the following line of reasoning: 🧵 [1/8]

Show threadGiorgio Comai
"If Ukraine's government believed an invasion was coming, they would be evacuating border villages, building up defences, moving troops, have clear contingency plans for civilians shared with municipal and regional authorities. They have access to classified Western intelligence, and surely intelligence of their own, and yet they are doing none of the above: obviously, they don't believe a war is coming." [2/8]
Feb 21 at 2:25pmTuba
Show threadGiorgio ComaiFeb 21

The Ukrainian government was insisting very publicly that no invasion was coming, both to international audiences - https://www.theguardian.com/world/2022/feb/02/ukraine-western-talk-of-imminent-attack-putin - and to domestic audiences - https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=DSMMlF9vptg

Obviously, they didn't believe a war was coming. [3/8]

Don’t panic: why Ukraine doesn’t like western talk of imminent attack

Analysis: While Putin’s intentions remain unclear, Kyiv would rather it didn’t get classed as the next Kabul

The Guardian
Show threadGiorgio ComaiFeb 21

Even before the latest long-read, Shaun Walker had been reflecting on this point back in 2022, with an article discussing how "Some are looking back at weeks before invasion and asking if more could have been done" - https://www.theguardian.com/world/2022/jun/03/ukraine-russia-war-ukrainians-question-mistakes-preparations-buildup

As one of the interviewees for that article put it, "Of course there are a lot of questions, the Russians were already drawing the letter Z on their equipment and everyone was saying something is coming, and our guys here were saying ‘don’t worry’." [4/8]

As war drags on, Ukrainians start to ask: could we have prepared better?

Some are looking back at weeks before invasion and asking if more could have been done

The Guardian
Show threadGiorgio ComaiFeb 21
And what about area experts that were sceptical about the likelihood of an invasion? It's right to question our own biases and assumptions, and the many implications of information asymmetry. [5/8]
Show threadGiorgio ComaiFeb 21

There's a whole line of criticism associated with the unfortunate label of "Westsplaining" - https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Westsplaining - blaming Western-European analysts for ignoring voices from the region and downplaying Russia's threat.

Yet, in this most momentous of times, listening to voices from Ukraine was a major contributing factor leading observers such as myself to downplay the risks that an invasion was forthcoming. [6/8]

Westsplaining - Wikipedia

Show threadGiorgio ComaiFeb 21
Shaun Walker's latest - https://www.theguardian.com/world/ng-interactive/2026/feb/20/a-war-foretold-cia-mi6-putin-ukraine-plans-russia - shows how people with direct access to a lot of information, did not believe a war was coming. These include people in different positions such as Zelensky's chief of staff Andriy Yermak, Russia's lead negotiator Dmitri Kozak, and, until the very last hours before the bombing started, Bruno Kahl, the chief of Germany’s foreign intelligence service. [7/8]
A war foretold: how the CIA and MI6 got hold of Putin’s Ukraine plans and why nobody believed them

Drawing on more than 100 interviews with senior intelligence officials and other insiders in multiple countries, this exclusive account details how the US and Britain uncovered Vladimir Putin’s plans to invade, and why most of Europe – including the Ukrainian president, Volodymyr Zelenskyy – dismissed them

The Guardian
Show threadGiorgio ComaiFeb 21

There's a lot to think about, with the benefit of hindsight. Surely, there's a lot of reflection for the intelligence community, and the policy-makers who had access to intelligence.

But analytically, I struggle to reach clear conclusions in terms of "lessons learned" for external observers and area experts. [8/8]