Raring to get stuck into this, having finished volume I earlier today.

Some interesting tidbits from Vol II of ASIO's official history:

1) ASIO's looking after a former agent.

2) The personal and familial toll of being an ASIO agent against Australian Communists.

3) Negative externalities of agent running.

4) Insider risk + Poor opsec hurting ASIO operations against the Communist Part of Australia.

(From John Blaxland, 'The Protest Years: The Official History of ASIO: 1963-1975'.)

Wow, the anti-Vietnam War organisation, Save Our Sons, had communist links.

Didn’t know that.

Wow, Monash Uni kids really took their opposition to the Vietnam War too far.
Well, when you put it like that.
ASIO following the same Soviet spy with the same Ford Falcon for two years. Oh dear.
ASIO's solution to Soviets intercepting their radio comms - the 'bon bon' machine sending preset coded messages to surveillance officers.
Interesting paradox: ASIO surveillance officers (from its Operational Base Establishment unit) knew the Soviets knew who and where they were, but that also constrained the operational freedom of the Soviets in Canberra. Also, gee whiz, tough work in the OBE.
On one hand, the President of the Oz Seamen's Union enabled the Soviets to find dissidents. On the other hand, a miner met the Soviets as part of a prank with drinking mates.

Dep-Sec Defence not liking DG ASIO had a hand in preventing ASIO from helping institute necessary protective security controls at the 'recently constructed joint US-Australian facilities at Pine Gap and Nurrungar'.

YIKES - talk about office politics hurting Australian/US natsec!

As one can imagine, vetting potential conscripts for the Vietnam War was a _lot_ of work.
Whoa, one of _Abbotsleigh's_ former heads was initially denied a migrant visa to come here in the 1960s because of her reported ties with American and Australian communists.

CNI protection ('key point security') back in the day and the role of ASIO. Over 1,300 assets, especially US installations like the critical USN comms one in WA.

Interesting that ASIO wasn't required to do penetration testing of potential CNI assets (the program was administered by Defence), but ASIO still had a big role in threat assessments for CNI assets and providing protective security advice.

After all, note the threat especially to US facilities in Oz from the Soviets + Vietnam War protests and the greater risks of political violence

--> How relevant that is today as we look at risks of Russian sabotage + Russian/Chinese active measures + 'The normalisation of violent protest and intimidating behaviour' - especially from the Pro-Palestine side - as observed by DG ASIO in his 2025 threat assessment, as well as the repeated (attempted) acts of sabotage by Pro-Palestine entities at ports and DIB sites in FVEY countries.

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