In place of the biological essentialist view of gender, more (nominally) progressive elements have put forward a theory which posits a dichotomy between gender and sex. Gender, it is argued, is socially constructed, something that is performed and enforced by society in accordance with conceptions of “masculinity” and “femininity.”
Sex, on the other hand, is claimed to be “innate,” based on immutable biological factors. This view still upholds an essential “maleness” and “femaleness.” Males have penises, females have vaginas, females develop breasts and the ability to bear children, males do not, or so it goes, but it is acknowledged that gender expression may not be tied to these characteristics in a rigid way.
This conception of sex as being distinct from gender can still be controversial in the popular discourse, but in academia, it is today somewhat mainstream.
While it is in some degree a step forward from older theories, the sex/gender dichotomy still leaves a lot to be desired. In reality, our bodies are quite complex and there is a wide degree of variance from person to person, yet we rigidly categorize our bodies into two classes.
“Sex characteristics” form a continuum, and in order to place bodies in one of two categories, it will be argued that we necessarily make this categorization on the basis of gender conceptions. Both sex and gender are socially constructed, and they are interrelated. At the end of the day, the sex/gender dichotomy is part of patriarchal ideology, and it is an idea that we need to break with in favor of a theory which is revolutionary and Marxist in character.
The purpose of the present article is to provide an initial counter to the idea that sex assignment is “just biology.” A properly Marxist theory of sex will be more thoroughly explored in part two.
[A quick note: what follows holds true for western societies generally, but the process of sex assignment may differ between cultures. The general point to be drawn from this is universal though, i.e. that sex is as socially constructed as gender and the two are fundamentally interrelated.]
The process of sex assignment begins before we are born. Parents hold the assumption that their child will be “one or the other,” and this affects how they will treat any perceived “abnormality” their child exhibits upon birth and throughout the child’s life. Modern ultrasound technology even allows parents the potential to become aware of the child’s genitalia during prenatal development, which of course already solidifies in the parents’ minds what the “sex” of their child will be.
And of course, the parents’ ideas about the sex of their child are fundamentally intertwined with social conceptions of gender.
But one of the most important moments in the sex assignment process happens in the first hours after birth. The case of those considered “intersex” can be illustrative here. Suppose a child is born in a western country who has ovaries on the inside, but a penis on the outside.
Alternatively, suppose a child is born with labia and a vagina, but also with testes (once again, these cases are not so uncommon; intersex individuals account for around 2% of all births, and in some regions of the world this rate is considerably higher).
The first thing that typically happens is that this situation is declared to be a medical emergency.
Think about this for a second. Intersex “conditions” present few if any health risks. There is of course a social stigma associated with any appearance of not fitting rigidly into one of the two sex classes.
Yet there is also a social stigma associated with being gay, and we don’t consider homosexuality a “condition” or a “disorder” that needs to be medically treated. Moreover, the treatments used to “correct” intersex characteristics sometimes carry substantial risks, and the long-term effects they have are still relatively ill-researched.
The motivation behind “correcting” intersex characteristics is thus not one related to the health of the child, it is entirely one of enforcing the sex binary. Any variance from the rigidly defined “male” and “female” classes is an emergency that must be snuffed out as soon as possible.
One thing that the sex/gender dichotomy (to remind ourselves—the idea that gender is socially constructed but sex is “innate”) ostensibly allows for is a theory of what it means to be transgender. The liberal theory is that trans women have “male bodies” but by gender are women, while trans men have “female bodies” but are men by gender.
This view, like the sex/gender dichotomy generally, leaves a lot to be desired. In particular it leaves in tact justifications for transmisogyny—hatred of trans women, the ideological product and justification of the structural oppression of trans women. This is not to imply that trans men face no hardships or that they benefit from the current structure to the same extent cis men do.
However, trans men are often able to largely assimilate into what tends to be called “male privilege” (a topic for another article, perhaps). Thus, we will focus herein primarily on how the sex/gender dichotomy can ideologically justify the oppression of trans women.
the fact that trans women were designated to have “male bodies” at birth is used as ammunition against trans women. It is argued that, because they have “male bodies,” trans women have some sort of structural power over other women. This is, to put it bluntly, a laughable claim in light of all the evidence to the contrary. But this argument has a great deal of sway in our society, in large part because of the widespread notion that sex is innate and immutable.