HardenedBSDThe #HardenedBSD Foundation and The HardenedBSD Project are happy to announce a collaboration with #Protectli to research and develop a censorship- and surveillance-resistant mesh network: https://hardenedbsd.org/article/shawn-webb/2024-09-23/hardenedbsd-and-protectli-collaborates-censorship-and-surveillance
gary@HardenedBSD i support this generally - plaese post gitlab links and updates on progress - also please support forks to help innovation, cooperation, and insights
Shawn WebbForcing all public Internet traffic to go through #Tor via a transparent proxy, certain open source projects will need to remove their prohibition on resolving .onion names.
Transparent proxying opens up the possibility of completely oblivious Tor Onion Service support.
Open source libraries and applications need to permit .onion domain queries by default.
For projects that want to prohibit .onion by default, I would suggest this:
Don't. Provide a facility wherein the end user can optionally block resolution of any TLD or hostname.
For example, one could envision a user wamtomg tp block the .zip TLD. Or another user desiring to block the .onion TLD.
The decision should be left by the user as to what to permit or prohibit.
This is where the @radicle project gets it right.
The #Radicle development team has done a fantastic job at supporting different methods of network access, including explicit support for the ways #Tor might be configured in the operating environment.
I can rest assured that Radicle can be safely deployed in any environment.