@Zoarial94 All of those examples are predicated on making them less practical to abuse than other options.
Zero-trust stuff is usually still readily abusable by physically breaking into places or resorting to various forms of coercion.
Google Pixels have a built-in permanent DoS? That's abusable in itself if you time things and come up with an appropriate scenario.
Android's FDE is broken in a number of ways and that only helps if the device is stolen when off or by an unskilled abuser. I also wouldn't trust any of Apple's crypto without being able to audit their code.
Hardware bypasses are possible, it's also possible to eavesdrop based on accelerometers among other sensors. It is potentially possible to add a film on the phone itself that refracts or otherwise interferes with the light in such a way as to prevent the user from being able to notice without careful inspection.
> Companies also fix vulnerabilities to prevent abuse from bad actors or bad-faith abusers.
That is part of not explicitly giving abusers access.
> These technologies prevent abuse.
Mitigate it at best, enable new forms at worse.
> We need to fight for technology that works in our favor. It's always been a tradeoff between convenience and security, but we can make the line less and less noticeable.
So as I said, we have a choice of its primary use and how effective and safe it is in doing so.
Ultimately most security is sufficient inconvenience of attack.