I was under the impression that RADIUS was some ancient protocol nobody used anymore (I remember it being big in the 90s dialup ISP infrastructure.) But of course it never went away and now it’s deployed for all sorts of decentralized auth: think VPNs and WiFi.
So like all 90s crypto it doesn’t use modern cryptographic methods (which in fairness, barely exists.) Authentication is done with a challenge/response protocol that builds a “MAC” in some ad-hoc way using MD5. An MITM attacker between client and server can forge this.
@matthew_d_green even many cell networks may still use it (less likely and limited networks for that, but still)
and *many* cloud-based hosted AAA + account solutions use it, as used by residential and other ISPs
(Not offhand sure how many do push for encrypted radius but the ones I do know about largely don’t - worth me doing a survey on this sometime I guess)
@SteveSyfuhs @matthew_d_green RADIUS is a lot like HTTP.
It has secure transports (RADIUS/TLS aka RadSec), it offers user authentication directly which you shouldn't use anymore, and it can also encapsulate other secure authentication protocols (aka EAP).
There is nothing wrong with RADIUS/TLS (or /DTLS) + EAP, and it will continue to be used for decades to come.
@SteveSyfuhs @matthew_d_green there should be no TLS-based EAP methods affected by this (and those are the only ones that should be used).
Also, RADIUS/TLS has been standardized since 2012 (sure it's experimental status still, but it is widely implemented and proven interoperable).
@matthew_d_green Different but somewhat related issue: