GrapheneOS not only leverages the same hardware-based security features as the OS but implements major hardware-based features unavailable elsewhere.
Hardware memory tagging for production hardening is an exclusive GrapheneOS feature with a best-in-class implementation.
Our USB-C port and pogo pins control feature does hardware-level attack surface reduction with code written for the drivers on each device:
https://grapheneos.org/features#usb-c-port-and-pogo-pins-control
Our Auditor app leverages the pinning-based hardware attestation available on Pixels based on our proposal for it.
Many of our other features are hardware-based, and some of these exist because of features we proposals or helped to secure against weaknesses.
In April, Pixels shipped reset attack protection for firmware based on our proposal, which is not available on other Android devices.
Our initial response to someone asking about them is here, where we were avoided saying more than necessary:
https://x.com/GrapheneOS/status/1804551479484645421
Unplugged followed up with spin and misinformation about GrapheneOS, which we debunked, and then they doubled down on doing even more of it.
@PiereChangstein @weare_unplugged Where do they make any claim about GrapheneOS? It's an ARMv8.2 MediaTek Dimensity 1200 SoC device running a non-hardened fork of the Android Open Source Project. The hardware/firmware doesn't come close to meeting our security requirements, and it's not a hardened OS.
Since they posted huge tweets, we replied with our own huge tweets with inline quotes of everything they wrote for ease of understanding:
1/2:
@weare_unplugged @PiereChangstein > Our goal was to create a phone where privacy is convenient. Flashing GrapheneOS, however, is not something most consumers can do easily. GrapheneOS is very easy to install via https://t.co/29OBsAOaiI and many companies around the world are selling devices with the OS
@weare_unplugged @PiereChangstein > Here are our responses to continue the conversation. What you've done is push more spin and misrepresentations about an open source project to promote your insecure product marketed based on false privacy and security claims. > Let's agree to disagree. While the web installer
@GrapheneOS I think it's a little harsh to call it "not a good private messaging system". There are precious few messaging services to the standard of Matrix or above that have wide capabillities that come close to many non-private, proprietary messengers.
And the few that tick those boxes have huge difficulties irt self-hosting. And afaik none of them have the variety of clients Matrix has, either.
But perhaps I'n being unfair. Maybe it's more accurate to say that Matrix is a good protocol, but not yet satisfactory as an *absolutely* private messenger.
If *absolutely* private is the goal I would be inclined to suggest something else like Briar or Signal - this much is true.
But I think it's plenty servicable for most peoples' - even tech-interested peoples' - standards of privacy in its current state.
@GrapheneOS Should have led with this and I wouldn't have had to read any further. Anything involving that dbag is automatically suspect on so many levels.
Thanks for all your work.