@andrejbauer @boarders @maxsnew ok that all sounds agreeable... but is there a concrete example I can chew on where "infinite conjunction" disagrees with "universal quantification"? I think that's where my grip on which definitions are being used is weak

@jcreed @boarders @maxsnew

*Internally* ∀ agrees with infima (which is what you probably mean by "infinite conjunction") because that is what the inference rules for ∀ state.

*Externally* there is a difference. Consider Peano arithmetic (PA) and a statement ¬Prf(n, ⌜0=1⌝) stating that n does not encode a PA-proof of 0=1. The statement ∀n.¬Prf(n,⌜0=1⌝) is not probable in PA, as it says that PA is consitent. However, the statements

¬Prf(0, ⌜0=1⌝)
¬Prf(1, ⌜0=1⌝)
¬Prf(2, ⌜0=1⌝)
¬Prf(3, ⌜0=1⌝)
...

are all provable in PA, therefore their infimum is true.

@andrejbauer @maxsnew this all sounds right to me. My whole question here is trying to resolve my curiosity and understand what what @boarders meant by "infinite conjunction" in the classical case, so I have no prior commitment to a definition there. Maybe it is about the external-internal truth distinction, then?
@jcreed @andrejbauer @maxsnew @boarders #RM3 Adjointness is good. Conjunction is adjoint to implication. Although for an infinite conjunction I'm gonna guess it's Both true and false. Like, 3-sat *validity* instead of being 100% true
@jcreed @andrejbauer @maxsnew @boarders In #RM3 or other #paraconsistent logics, True, and also Both true and false, are valid. False is not valid.