ploumJan 24, 2024

When I graduated as an engineer, a friend told me "How do you feel entering a plane when you know that people like us build it".

I’ve worked several years in the automotive industry and saw how software was done there.

When the 737-MAX crashed, I entered into the rabbit-hole and built a really good understanding of the software issue.

The results are:

- I don’t board a boeing plane anymore.
- I avoid cars as much as I can.
- I be sure to recommend cars with the less possible software.

Show threadtntJan 24, 2024
@ploum Watch a bunch of the Mentour Pilot videos .... then you won't want to board airbus either 😅
Show threadploumJan 24, 2024

@tnt : I admit that there’s no particular reason why Airbus would be better.

But the 737-MAX decision to decide to fix the structural imbalance resulting from bigger engines with a software messing with pilot’s control in order to not have to go to the certification process of a new plane is completely criminal.

While everything else I saw in the automotive industry was pure incompetence (to a level that no coder can even imagine)

Show threadMartin JostJan 24, 2024
@ploum @tnt
And then - as far as I understood - use one pivot tube to measure airspeed for that
I always assumed for critical sensors there are (at least) three for a 2 out of 3 majority decision(?)
Show threadHabrokJan 24, 2024
@godot @ploum @tnt This detail to me sounded suspiciously like "if we use more than one sensor, then the system could be viewed as safety-relevant with all the consequences like certification, mandatory pilot training etc., so it's better if we only attach one sensor."
Show threadMartin Jost
@Habrok42 @ploum @tnt This also shows the airspeed to the.pilot. MCAS or not: In my understanding this is security relevant. [But I'm no airplane expert - can someone better on the matter comment?]
Jan 24, 2024 at 7:43pmWeb
Show threadHabrokJan 24, 2024
@godot @ploum @tnt Yes, the pitot tubes and the sensors for the angle of attack are security relevant and therefore redundant sensors are mounted. Autopilot and other systems can use all the sensors and normally indicate if the values of the sensors differ too much so the flight crew can work out which sensor is faulty and should be disabled. But MCAS only used one AoA sensor, trusted this one blindly and could not be switched to another sensor.